Part I — Situation overview

On 16 July 2026 the cases of two emblematic state IT projects turned to the criminal-law phase at once. The Integrity Authority (the office created in 2022 to examine the use of EU funds) closed an interim report on its examination of certain procurements of the Gondosóra programme, and according to its statement “on the basis of the circumstances uncovered in the report, the Authority has filed a criminal complaint against an unknown perpetrator on suspicion of several criminal offences”; in addition it is initiating an irregularity procedure at the managing authority. On the same day Zoltán Tanács, minister for science and technology, announced at the government spokesperson’s briefing: following the screening conducted at his ministry, the government has filed a forty-page criminal complaint in the case of the operators of the school KRÉTA system and further state software (Neptun, Poszeidon, EKEIDR) — among the suspected offences raised are mismanagement of assets, abuse of office, competition-restricting agreement and budget fraud. According to the minister, more than 100 billion forints have been paid out for the affected systems since 2019; considering the full corporate-group circle it is “a 300-400-billion topic”, and in the months before the elections contracts worth nearly 20 billion forints were concluded; Prime Minister Péter Magyar spoke at the briefing of companies belonging to the interest sphere of Zoltán Fauszt and former minister László Palkovics.

The prehistory and structure of the two cases is strikingly similar. Gondosóra was launched by the previous government in 2022: the programme runs on some 105 billion forints of non-repayable EU support, with 108.78 billion forints of eligible total cost, charged to the recovery fund (RRF — the EU’s post-pandemic reconstruction programme); the service is provided by 4iG; the pricing and intermediary chain of the procurement of the one and a half million devices has been disputed for years by independent MP Ákos Hadházy — in 2024 he also turned to the EU anti-fraud office (OLAF) —, and pro-government campaign messages appeared repeatedly on the devices. In the case of KRÉTA and its companions, by the minister’s diagnosis competition was extinguished by government decisions: the systems were made compulsory, the source code, the professional knowledge and the operation are not in state hands, and the state has no substantive control point. It is important to fix: a criminal complaint is neither an indictment nor a judgment — the investigating authority decides on the investigation, the prosecution service on indictment, a court on guilt; those affected are entitled to the presumption of innocence. The government, meanwhile — according to the social affairs ministry’s communication — is reviewing and redesigning the Gondosóra programme.

MIAK’s reading: the two criminal complaints are not two separate scandals but two symptoms of the same procurement model error — the structure of single-supplier, non-competed, made-compulsory state IT produces the exposure, regardless of what the court finally establishes in the individual cases.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. Controlling Corruption by Robert Klitgaard (a classic of corruption research, former professor of the Harvard Kennedy School) condenses the diagnosis into the famous formula: corruption flourishes where monopoly and broad discretion meet a lack of accountability (C = M + D − A) — single-supplier, made-compulsory state software maximises all three terms of the formula. Corruption and Government by Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor of law and political science at Yale University, pioneer of the economics of corruption) typologises the mechanisms of procurement corruption — among them the case where the tender’s specification is tailored so that a single company remains an eligible supplier —, and shows that abuse around large state contracts damages the budget and service quality at the same time. And The Innovator’s Dilemma by Clayton M. Christensen (innovation-research professor of Harvard Business School) illuminates the lock-in from the market side: the incumbent supplier’s positional advantage becomes self-sustaining from the existing customer relationships, entrants are crowded out — with a state monopoly customer this lock-in effect (in the English literature vendor lock-in) is even stronger, because the possibility of switching also disappears. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures.

3.1 A service-continuity guarantee for the duration of the investigations (immediately, with a public undertaking)

The government and the affected ministries should make a public service-continuity undertaking: the emergency-call function of Gondosóra and the basic educational-administration functions of KRÉTA operate without interruption during the whole period of the investigations and the redesign, and those affected — several hundred thousand elderly users, and the schools and families — are informed of every change in advance, comprehensibly. A condition of the credibility of accountability is that its price not be paid by the elderly person or the schoolchild: in the case of Gondosóra the goal is the service’s targeted, cheaper successor (SZ1), not the loss of the service. The continuity plan should also cover the fate of the data (who holds them, who may access them, what happens on a change of provider) — this is the application of the D2 open-data and auditability principle.

3.2 A multi-supplier, open successor model for the state base systems (successor-model plan within 6 months)

The science and technology ministry should prepare a successor-model plan for the compulsory state base systems (school administration, higher-education study records, document management): state-owned source code or an open-source base, documented data structures and interfaces, and modular, multi-supplier operation, so that the loss or replacement of a single supplier does not endanger operation. This is the institutional antidote to the Christensenian lock-in mechanism (see 6.4.3), and the direct application of the D6 procurement innovation quota programme point: a fixed share of state IT procurements should open to small and medium-sized enterprises, so that in the coming decade there is someone to ask for a bid. In the language of the Klitgaard formula (see 6.4.1): dismantling the monopoly (M) is the most effective anti-corruption intervention — more effective than any subsequent punishment.

