Part I — Situation overview

On 12 July 2026, Vitézy Dávid, minister for transport and investment, published the financial data of the concession arrangement under which the Hungarian state entrusted the operation and development of the expressway network to a private company through a 35-year contract. According to the published data, over the past four years the ministry disbursed a total of 1024 billion forints to the concession-holder, yet the technical content actually spent on the network from this — asphalting on certain sections, and the start of the widening of the M1 motorway to three lanes — does not even reach half of the sum paid out (MIAK press monitor, 13 July 2026; Portfolio, 12 July 2026). According to the public data disclosure, the concession company concerned belongs to the business interests of Mészáros Lőrinc and Szíjj László.

The essence of the concession model elsewhere is precisely risk-sharing: the private party invests up front, takes on business risk over a long term — for example the fluctuation of toll or traffic revenue — and recovers its capital through availability fees. The domestic arrangement described by the minister differs from this: the toll revenues continue to flow to the state, and the state also took over the 2022 construction-industry inflation through a contract amendment, so that effectively no substantive risk fell on the private party. The arrangement has also drawn objection at international level: the European Commission launched an infringement procedure against Hungary precisely because of the absence of risk transfer, and the ministry indicated that it will not act until the EU procedure has concluded.

By MIAK’s reading, this case is a textbook example of rent-seeking — extra profit obtained from state protection, without competition: a public-money-financed, risk-free, prepaid income flow to a narrow circle, while the public-interest consideration — the completed road — is a fraction of the expenditure. The problem is not primarily the behaviour of a single company, but the structure of the contractual arrangement, which institutionally made it possible to shift the entire risk onto the taxpayer.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the theoretical frame in which the case can be precisely interpreted. According to the famous formula of Robert Klitgaard (former professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, author of the classic handbook of anti-corruption policy), corruption flourishes where monopoly and discretion meet the absence of accountability (C = M + D − A) — a 35-year, risk-free concession awarded without competition strengthens all three factors at once. Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor at Yale, a leading researcher of the economic and institutional analysis of corruption) distinguishes productive economic activity from rent-seeking, which produces unproductive cost, and points out: what is decisive is not the size of the payment, but what was bought for it — in the present case, how much real public-interest performance stands behind the sum disbursed. The World Bank research of Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón empirically demonstrates that better governance — and within it a lower level of corruption — stands in a strong causal relationship with better development outcomes. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with source references — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures which together provide the institutional filter of concession rent-seeking.

3.1 A risk-sharing audit of concession and PPP contracts (within 90 days)

MIAK proposes that within 90 days the government order a risk-sharing audit of every ongoing concession and PPP contract (a long-term investment-operation partnership between the private party and the state) above 10 billion forints, with an independent expert panel and a public result. For each contract the audit must show what business risk the private party actually bears, and how much the state retains or takes back — with particular attention to subsequent contract amendments, which (as in the case of the 2022 construction-industry inflation adjustment) can shift the risk back onto the budget. In the Klitgaard framework of C = M + D − A (see 6.4.1) this strengthens the accountability (A) factor: the structure of the contract steps out of the informal space and becomes measurable and answerable. The audit is not retroactive punishment but fact-finding — the aim is the risk calibration of future arrangements, in line with the expected conclusions of the European Commission’s ongoing procedure.

3.2 Compulsory value-for-money publicity — extending the public-money dashboard (from the next budget year)

MIAK proposes that in every concession and major infrastructure contract two data be made public, compulsorily, in machine-readable form and in real time: the public money disbursed and the value actually created and verified by an independent technical survey (completed road section, refurbishment, expansion). The quotient of these two — the value-for-money ratio — is the most direct measure of a contract’s efficiency. The very present data disclosure proves how strong this publicity is: a single ministerial briefing was enough to make the arrangement’s disproportion visible. The proposal builds on the philosophy of MIAK’s A1 public-money dashboard, and is in line with what Rose-Ackerman stresses (see 6.4.2): the object of the analysis is not the amount of the payment in itself, but the real consideration received for the payment. Data publicity is thus not an end in itself, but the operational tool for filtering out rent.

