Part I — Situation overview

On 15 July 2026, former minister of foreign affairs and trade Péter Szijjártó announced that he is resigning his parliamentary mandate because he will become the executive responsible for external relations and new business lines at the Chinese BYD group. The news travelled across the entire domestic press spectrum — 24.hu, Telex, HVG, 444.hu, Portfolio, ATV, Magyar Nemzet and Mandiner all carried it on their front pages. According to the reporting of Telex and 24.hu, BYD’s Hungarian expansion — from the Komárom bus factory to the Szeged passenger-car plant — was assisted by tens of billions of forints in state subsidies during Szijjártó’s ministership, and the National Investment Agency (HIPA), responsible for investment promotion, also belonged to his portfolio. Fidesz framed the move as a success, prime minister Péter Magyar raised legal and moral concerns, while Miklós Ligeti, legal director of Transparency International Hungary, drew attention to the fact that no post-employment restriction whatsoever applies to former ministers and MPs today.

The story is not without precedent: according to Telex, Szijjártó is not the only former Hungarian diplomat who has signed with a Chinese-backed company — former foreign-service officials can be found in the management of CATL, Semcorp and the CCTA as well. MIAK therefore reads the news not as a personnel affair but as a system fault: Hungary has no mandatory waiting period (in international parlance a cooling-off period) between a position of public power and a job at a company that received state subsidy within the official’s decision-making remit. Szijjártó’s move is not unlawful under the law in force — and precisely that is the problem. What is visible here is a textbook case of the revolving-door phenomenon (the unregulated passage between public power and the private sector), whose treatment is an institutional question independent of parties.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor at Yale University, a leading researcher of the economics of corruption), in her Corruption and Government, names post-government employment as the hardest point of corruption regulation: the official is often hired by the very company with which they stood in business contact during their term — which is why the American rules prescribe a two-year representation ban. The formula of Robert Klitgaard (former professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, a classic of corruption research) — corruption = monopoly + discretion − accountability — is the diagnosis of the individual-government-decision subsidy system: where a single ministry distributes public money with exclusive discretion and ex-post control is weak, the system is vulnerable regardless of the actors’ intentions. And On China by Henry Kissinger (American diplomat, former secretary of state) shows that the Chinese state-business entanglement is not incidental but strategic logic — for the host country the relationship therefore requires risk analysis, not isolation. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures for regulating the revolving-door phenomenon.

3.1 Writing a mandatory cooling-off period into law (within 12 months)

The National Assembly should adopt a conflict-of-interest act prescribing, for ministers, state secretaries and senior officials taking part in subsidy decisions, a cooling-off period of 18–24 months before taking employment at companies that won state subsidy, a concession or high-value public procurement within the official’s decision-making remit. The model is at hand: former European commissioners are subject to a two-year (the former president to a three-year) notification and scrutiny obligation, and the OECD’s 2010 recommendation expressly asks member states to regulate post-public-service employment. In the Klitgaard frame (see 6.4.2) this strengthens the accountability term of the formula. The ban is not a general ban on employment: it must be proportionate to the position held and to the decision-making involvement — the aim is not punishment, but that the suspicion of a link between the official decision and the later job cannot even arise.

3.2 A public lobby register and the publication of decision-makers’ calendars (within 24 months)

The lobby register under MIAK programme point A4 would record who consulted with whom, when, and on what matter — the advocacy entries of ministerial and state-secretary calendars would be public. One lesson of the affair that has just erupted is precisely that large investor negotiations proceed undocumented today: it cannot be reconstructed afterwards when the possibility of a job offer first arose. On the model of the Irish Lobbying Act (2015) the system is workable: there, alongside more than 2,200 registered lobbyists, GRECO (the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption body) rated the regulation as good practice. As a complement to the economic-diplomacy programme point KP8, a code of ethics would separate investment promotion from personal advocacy.

3.3 An ex-post conflict-of-interest audit of large subsidy decisions (by the end of 2027)

Subsidies awarded by individual government decision (EKD) — 550 billion forints in 2025 in this form alone, according to the figure cited by 24.hu — should receive a mandatory, public ex-post audit: were the promised jobs created, and which of the officials in the decision chain later took a job at the beneficiary company or within its sphere of interest. For Chinese investments this should be complemented by the four-dimensional risk analysis under KP21 — not out of hostility to China but out of risk awareness: Germany’s China-Strategie (2023) follows the same logic. The audit’s results would feed into the annual Regulatory Capture Report of the programme against rent-seeking (G6).