3.3 A public single-bid monitor and a procurement red-flag system (first quarterly report by the end of 2026)

The government should publish quarterly the single-bid share of state procurements, broken down by ministry and by value band, supplemented with automatic risk flags (recurring winner, suspected specification tailoring, an intermediary chain, a pre-election contracting peak). The single-bid share is an indicator tracked in EU comparison too, in which Hungary stood durably among the worst — its reduction is in itself a measurable fall in corruption risk. This is the working form of the A2 public-procurement transparency programme point, the practical detector of the Rose-Ackermanian specification-tailoring typology (see 6.4.2), and the natural module of the A1 public-money dashboard. The Integrity Authority’s investigative experience — which is now also an important test of the institution’s functionality — should be built into the design of the future independent corruption-investigation institutional system (A10).

The common principle of the three proposals: accountability becomes an institution if, besides uncovering the cases of the past, it also transforms the procurement structure of the future — the fate of the criminal complaints is decided by the investigating authority, the prosecution service and finally the court, but the model change is the business of the government and the National Assembly.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Public finances Dismantling the single-supplier dependence brings price competition and better quality in the medium term; the EU financial-correction risk falls The irregularity procedure may entail repayment of EU funds — the cost is ultimately borne by the budget if the civil-law enforcement of claims is missed
Service security The continuity guarantee protects the elderly users and the schools during the transition With a drawn-out investigation plus a supplier conflict, the systems’ maintenance may deteriorate — a plan is needed for the supplier-side “walk-out” scenario
Political culture The Integrity Authority’s successful action is a precedent: even an institution created under the NER can work — the institution matters, not the label If accountability becomes a communications campaign, procedural cleanliness is damaged; the presumption of innocence and the order of fact-finding are not interchangeable

The main dilemma stretches between speed and lawfulness: the public expects fast and spectacular accountability, but criminal proceedings are long and their outcome open — if political communication treats the cases as foregone conclusions, that discredits the later judgments too, and makes even the justified accusations attackable. The other tipping point is continuity: Gondosóra serves several hundred thousand elderly people — the redesign is successful if the user feels nothing of it, only the budget does.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking four key performance indicators (KPIs):

  • Service continuity: the availability of the Gondosóra emergency call should remain complete during the investigation period too; KRÉTA should work without disruption at the start of the school year.
  • Successor model: the successor-model plan of the compulsory state base systems public within 6 months; the concept of Gondosóra’s redesigned, cheaper continuation ready before the 31 December 2026 close of the EU financing.
  • Single-bid share: appearance of the first quarterly single-bid monitor by the end of 2026; a measurable fall in the share in 2027.
  • Procedural progress: publication of the Integrity Authority’s closing report; regular information — respecting the presumption of innocence — on the state of the proceedings launched upon the criminal complaints.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks the government to treat the two criminal complaints not as an endpoint but as a starting point: an immediate service-continuity undertaking towards the affected elderly and schools, within six months a multi-supplier successor-model plan for the compulsory state systems, and a quarterly public single-bid monitor — so that the state IT of the coming decade does not reproduce the structure of the present cases.

Two MIAK foundational values are at stake in the case. Transparency is here a preventive force: public procurement data and open, auditable systems narrow the space for abuse from the outset — it is cheaper to make corruption visible than to punish it afterwards. Accountability, in turn, is two-directional: it applies to the contracts of the past — independently of party affiliation, with a single yardstick —, and it applies to the present government’s own procurements too, which the same monitor must measure.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal band framed from the direction of suspected systemic abuse: 444.hu embedded the Integrity Authority’s statement in the Gondosóra case’s multi-year prehistory — Ákos Hadházy’s criminal complaints, the dispute over the Dubai intermediary chain and the per-device pricing, and the pro-government campaign running on the devices —, while HVG put the fact of the authority’s investigation in its headline (the article was not publicly downloadable). The public-affairs band emphasised government action: Telex made news of the social affairs ministry’s “we are reviewing and redesigning” answer, 24.hu treated the case in the frame of the screening and rethinking, together with the programme’s financing data, and ATV, based on the government spokesperson’s briefing, presented the details of the KRÉTA complaint — the six suspected offences and the corporate-group involvement. Népszava highlighted that the operator had earlier not feared the screening (headline-level reference only). The pro-government-conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) did not put the topic into front-page focus on the day examined — the framing asymmetry is itself telling: the case of state IT procurements currently fits into one side’s accountability narrative, while the procurement model error is a party-neutral lesson valid for every future government.