3.3 An institutional filter against rent-seeking — a regulatory-capture audit (within 12 months)

The third proposal is the institutionalisation of an annual, system-level regulatory-capture audit: uncovering in which sectors, in what contractual or licensing arrangement, rent arises without competition from state protection. The concession model must be attached here too: for the award of future expressway and utility concessions, compulsory competitive tendering and a compulsory, pre-fixed risk-sharing minimum. MIAK’s G6 programme against rent-seeking and its A2 public-procurement transparency programme point together provide the frame: the latter uses artificial intelligence to flag single-bid, overpriced or repeat-winner procedures. The common principle binding the three proposals: where the state creates a monopoly or protected position, the risk-sharing and value-for-money ratio of the contract must be fixed publicly and answerably — this is the institutional brake that the Klitgaard and Rose-Ackerman frameworks prescribe for pushing back rent.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Economy / budget The risk-sharing minimum and compulsory tendering can substantively lower the price of future concessions; the freed-up resource can go to other public tasks In the short term, legal uncertainty and litigation risk in vetting the ongoing contracts; investor confidence may fall if the vetting looks like retroactive punishment
Society The visibility of the path of public money strengthens trust and fact-based public debate; the value-for-money ratio is a measure everyone can interpret Data publicity alone brings no action; without consequence it remains a “data tsunami” that the public cannot turn into accountability
Public administration Concession-contract management is professionalised; a standard methodology of risk-sharing is built up Setting up independent technical-survey and audit capacity is time-consuming; in its absence the indicators can be manipulated (indicator hacking)

The main matter for consideration is the balance of legal certainty and the public interest: ongoing contracts cannot be terminated unilaterally without consequence, so MIAK foregrounds fact-finding and a forward-looking rule instead of retroactive sanction. The proposal tips to the risk side if the vetting becomes a political tool, or if the data made public is not accompanied by a clear, pre-fixed decision consequence. It will work if there is independent, credible technical capacity to measure the value-for-money ratio, and if the regulatory-capture audit distinguishes a rule that serves the real common good (e.g. a safety requirement) from protection that produces rent.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following key performance indicators (KPIs) — these will show over 12–24 months whether the direction is good:

  • Risk-sharing ratio: in ongoing concession contracts above 10 billion forints, the share of business risk actually placed on the private party — proposed target: a pre-fixed, non-zero minimum in every new contract.
  • Value-for-money publicity: the percentage of large infrastructure and concession contracts for which the disbursed-public-money / verified-technical-value quotient is available in real time — proposed target: 100% by 2028.
  • Competitiveness: among newly awarded expressway and utility concessions, the share of open procedures with multiple bidders — proposed target: a substantive rise compared with current practice.
  • Regulatory-capture audit: whether the annual report on rent-producing sectors is prepared and made public.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: the present data disclosure is not the affair of a single company, but the structural lesson of the concession structure — the risk-free, prepaid flow of public money is an institutional error, not chance. MIAK asks the decision-maker to introduce together the independent risk-sharing audit of ongoing contracts, the real-time publicity of the value-for-money ratio of every such arrangement, and the compulsory tendering of future concessions, in line with the outcome of the European Commission’s ongoing procedure. This case mobilises two MIAK foundational values above all: transparency, because the problem itself became visible from a public data disclosure, and proves that the openness of the path of public money is the strongest disciplining force; and accountability, because rent can be filtered out if the risk-sharing and result of the contract become answerable. Without these two, even the best-intentioned concession falls into the trap of “monopoly minus accountability” in the Klitgaard formula.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

In the economic press, Portfolio gave the most detailed, mechanism-centred framing: it approached not from the scandal but from the contract structure, highlighting the “front-loaded” structure, the logic of availability fees and the legal background of the EU infringement procedure. This factual, economic reading is close to MIAK’s approach.

In the public-affairs, left-liberal band, HVG highlighted the political dimension of the ministerial move (“the transport minister has again taken on the company”), and stressed the wait until the conclusion of the Brussels investigation; the full text of the article was behind a paywall, so only the lead-in was publicly available. On the same day 24.hu foregrounded not the concession data disclosure but the minister’s other, railway announcement (the reopening of the Dombóvár–Komló line) — this is the positive side of the transport ministry’s data-based development narrative. Népszava sharpened its headline on the role of the Mészáros and Szíjj business interests (headline-level reference only).