The common principle of the three proposals: trust is created not by declarations but by institutions. The Rose-Ackerman lesson is that regulating post-mandate employment does not rest on the honesty of the individual — a good rule protects precisely by ensuring that it does not have to rest on individual honesty.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Public integrity The suspicion of linking a subsidy decision with a later job can be institutionally excluded; the credibility of decisions grows If the ban is too broad, the rule disproportionately restricts the constitutional right to work
Economy A more predictable, person-independent decision environment for investors; the EKD system becomes more disciplined The pool of experts may narrow: the private sector attracts experienced officials less easily if switching is restricted
External relations Chinese (and every foreign) investor relations move into a more transparent frame; exposure to influence-seeking falls The tightening may create short-term tension with the large investors already settled

The main question of judgement is proportionality: if the cooling-off period is too long or covers too wide a circle, public service loses its appeal, and the rule incentivises circumvention (consultancy contracts, indirect employment). That is why the ban must be tied to actual decision-making involvement, and — on the EU-commissioner model — to examination by an independent ethics body, not to automatic prohibition. The other risk is selective application: if the rule is applied only to political opponents, the institution’s credibility is lost at once. The cooling-off period works if it applies without exception, equally to the officials of every government.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following key performance indicators (KPIs):

  • Within 12 months: submission and adoption of the bill on the cooling-off period; publication of the list of positions covered by the rule.
  • Within 24 months: a working lobby register with at least 500 registered organisations; publicity of the advocacy entries of ministerial calendars.
  • By the end of 2027: a public ex-post audit of 100% of EKD subsidies above 5 billion forints; an annual, public account of post-mandate placements.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks the National Assembly and the government to close the Szijjártó affair not as a personnel scandal but as a legislative task: the bill on the cooling-off period and the lobby register should come before the National Assembly still in this parliamentary term, in its first year. The proposal connects directly to two MIAK foundational values: to transparency — because the boundary between decisions of public power and private interest can only be drawn with documented, public procedures —, and to being non-ideological — because the revolving-door rule is not aimed at one party: it will bind the officials of the present and of every later government just as it does those of the previous one. Whoever criticises the phenomenon from opposition today must accept the same yardstick in government tomorrow.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal band chose the frame of public money flowing back: Telex (“Szijjártó’s ministry generously subsidised BYD, and the company is now repaying him”) suggests a cause-and-effect link between the subsidies and the job, and in a separate article widens the pattern to the other former diplomats; HVG reinforces the same frame with its headline “BYD repays tens of billions of forints of public money”; 444.hu highlights the intra-party dimension (Szijjártó consulted twice with Orbán about his resignation).

The public-affairs band is more fact-reporting: 24.hu carries, alongside the announcement, the expert assessment of Transparency International’s legal director (“no restrictive regulation whatsoever applies to former ministers”) and quotes the revolving-door chapter of the White Book; ATV focuses on the circumstances of the announcement (the politician had already been seen at BYD’s Budapest headquarters). Portfolio, in an economic frame, relays the reaction of Péter Magyar, who voiced moral and legal concerns.

The pro-government-conservative band frames it as a success story: Magyar Nemzet puts Viktor Orbán’s assessment in its headline (“The transfer of the summer is BYD’s”), while Mandiner uses the frame of “failing upwards” — according to its commentary the new post is more influential even than the foreign ministership, and the paper projects, as a consequence of the MPs’ term limit, a big-company pull effect. It is noteworthy that no band disputes the absence of conflict-of-interest regulation — the difference lies in whether they frame the transfer as a problem or as a success.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Job-creation subsidy of BYD’s Komárom bus factory 925 m HUF HVG, 15 July 2026
Total of individual-government-decision (EKD) subsidies in 2025 ~550 bn HUF 24.hu, 15 July 2026
Planned longer-term capacity of the Szeged BYD plant ~300 thousand cars per year 24.hu, 15 July 2026
Foreign direct investment arriving from China in 2022 1,600+ bn HUF Telex, 15 July 2026
Cooling-off period of EU commissioners (code of conduct) 2 years (3 for the president) European Commission code of conduct (2018)
Hungary’s governance indicator — control of corruption (2024) −0.17 World Bank WGI 2024
Registered lobbyists in Ireland under the Lobbying Act 2,200+ GRECO assessment, Irish lobby register