6.2 Facts and data

Indicator Value Source
Gondosóra — EU support ~105 billion HUF (RRF, non-repayable) 24.hu summary
Gondosóra — eligible total cost 108.78 billion HUF 24.hu summary
Gondosóra — devices procured ~1.5 million press reports (Hadházy documents)
Gondosóra — end of EU financing 31 December 2026 24.hu summary
KRÉTA and companion systems — payments since 2019 100+ billion HUF Zoltán Tanács, government spokesperson’s briefing
Full corporate-group circle by the minister’s estimate “a 300-400-billion topic” Zoltán Tanács, government spokesperson’s briefing
Contracts concluded in the months before the elections ~20 billion HUF Zoltán Tanács, government spokesperson’s briefing
Size of the KRÉTA complaint, suspected offences 40 pages; mismanagement of assets, abuse of office, competition-restricting agreement, budget fraud, corruption and data-protection offences ATV report

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — public-procurement transparency and risk flagging (A2), public-money dashboard (A1), independent corruption-investigation institutional system (A10);
  • Digitalisation and AI regulation (programme points) — procurement innovation quota, breaking the lock-in effect (D6), open data and auditable state systems (D2);
  • Public administration and e-government (background) — the operating model of the state base systems, one-stop digital administration (KI1);
  • Social policy (programme points) — the targeted, cheaper successor of Gondosóra’s elderly-protection function (SZ1).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

By Klitgaard’s stylised formula, illicit behaviour flourishes where the agent holds a monopoly over his clients, possesses broad discretion, and his accountability towards the principal is weak — corruption = monopoly + discretion − accountability. An important refinement of the book is that rules in themselves are neither good nor bad: a rule can create a monopoly (and with it corrupt terrain), but it can also reduce discretion and ease accountability. Translated to Hungarian state IT procurements: when a government decision makes a system compulsory and excludes competition, the rule itself builds up the “M” and “D” terms of the formula — the present criminal complaints are ex-post replenishments of the “A” term, but the lasting solution is the prevention of the monopoly, not merely its belated dismantling.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman describes four typical mechanisms of corruption around large state contracts: one can pay for getting onto the pre-qualification list, for insider information, for the tailoring of the tender specification — so that only the paying company remains an eligible supplier —, and for the selection of the winner itself. Her conclusion is that top-level corruption distorts government operation in its structure: the state pays too much for procurements, bad projects are born, and the companies guarding their monopoly position with bribery consume the market efficiency gains as well. In the Gondosóra and KRÉTA cases it is the courts’ job to establish whether a criminal offence occurred — the Rose-Ackermanian typology, however, is a compass regardless: specification tailoring and the intermediary chain are precisely the patterns that the quarterly risk-flagging monitor proposed by MIAK must filter out automatically.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 Clayton M. Christensen: The Innovator’s Dilemma

In the foundational work of the theory of disruptive innovation, Christensen shows that the advantage of incumbent, established firms stems from existing customer relationships and the proven value network — and that this advantage becomes a trap over time, because the incumbents optimise for the needs of their existing customers while new entrants break in from the underserved segments. With a state monopoly customer the mechanism is more distorted: if the customer itself excludes the entrants — with a made-compulsory system, with non-competed extensions —, then the last channel of market correction also disappears, and the incumbent supplier’s position depends not on its performance but on its access. The innovation quota of the D6 programme point reverses this logic: opening a fixed share of procurements to small and medium-sized enterprises artificially reopens the entry channel that the single-supplier model closed.

📖 Source: Clayton M. Christensen: The Innovator’s Dilemma

6.5 International comparison

Working models exist for the multi-supplier, open model of state base systems: Estonia’s state digital infrastructure (the X-Road data-exchange layer) is open source, with documented interfaces, so the suppliers of the individual sectoral systems can be replaced without touching the backbone; the procurement framework (G-Cloud) of the United Kingdom’s Government Digital Service (GDS) expressly eases the entry of small suppliers with short, modular contracts. The share of single-bid procurements is measured per member state by the European Commission’s Single Market Scoreboard — Hungary has ranked regularly among the EU’s laggards on this indicator over the past decade, which was also a recurring item in the conditionality disputes over cohesion funds. The lesson: reducing the single-bid share is not only corruption prevention — it is also an EU fund-access and price-competition question.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency
  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office

Digitalisation and AI regulation

  • D6 — Public-procurement innovation quota
  • D2 — Open-data programme

Social policy

  • SZ1 — Targeted support

Proposed new programme point: A multi-supplier, open successor model for state base systems (source-code ownership, service-continuity guarantee) — for the Digitalisation and AI regulation area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 17 July 2026 — topic 7):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Clayton M. Christensen: The Innovator’s Dilemma

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A2, A1, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Digitalisation and AI regulation (programme points; programme point ID: D6, D2)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point ID: SZ1)
  • MIAK press monitor, 17 July 2026 — topic 7, score: 79/100

Additional public data sources:

  • EKR — the database of the electronic public-procurement system
  • The Integrity Authority’s statements and annual report
  • EC Single Market Scoreboard — single-bid procurement share (single bidding)
  • EC RRF Scoreboard — the financing frame of the Gondosóra programme

Generation metadata