Part I — Situation overview

On 23 July 2026, at the government spokesperson’s briefing, Prime Minister Péter Magyar made two interconnected announcements. On the one hand, the government decided on a “full review” of the operation of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ — the institution monitoring state financial management), and on the strengthening of the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV), which would thereafter examine the wealth of politicians and those living in the same household with them. On the other hand, the Ministry of Economy and Energy (the portfolio of István Kapitány) filed four criminal complaints in the Eximbank cases, worth around one thousand billion forints in total. Two of the four are the cases that have attracted the greatest public attention: a 59-billion-forint Sofitel luxury-hotel project linked to the interests of István Tiborcz (on suspicion of misappropriation), and László Szíjj’s African bridge construction — between Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo — supported by 126 billion forints of bond financing, for which the Hungarian state undertook a 101-billion-forint guarantee. The fourth case concerns a North Macedonian loan, a further one an Egyptian railway development.

The story is composed of two threads that are sharply distinct in public-law terms. One is the risk-taking of the state banks and the financing of NER-linked enrichment — this is a legitimate subject of investigation and publicity. The other is the question of authority over the oversight institutions. It is important that the two threads do not slide into one another: the ÁSZ is an oversight body subordinate to the National Assembly and independent of the government (Article 43 of the Fundamental Law); its president is elected by the National Assembly for twelve years, and the government may not instruct it, nor “screen” it, by an executive act. It is no coincidence that the organisation’s own leadership (President László Windisch) reacted thus: the audit office monitors the government, not the other way round. That sentence points precisely to the public-law boundary.

In MIAK’s reading the situation is of a dual nature, and precisely for this reason it is delicate. Uncovering the wealth around NER, which is often opaquely financed, is a legitimate public interest that the new majority has both the right and the duty to serve. Yet the instrument of disclosure cannot be placing an independent oversight institution under government pressure: the system of checks and balances is not a convenience device tailored to the given government, but a constraint equally binding on every government — even when it is inconvenient for the new majority. The character of the problem is thus not the intention to hold to account, but the choice of the institutional path of accountability.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the theoretical frame within which the topic can be interpreted. In their work Why Nations Fail (2012), Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (economists, leading authors of institutional economics; they received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2024) see the key to lasting development in inclusive institutions and in the system of checks and balances — mutual control — which “distributed power fairly broadly” and prevented anyone from abusing it. The book Spin Dictators by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman documents the reverse process: modern autocrats dismantle control not through open violence but through the internal hollowing-out of formally democratic institutions — the co-optation of the courts and the audit office; in the Venezuelan case both the head of the state audit office and the chief prosecutor became supporters of those in power. Elinor Ostrom’s work The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1990) illuminates that credible, mutual monitoring is neither free nor automatic: the value of a legitimate oversight institution stems precisely from the fact that all parties trust its neutrality — this capital of trust can be consumed by a single political act, but rebuilding it takes years. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures which together ensure that accountability is real, but the independence of the institution is not harmed either.

3.1 Statutory reinforcement of the ÁSZ’s independence and steering the review onto a parliamentary track (within 90 days)

Instead of the government’s decision on a “full review”, MIAK proposes that any substantive review concerning the State Audit Office take place exclusively within the competence of the National Assembly, in a public legislative procedure — since the ÁSZ is a body subordinate to the legislature, not to the executive power. The National Assembly may lawfully request a report, amend the ÁSZ Act, and examine the institution’s past practice (for example the legitimate question of the asymmetry of party-financing audits) — but all of this with respect for the mandate of the incumbent president and the operational independence of the institution. In addition, MIAK proposes a statutory institutional-independence guarantee package that protects, in both directions, the budgetary and personnel independence of the ÁSZ, the Constitutional Court, the prosecution service and the ombudsman. This is the practical implementation of programme point A6 (strengthening checks and balances). The aim is not to slow accountability, but to ensure that institutional control works the same way after the next change of government too.

3.2 Full transparency of state banking exposure — the Eximbank cases through the ordinary route (by 2027)

MIAK would make the loan, bond and guarantee undertakings of Eximbank and the other state banks available on public, machine-readable data sheets at project level (beneficiary, amount, extent of state guarantee, risk assessment, performance) — this is the extension to the state banking system of the logic of the A1 public-money dashboard and the G1 data-driven budget, connected to the A8 accountability monitoring. As for the concrete criminal complaints: the clarification of the cases linked to the Tiborcz and Szíjj interests should take place through the ordinary prosecutorial and judicial route, not through a political announcement or tax-authority pressure. This is correct for both a principled and a practical reason: the persons reported are entitled to the presumption of innocence, and proving the case is the task of the independent prosecution service and the courts. The operating principle of the G10 state development bank — transparent, politically independent, performance-based financing — is at the same time the framework for preventing similar risk-taking in the future.

