Part I — Situation overview

10 July 2026 was a double turning point in Hungarian public finances. The Economic and Financial Affairs Council of the European Union (Ecofin) unanimously approved Hungary’s revised recovery plan — the domestic programme of the EU recovery fund (RRF — Recovery and Resilience Facility) —, with which some EUR 10 billion, on the order of HUF 3,600 billion in forints, becomes available to draw down. On the same day Brussels confirmed Hungary’s accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO — European Public Prosecutor’s Office), the independent, supranational prosecuting authority for crimes harming the EU budget. According to prime minister Péter Magyar, with this “the final obstacle has also been removed before the bringing home of the EU trillions” (Telex, 10 July 2026). Finance minister András Kármán put it more cautiously in Brussels: “The 31 August deadline is very tight” — but he added that this cannot be an obstacle to the drawdown (HVG, 10 July 2026).

The event is not without antecedents. In the July weeks MIAK already dealt with the transformation of the Hungarian Development Bank and the institutional background of the transparent management of EU funds. The current development, however, is different in substance: it is not about the reshaping of a domestic institution, but about an external, member-state-level approval — and alongside it about an institutional step, the EPPO accession, which structurally plugs Hungarian public finances into the European criminal-law anti-corruption network. The previous government stayed outside this network for years; for accession — as one analysis put it — “the change of government was needed” (HVG, 10 July 2026).

MIAK’s reading is that the open funding gate is good news, but the harder work now begins. The arrival of the money is not a result, but an opportunity: the real question is whether the use will be transparent, whether the commitments remain domestically accountable, and whether the EPPO protection is supplemented with a domestic capacity that protects not only EU money but all public money. The stake, then, is not the amount, but the quality and verifiability of the use.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to the concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame in which the topic can be interpreted. According to Robert Klitgaard’s C = M + D − A formula (1988), corruption flourishes where a monopoly position (M) and discretionary — that is, judgemental — competence (D) meet the absence of accountability (A) — a large sum of discretionarily allocated EU funds carries exactly this triple risk, which is why protection can also be designed through these three factors. Susan Rose-Ackerman’s (1999) thesis is that meaningful anti-corruption reform is not possible unless the international community and the domestic political leadership support it at the same time — this is a direct argument for the parallel building of the EPPO (international pillar) and a domestic, independent corruption-investigation capacity (domestic pillar). In the conceptual frame of Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012), external institutional constraint can be a tool for strengthening inclusive institutions — the EU conditionality system is not merely a burden, but a disciplining frame that can strengthen the security of private property and the impartiality of the legal system. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures so that the funding now opened truly serves a public purpose, and the institutional achievement remains lasting.

3.1 Transparent fund drawdown — public public-money dashboard (within 60 days)

The number-one guarantee of the use of the roughly HUF 3,600 billion being released is publicity. MIAK proposes that every recovery and cohesion subsidy — the beneficiary, the amount, the goal and the performance milestones — be placed on an easy-to-understand, searchable public-money page even before the payments ramp up, within 60 days. This fits the SZ14 programme point, which fixes the methodology of the maximal but output-oriented drawdown of the cohesion allocation, foregrounding actual results (energy saved, jobs created, travel time reduced) instead of the mere payment rate. On the public-procurement side the AI-based anomaly detector of the A2 programme point — which flags single-bid procedures and recurring winner–contracting pairs — can be a precondition of payment. In Klitgaard’s C = M + D − A frame (see 6.4.1) this strengthens exactly the accountability (A) factor, while narrowing discretion (D).

3.2 Supplementing EPPO accession with a domestic, independent corruption-investigation capacity

The accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office is an important institutional achievement, but it has a structural limit: its competence extends to crimes harming the EU budget. Public-money abuses committed from purely domestic sources may fall outside its field of view. MIAK therefore proposes that alongside the EPPO a domestic corruption-investigation authority independent of the government, with strong powers, be built on the model of Singapore’s CPIB — this is fixed by the A10 programme point. The key is duality: strong investigative powers and strong external control together. According to Rose-Ackerman’s argument (see 6.4.2) reform is only lasting if the international and the domestic pillar stand at the same time. A point of public-law precision: the EPPO is an EU prosecuting authority that does not abolish the competence of the Hungarian prosecution service, but gives a parallel, supranational power; the Hungarian prosecution service is an independent constitutional body (Article 29 of the Fundamental Law), the exerciser of public prosecution. The proposed domestic authority would be an investigating body of the executive power, which may initiate reports and civil-law claims, but may not pronounce criminal liability — that remains the exclusive competence of the prosecution service and the courts.