In the public-affairs band, Index did not bring the topic into top focus on this day and published no policy material on it. The conservative, pro-government band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) expressly did not raise the concession data disclosure among the top topics on the monitored day — it did not frame the question of risk-sharing and value-for-money independently on this day.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Sum disbursed over the past four years 1024 billion HUF ministerial data disclosure, Portfolio 12 July 2026
Technical content spent on the network does not even reach half of the sum disbursed ministerial data disclosure, Portfolio 12 July 2026
Term of the concession contract 35 years ministerial data disclosure, Portfolio 12 July 2026
EU procedure infringement procedure over the absence of risk transfer European Commission, cited by Portfolio 12 July 2026
Hungary WGI 2024 — control of corruption −0.17 World Bank WGI 2024
Hungary WGI 2024 — rule of law +0.35 World Bank WGI 2024
Hungary WGI 2024 — government effectiveness +0.42 World Bank WGI 2024

According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024 data, Hungary’s control-of-corruption indicator (−0.17) stands below the international median, while the rule of law (+0.35) and government effectiveness (+0.42) are in positive territory — this structural picture is precisely the pattern where risk-free, protected rent arrangements are most viable: the formal institutions work, but the control of corruption is weak.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — concession rent falls precisely within the scope of public-money publicity (A1) and public-procurement transparency (A2);
  • Economy (programme points) — the programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture (G6), as well as competition policy and anti-monopoly (G5), provide the economic frame;
  • Transport and infrastructure (programme points) — the data-based ordering of investment priorities, free of political bargains (KO4), represents the same data-driven logic that the minister also stressed for the railway development.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

The core of Klitgaard’s theory of corruption is that corruption proliferates where monopoly and discretion are paired with the absence of accountability — this he condenses into the formula C = M + D − A (corruption = monopoly + discretion − accountability). The book also points out that in the “rent-seeking society” actors compete unproductively for the monopoly rent, which draws resources away from real value creation. A 35-year concession awarded without competition and relieved of risk through subsequent contract amendments maximises precisely these three factors: monopoly position, wide discretion in shaping the contract, and weak external accountability. MIAK’s proposals — a risk-sharing audit, value-for-money publicity, compulsory tendering — directly raise the accountability (A) factor, and narrow the monopoly and discretion components.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman’s work analyses corruption not as the moral problem of “bad apples”, but as a structural-incentive phenomenon: the aim of reform is to reduce the material gain arising from the payments, not simply to remove individual actors. The book describes rent-seeking as the opposite pole of productive economic activity, and stresses that the key question of the analysis is not the amount of the payment, but what was bought for it — for which sectoral and case-by-case deep analysis is needed. This argument directly supports MIAK’s value-for-money proposal: the 1024 billion forints in itself reveals nothing, it can be evaluated only in relation to the verified technical value behind it. According to Rose-Ackerman, mere enforcement and control are ineffective if the underlying conditions that produce rent — in the present case the risk-free structure of the contract — are not eliminated; this is why MIAK places the emphasis on structural risk-sharing, not on one-off accountability.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 Kaufmann–Kraay–Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

The foundational study of the World Bank researchers (Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, the creators of the Worldwide Governance Indicators methodology) demonstrates for more than 150 countries that a strong causal relationship exists between better governance and better development outcomes. The study forms six aggregate governance indicators, among them control of corruption — this is the WGI frame in which Hungary’s 2024 value of −0.17 can be placed. In the authors’ formulation:

“Six new aggregate measures capturing various dimensions of governance provide new evidence of a strong causal relationship from better governance to better development outcomes.”

For the concession case this means: risk-free rent arrangements are not merely the efficiency questions of one or another contract, but symptoms of the weakness of the control of corruption — and since the indicator is empirically connected with development outcomes, pushing back rent is not a moral gesture but also a growth interest.

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2196, 1999)

6.5 International comparison

The benchmark for the risk-sharing of concession and PPP arrangements is well developed internationally: both the OECD and Eurostat lay down that a contract qualifies as a genuine concession (and not a hidden loan that increases state debt) only if the private party bears substantive demand or availability risk. It is precisely on this point that the European Commission objects to the Hungarian arrangement. The operational model of public-procurement transparency is Ukraine’s ProZorro system, where the share of single-bid procedures fell from 40% to 18% and brought annual savings of some 2 billion dollars — this illustrates that competition and publicity are the strongest antidote to rent, in line with the Klitgaard and Rose-Ackerman theoretical frame.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency

Economy

  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture
  • G5 — Competition policy and anti-monopoly

Transport and infrastructure

  • KO4 — Railway development with data-based priority

Proposed new programme point: A compulsory risk-sharing minimum and value-for-money publicity for concession and PPP contracts — at the intersection of the Transport and infrastructure and the Transparency and anti-corruption policy areas.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 13 July 2026 — top-10 topics):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2196, 1999)

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A2)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G5, G6)
  • MIAK policy area: Transport and infrastructure (programme points; programme point ID: KO4)
  • MIAK press monitor, 13 July 2026 — topic 6, score: 69/100

Additional public data sources (if used):

  • World Bank — Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024
  • Eurostat / OECD — risk-sharing classification of concession and PPP contracts

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