3.3 The NAV strengthening with rule-of-law guarantees, wealth screening on a rules basis (by 2027)

The aim of screening politicians’ wealth is legitimate, but the instrument must be paired with rule-of-law guarantees: the NAV’s extended powers should be exercised subject to judicial control, proportionality and purpose limitation, and must not become a discretionary, occasionally political crosshair. MIAK proposes that the basis of wealth monitoring be a machine-readable, comparable asset-declaration system applying equally to everyone (A3), one that performs automatic cross-checks against the real-estate and company registers — so that the procedure does not depend on whom the authority happens to be looking at, but runs by rule, identically for everyone. The uncovering of abuses should be complemented by a protected, anonymous whistleblowing system (A5).

The three proposals are bound together by a single principle: the symmetry of checks and balances. Accountability is credible if it depends not on government convenience but on rules and independent institutions — and if the same constraint binds today’s majority that we would also expect of the next. This is the institutional framework that the literature foundation (see 6.4 Literature in detail) theoretically underpins.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Economy Transparency of state banking exposure reduces hidden risk-taking and the accumulation of unbacked guarantees Too rapid, litigation-driven screening may in the short term create uncertainty among the state banks’ partners
Rule of law Statutory anchoring of the ÁSZ’s independence sets a precedent: the oversight institution stays stable at every change of government If the review nonetheless takes place through the executive route, it weakens the system of checks and balances — in both directions
Society Rules-based wealth screening applied equally to everyone strengthens public trust in accountability Targeted, discretionary screening may create the perception of “the victor’s revenge”, which erodes legitimacy

The main deliberative question is the tension between the speed of accountability and the durability of institutional independence. The proposal works if the energy of accountability is channelled onto the ordinary prosecutorial-judicial route and onto public data — and it tips into risk if, for the sake of short-term political gain, the executive power reaches directly for the oversight institutions. The lesson of Spin Dictators is precisely that this reaching usually begins with a well-intentioned, “clean-up” justification — the difference between the democratic and the non-democratic route is not the goal but the instrument.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed performance indicators)

It is proposed that the following performance indicators (KPIs, in English Key Performance Indicator) be tracked over 12–24 months:

  • The share of the state banks’ (Eximbank and its peers’) new bond and guarantee undertakings that have a public, machine-readable project data sheet: target 100% by 2027.
  • Every step affecting the ÁSZ’s operational independence should take place through the parliamentary (legislative) route — the number of interventions ordered by executive act: target zero.
  • The share of the NAV’s extended wealth screenings that are subject to judicial authorisation and based on a documented proportionality test: target the whole set.
  • The share of the Eximbank complaints that turn into a substantive, independent prosecutorial investigation, and their turnaround time.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: accountability is strong if it depends not on the power situation but on the rule and the independent institution. MIAK asks the decision-maker to direct the legitimate energy of uncovering NER wealth onto the ordinary prosecutorial-judicial route and onto public data on public money, and to leave the review of the State Audit Office within the competence of the National Assembly — with respect for the independence of the incumbent institution. This approach moves two MIAK foundational values together: accountability, because it makes the path of public money visible to everyone and challengeable before a court, and transparency, because it places state banking exposure and asset relations under rules-based, machine-readable publicity. These two are decisive precisely here because the stake of the topic is not the outcome of a single case, but whether the system of control works the same way under the next government too.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The public-affairs-left-liberal band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu, 24.hu) placed the emphasis on the public-law boundary. Telex highlighted the key sentence of the ÁSZ statement (“The ÁSZ monitors the government, not the government the ÁSZ”), HVG focused on the reaction (“Péter Magyar and his people would review the operation of the State Audit Office, whereupon the organisation signalled: it does not work like that”), as well as on the state banks’ 126-billion, pre-election risk-taking. The 24.hu explored the details of the complaints — the four cases, around one thousand billion forints in total — most meticulously, while 444.hu summarised the announcement package (NAV strengthening, ÁSZ screening, Eximbank complaints). This band considered the uncovering of NER wealth legitimate, but several outlets signalled the public-law problematic nature of screening the ÁSZ.

The economic band (Portfolio) approached most of all from the angle of the institutional conflict: the headline “This is how the Tisza government goes after the State Audit Office” placed the clash between the government and the oversight institution at the centre, highlighting that screening the ÁSZ is an unusual and, in public-law terms, contestable step.