3.3 The accountability of the commitments — issue-based EU coalition and credibility audit

The opening of the funds is tied to conditions, and the pro-government press places precisely the content of the commitments at the centre. According to MIAK the right answer is not the denial of the conditions, but their public, itemised accountability: the fulfilment of the steps undertaken by the government must be measured through the same public-money and rule-of-law indicator system that the opening of the funds also uses. For widening the EU room for manoeuvre MIAK proposes the KP17 issue-based coalition-building: Hungary should not rely on a single bloc, but build changing coalitions issue by issue — in cohesion with member states in a similar situation, in the rule of law with the net contributors. For measuring alliance reliability the KP23 annual credibility audit provides a frame, which makes public how far Hungary keeps its international commitments. In this way the commitment appears not as an external constraint, but as a verifiable undertaking made along the domestic interest.

The common principle of the three proposals is that money is a tool, not a goal: transparency (public use), accountability (domestic and EU corruption protection) and credibility (accountable commitments) together make the funding gate a lasting result. This is exactly the inclusive institutional strengthening that Acemoglu and Robinson write about (see 6.4.3).

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Economy The demand-boosting, growth-stimulating effect of the ~EUR 10 billion funding; making up for delayed developments The financing of badly prepared projects because of the tight (31 August) deadline; loss of funds due to the n+3 rule
Institutional system The EPPO accession structurally strengthens corruption protection; the public-money dashboard increases accountability Protection narrows to EU money if no domestic capacity is built alongside it; the dashboard may remain formal without real data content
Foreign policy and rule of law Joining the rule-of-law network increases credibility and room for manoeuvre Framing the commitments as an “external constraint” may deepen domestic-political division

The main question to weigh is the dilemma between speed and quality. The tight drawdown deadline puts pressure on quick payment, and this may slide into the logic of “drawdown at any price”, which finances badly planned projects. The proposal works if the output indicators (not the payment rate) take priority, and the public-money dashboard is already live before the ramp-up. The proposal tips towards the risk side if the decision-maker considers the EPPO accession sufficient, and the building of the domestic, independent investigative capacity fails to happen — then abuses committed from purely domestic sources remain unprotected.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested performance indicators)

The success of the proposal is made trackable by a few concrete, suggested performance indicators (KPIs, that is, measures from which in 6–24 months it can be seen whether the direction is good):

  • Drawdown rate: the drawdown of at least 95% of the opened envelope by the relevant deadlines, without loss of funds (up to 2030, taking into account the n+3 rule — the given year’s envelope must be drawn down in the following three years).
  • Share of single-bid public procurements: a decrease from the current about 30% to below 15% within three years.
  • EPPO activity in Hungary: the number of investigations and indictments concerning Hungary in the public EPPO annual report moves onto a rising path.
  • Public-money dashboard coverage: 100% of the recovery and cohesion payments are publicly, itemisedly accessible.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message is simple: the opening of the funding gate is an opportunity, not a performance. From the decision-maker MIAK asks that before the ramp-up of the payments the public public-money dashboard be made live, that alongside the EPPO accession the setting-up of a domestic corruption-investigation authority independent of the government be begun, and that the commitments be made itemisedly, publicly accountable. This programme moves two MIAK foundational values: transparency, because the use of public money protects against abuse only if every forint is traceable; and accountability, because the institutional achievement (EPPO) is only lasting if domestic control supplements it, rather than replacing it. The stake is not the amount — that is Hungary’s right — but that it should depend on the quality and verifiability of the use whether it truly serves a public purpose.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal and public-affairs band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu, 24.hu) highlighted primarily the technical and political significance of the drawdown. Telex, in Péter Magyar’s words, emphasised “the removal of the final obstacle”, HVG focused on the EUR 10 billion sum and András Kármán’s “very tight deadline” warning, and 444.hu quantified the stake (“more than HUF 3,500 billion”). This band also highlighted the EPPO accession as a separate piece of news, noting that for this “the change of government was needed”.

The economic band (Portfolio) focused on the mechanism: “the Ecofin stamp is in place”, while also reporting that the government would insert a new risk filter at the payments, that is, the data of the subsidies may enter Brussels’ risk analysis. This framing foregrounds the control side — not only the arrival of the money, but the control of the use.