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — revolving-door regulation and lobby register (A4), publicity of asset declarations (A3), independent investigative capacity (A10);
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — China analysis framework (KP21), separating economic diplomacy from private interest (KP8);
  • Economy (programme points) — programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture, including the regulatory revolving-door ban (G6);
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — official selection and rotation, asset-proportionality checks (KI7).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

In her international comparison of public-service conflict-of-interest regulation, Rose-Ackerman concludes that the hardest field to enforce is precisely job-seeking: the open, immediate exchange of favours (quid pro quo) is well controlled in the United States, yet officials are often hired, after their departure, by the companies that stood in business contact with them during their term of office. The American rule therefore prescribes a two-year ban on representation before the former employing authority, and the Clinton administration asked senior officials for a five-year undertaking; the French restrictions on post-public-service employment, by contrast, the author finds weakly enforced — the rule alone is thus not enough, working oversight must stand behind it. Translated to the Hungarian situation: here even the weakly enforced rule is currently missing — no cooling-off period whatsoever applies to former members of government, that is, not even the most elementary line of defence has been built.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

According to Klitgaard’s famous formula, corruption risk accumulates where monopoly position and wide discretionary power meet weak accountability. The individual-government-decision subsidy system is implicated in all three factors: the decision was concentrated in the hands of a single ministry (monopoly), the discretion in awarding the subsidy is broad (discretion), and ex-post, public performance control is haphazard (accountability deficit). The author’s case studies — the Hong Kong and Singapore anti-corruption agencies — show that systemic risk can be treated with systemic counterweights: a register, mandatory asset declaration, ex-post audit. In this frame the BYD affair is not proven abuse but a symptom of missing controls: the system today does not even make it possible to demonstrate that everything happened by the rules.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.3 Henry Kissinger: On China

According to Kissinger’s analysis, Chinese strategic culture builds on long-term, gradual position-building — seen from China, an economic relationship is never purely business but part of the wider state strategy, in which the boundary between state and corporate interest blurs. For the host country it follows not that Chinese investment is to be avoided, but that the relationship must be handled with deliberate, documented risk analysis: who negotiates with what mandate, and what personal interests may arise. The pattern of Hungarian diplomats signing with Chinese companies, uncovered by Telex, is in this frame not a series of individual career decisions but an exposure signal, to which the institutional analysis under KP21 is the answer.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: On China

6.5 International comparison

The European Commission’s code of conduct prescribes a two-year (for the president, three-year) notification obligation for former commissioners: every planned employment must be notified to the college, which decides on the basis of the opinion of an independent ethics committee — the system thus does not prohibit automatically but scrutinises. The OECD’s 2010 recommendation on post-public-service employment asks member states for the targeted regulation of risky transitions (regulator → regulated, subsidiser → subsidised). Ireland’s lobbying act (2015) institutionalised the principle of the “legislative footprint”; France entrusted the prior examination of former officials’ moves to the independent transparency authority HATVP. In Canada a two-year general cooling-off period applies to former ministers. The common element: everywhere the rule is tied to decision-making involvement and applied by an independent body — these are the two elements missing from Hungarian law today.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A4 — Lobby register
  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office

Foreign policy

  • KP21 — Four-dimensional China analysis framework
  • KP8 — Economic diplomacy integration

Economy

  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture

Public administration and e-government

  • KI7 — Official selection and rotation system

Proposed new programme point: Mandatory cooling-off period for the post-mandate employment of holders of public power — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 16 July 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: On China

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A4, A3, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP21, KP8)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G6)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI7)
  • MIAK press monitor, 16 July 2026 — topic 1, score: 90/100

Additional public data sources:

  • OECD: Post-Public Employment — Good Practices for Preventing Conflict of Interest (2010)
  • European Commission: code of conduct for commissioners (2018)
  • Transparency International Hungary: White Book — Is There a Way Out of Systemic Corruption? (Fehér Könyv)
  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024

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