The conservative-pro-government band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) did not feature a prominent article on the topic in MIAK’s press-monitor source selection that day; the expected framing is the narrative of political revenge against an independent institution. For MIAK it is important that this frame — precisely because it comes from the opposite side — draws attention to the same real public-law risk that the present analysis also places at its centre: the executive power may not reach directly for the oversight bodies.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Number of Eximbank complaints / total value 4 cases / ~1000 billion HUF Ministry of Economy and Energy, 24.hu 23 July 2026
Tiborcz-linked Sofitel project 59 billion HUF 24.hu 23 July 2026
Szíjj project (Zambia–Congo bridge) bond financing 126 billion HUF 24.hu 23 July 2026
of which Hungarian state guarantee 101 billion HUF 24.hu 23 July 2026
North Macedonian free-use loan 1 billion EUR (~360 billion HUF) 24.hu 23 July 2026
Hungary WGI 2024 — control of corruption −0.17 World Bank WGI 2024
Hungary WGI 2024 — rule of law +0.35 World Bank WGI 2024

The public-law status of the ÁSZ: an oversight body subordinate to the National Assembly and independent of the government (Article 43 of the Fundamental Law); its president is elected by the National Assembly for twelve years. The ÁSZ is an oversight body, not one with binding power: it makes findings and submits reports to the National Assembly; actual holding to account (political or criminal) is the competence of the National Assembly, and of the prosecution service and the courts.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the strengthening of checks and balances, the public-money dashboard, the publicity of asset declarations and the protected whistleblowing system form the backbone of the proposal;
  • Economy (programme points) — transparency of state banking exposure and the data-driven budget are the framework for the future handling of Eximbank-type risk-taking;
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the rotation of officials in corruption-risk areas and efficiency measurement strengthen the institutional background of accountability.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Acemoglu and Robinson: Why Nations Fail

In explaining lasting development, Acemoglu and Robinson place inclusive political institutions and the sharing of power at the centre. Through the example of the Roman Republic they show that the institutions were designed so that no one could consolidate power alone:

“The institutions of the Republic operated a system of checks and balances, that is of mutual control, which distributed power fairly broadly.”

According to the authors, the countries that grew rich were those in which “the government was accountable and felt responsible for its citizens”. In the case of the ÁSZ dispute this means: the value of the system of mutual control lies precisely in the fact that the oversight institution operates independently of the government of the day — if this independence can be reshaped according to the power situation, the system loses the property that produces lasting development.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu–James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

6.4.2 Guriev and Treisman: Spin Dictators

Guriev and Treisman describe the working of modern, “soft” autocracies, which dismantle control not through open violence but through the internal hollowing-out of formally democratic institutions:

“Modern autocrats manipulate elections, dismantle the system of checks and balances, rewrite constitutions and fill the courts with loyal henchmen.”

The book also shows the pattern concretely on the example of Venezuela: by 2006 “both the head of the state audit office and the chief prosecutor” had become supporters of those in power. In interpreting the Hungarian situation this is the most important warning — not because the new government would show such an intention, but because direct executive control over the independent oversight bodies (audit office, prosecution service) is exactly the step that marks the dividing line between the democratic and the non-democratic route. The lesson is symmetrical: it applies to every government.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev–Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

6.4.3 Ostrom: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Examining the conditions of the self-organising management of common resources, Ostrom shows that credible, mutual monitoring is one of the central problems of stable institutions — it is not automatic, and it is not free. The assumption of perfect and costless monitoring by an external authority is unrealistic; in reality monitoring works if those concerned trust the neutrality and credibility of the system. The value of the ÁSZ as a neutral oversight institution stems precisely from this accumulated capital of trust: the findings of a neutral auditor are accepted by all parties. If the institution becomes a function of the government’s will, this capital of trust is used up — and according to Ostrom’s analysis, rebuilding such institutional trust is a slow and costly process.

📖 Source: Elinor Ostrom: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

6.5 International comparison

The international yardstick of audit-office independence is INTOSAI’s (the international organisation of supreme audit institutions) Lima and Mexico Declarations, which regard organisational, financial and personnel independence as the precondition of effective public-finance oversight. The Venezuela case treated in 6.4 is the negative pattern of this: the co-optation of oversight institutions is one of the most characteristic steps of democratic backsliding. As a positive counter-example, Estonian and Scandinavian practice shows that strong, statutorily anchored institutional independence and broad publicity together ensure the credibility of audit-office work — regardless of which political force happens to be in government.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency
  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations
  • A5 — Whistleblowing system
  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office

Economy

  • G1 — Data-driven budget
  • G10 — State development bank
  • G19 — Radical transparency in economic decision-making

Public administration and e-government

  • KI7 — Official selection and rotation system
  • KI8 — Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration

Proposed new programme point: The exposure data sheet of the state banks — a public, machine-readable project data sheet for every state banking loan, bond and guarantee undertaking — for the Economy and the Transparency and anti-corruption policy areas.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 24 July 2026 — top-10 topics):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu–James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail
  • 📖 Sergei Guriev–Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators
  • 📖 Elinor Ostrom: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Note: the local file path of the book does NOT appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G1)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points)
  • MIAK press monitor, 24 July 2026 — topic 3, score: 83/100

Additional public data sources:

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024 — Hungary’s governance-quality indicators
  • Article 43 of the Fundamental Law — the public-law status of the State Audit Office

Generation metadata