The pro-government, conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) placed the emphasis on the conditions and the counter-value: “here is the list, this is what Tisza undertook for the EU money”. According to Mandiner, the largest opposition party, reacting, put it that “it is in the common interest of society that the government should not undertake measures that do not serve the Hungarian people”. This framing poses a real question — the content and accountability of the commitments are at least as essential as the money itself. ATV, meanwhile, explored with international lawyer Tamás Lattmann why the Orbán government did not want to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office earlier.

6.2 Facts and data

Item Value Source
Recovery funds being opened ~EUR 10 billion / ~HUF 3,600 billion Ecofin/EU Council approval, 10 July 2026
Payment deadline (Kármán) 31 August 2026 HVG, 10 July 2026
Hungary’s control-of-corruption indicator (WGI 2024) −0.17 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024
Hungary’s rule-of-law indicator (WGI 2024) +0.35 World Bank WGI 2024
Share of single-bid public procurements (baseline) ~30% MIAK target-value base (A2)

According to the World Bank’s governance-quality indicators (WGI), Hungary’s control-of-corruption value is in the negative range — this provides the structural reason why, alongside the EU accession, domestic institutional strengthening is also needed.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Economy (background material) — the demand-boosting effect of the fund drawdown, the payment conditions and project quality;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — public-procurement publicity as a payment precondition and the EPPO-complementary domestic investigative capacity;
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — widening the EU room for manoeuvre with issue-based coalitions and measuring alliance credibility;
  • Justice (background material) — clarifying the prosecution service’s independent constitutional role relative to the EPPO.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard describes corruption with a stylised equation: illegal conduct proliferates where the official is in a monopoly position, has broad judgemental (discretionary) power, and is weakly accountable to the principal.

“CORRUPTION = MONOPOLY + DISCRETION − ACCOUNTABILITY.”

A large sum of discretionarily allocated EU funds makes all three factors risky: protection therefore consists not of moralising, but of narrowing monopoly and discretion, and of increasing accountability (publicity, control). In the case of the EU funding gate this means that the public-money dashboard and the public-procurement anomaly detector are not a “nice gesture”, but the operational realisation of Klitgaard’s A factor.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

According to Rose-Ackerman there is no universal recipe against corruption, but the goal is always to reduce the benefit derived from bribery — not merely the removal of the “rotten apples”. Her key thesis is the political condition of reform:

“Effective reform cannot occur unless both the international community and domestic political leaders support change.”

That is, meaningful reform is only possible if the international community and the domestic political leadership support it at the same time. In the Hungarian situation this illuminates exactly the parallel necessity of the EPPO accession (international pillar) and a domestic, government-independent corruption-investigation authority (domestic pillar): the one without the other remains one-sided.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

6.4.3 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

The authors distinguish between inclusive and extractive institutions. Inclusive economic institutions — as they write — prioritise the security of private property, the impartiality of the legal system and the provision of public services, and thus create a level playing field for economic actors.

“Inclusive economic institutions… secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a provision of public services that provides a level playing field in which people can exchange and contract.”

In this frame the EU conditionality system and the EPPO accession are not an external burden, but an external disciplining frame that can push domestic practice towards inclusive institutions — provided that the domestic political will also strengthens this, rather than circumventing it.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

6.5 International comparison

For the efficient drawdown of cohesion funds the Polish example is the most telling: in the 2014–2020 cycle Poland drew down nearly 95% of the envelope on time, while operating output-oriented monitoring. In the field of public-procurement transparency the Ukrainian ProZorro system provides a precedent: after its introduction the share of single-bid procedures fell from about 40% to 18%, bringing significant savings. On the side of institutional corruption protection, Singapore’s CPIB model shows that strong powers and strong external control are workable together — this is the model behind the A10 programme point.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency (anomaly detector, curbing single-bid procedures)
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Authority (CPIB model)

Economy and social policy

  • SZ14 — Cohesion Pillar 2.0 (the maximal, output-oriented drawdown of the Hungarian allocation)

Foreign policy

  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU
  • KP23 — Alliance credibility audit (annual)

Proposed new programme point: EPPO-complementary domestic public-money-protection protocol — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area, fixing the methodology of covering the legal gap between abuses committed from EU and from purely domestic sources.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 11 July 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Note: in the blog’s visible text the local file path of the books does not appear — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A2, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point ID: SZ14)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP17, KP23)
  • MIAK press monitor, 11 July 2026 — topic 1, score: 96/100

Additional public data sources:

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024 — control of corruption, rule of law
  • European Commission RRF scoreboard; EPPO annual report; EKR public-procurement database

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