The president of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ) — the constitutional institution that checks the use of public funds — László Windisch, on 16 June 2026 initiated the termination of the legal relationship of the president of the Integrity Authority, Ferenc Pál Biró. The person concerned reacted the same day, calling the move “the political mission of the fallen power”. The news is at once an institutional, a legal and an EU matter: the Integrity Authority was, after all, one of the cornerstones of the conditionality framework alongside which the European Commission negotiated the release of the frozen EU funds.

Part I — Situation overview

The Integrity Authority was created by the National Assembly in 2022, expressly in defence of EU funds: its task is to monitor the use of public procurements and cohesion money, and to flag cases suspected of fraud and corruption. Its creation was a direct condition for Hungary even to have a chance at the withheld money. The legal status of the authority’s head — that is, on what ground and through what procedure they can be removed — is therefore not an internal affair but one of the measuring points of the EU conditionality mechanism.

The present move is sensitive because it fits into the logic of post-change-of-government rule-of-law restoration, yet the intention to remove a leader tied to the old system can easily tip over into a violation of independence. The value of an anti-corruption institution lies precisely in its being independent of the power of the day — and this independence is defined not only by the rules of appointment but also by the rules of removability. If a leader can be made to go because the new majority does not like them, then the next leader too is independent only as long as they suit the power.

By MIAK’s reading, the character of the problem is not who is removed, but through what procedure. An anti-corruption authority must be accountable — but the instrument of accountability is a procedure bound to statutory conditions and publicly reasoned, not political expediency.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame within which the topic can be interpreted. According to the famous formula of Robert Klitgaard (American economist, one of the founders of corruption research) — corruption = monopoly + discretion − accountability — corruption flourishes where power is concentrated, the freedom of decision is large, but accountability is weak; the opaque removal of a supervisory authority’s head destroys precisely the accountability term. Susan Rose-Ackerman (American law professor, a leading researcher of the political economy of corruption) devotes a separate chapter to the fact that independent judicial and oversight institutions work only if the legal status of their leaders is protected from day-to-day politics. And Daniel Kaufmann (one of the developers of the World Bank’s governance-research programme) shows that the “control of corruption” and the “rule of law” are measurable institutional indicators that deteriorate if the independence of oversight bodies weakens. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that tie the independence of anti-corruption institutions not to a person, but to rules.

3.1 Fixing statutory grounds for dismissal (within 30 days)

MIAK proposes that the law fix, in an exhaustive, closed list, the grounds for dismissing the head of the Integrity Authority (and of every supervisory body of similar legal status): only a serious, proven legal violation, lasting incapacity to perform the task, or a conflict of interest may be a ground — a political assessment (for instance “a person of the former power”) never. The decision reasoning the dismissal must be public, and open to judicial review. In the Klitgaard frame (see 6.4.1) this strengthens the accountability factor without handing the discretion into the hands of politics.

3.2 An institutional-independence index and an annual report (from 2027)

Building on MIAK’s A6 programme point, MIAK proposes an annual “Institutional Health Report” that measures, with objective indicators, the actual independence of the ÁSZ, the Integrity Authority, the prosecution service and other control bodies: the protectedness of the leaders’ legal status, the procedural cleanliness of appointments and dismissals, the proportion of decisions taken against the government. The aim is not intervention but accountability through the power of publicity — similar to the logic of the A1 public-money dashboard, which disciplines by making the data visible.

3.3 Strengthening, not replacing, the anti-corruption architecture (ongoing)

MIAK’s A10 programme point aims at setting up an independent Corruption Investigation Office on the model of the Singaporean model. The lesson of the present situation is that the value of new institutions is lasting only if their dismantling is also difficult: the guarantee of independence is the embedded legal status, not the person of the leader. MIAK therefore proposes that the existing authorities be strengthened (competence, budget, a leadership change tied to a two-thirds or qualified procedure), rather than transformed according to the demands of the new majority.

The common principle of the three proposals is that an anti-corruption institution is credible if its own independence survives the change of power too. The reform cannot be the takeover of the old system’s instruments with a new sign — this is the essence of the institutional protectedness described by Rose-Ackerman (see 6.4.2).

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law A transparent dismissal rule strengthens the predictability of control bodies If the procedure remains political, the new government too passes on a pattern of “removable institutions”
EU funds The conditionality milestones are credibly fulfilled, the release is safe The European Commission may signal a new concern over the manner of the leadership change, which slows the payments
Public trust An institution-centred, not person-centred argument raises the credibility of anti-corruption policy The “we are the clean ones” rhetoric causes a loss of credibility if the procedure is not flawless

The main point to weigh is how the speed of rule-of-law restoration and the cleanliness of the rule-of-law procedure can be reconciled. The proposal tips to the risk side if urgency (a fast “clean-up”) overrides the procedural guarantees: then the reform weakens precisely the independence whose restoration it proclaims. The proposal works if the rule of removability is stricter than that of appointment — that is, if a leader is harder to remove than to install.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following performance indicators (KPIs) over a 6–24 month horizon:

  • Publicity of dismissal reasonings: in 100% of control-body leadership changes there should be a public decision that cites a statutory ground and is open to judicial review.
  • Competence stability of the Integrity Authority: the authority’s powers and budget do not shrink during the leadership change (measurable by comparing the founding law and the budget lines).
  • European Commission feedback: the next rule-of-law report should not contain a new concern relating to the independence of anti-corruption institutions.
  • Institutional indicator: in the World Bank’s governance indicators (WGI), the “control of corruption” value — which for Hungary was −0.17 in 2024 — should improve substantively in the next measurement cycle.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers and the public alike is simple: the heads of anti-corruption institutions may be removed only through a transparent, statutorily bound, publicly reasoned procedure. The request is concrete — fixed grounds for dismissal, a public decision, judicial review — not an abstract expectation. This approach engages two MIAK foundational values: accountability, because the institution thus remains answerable even independently of the power, and transparency, because the public reasoning is what makes it verifiable that the leadership change was a professional and not a political decision. The two values here are not ornament: the Integrity Authority was built precisely to embody them — its dismantling would contradict its own purpose.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal and public-affairs band, Telex and HVG approached the matter factually, from the angle of the institutional stake: they placed the content of the initiative and the reaction of the person concerned at the centre, stressing that the Integrity Authority is part of the EU conditionality framework. 24.hu highlighted the reaction of the person concerned, Ferenc Pál Biró (“the political mission of the fallen power”), thus showing the personal-political dimension of the conflict. In the economic band, Portfolio focused on the institutional and funding aspect of the move (“The ÁSZ has acted”), that is, on the fact that the question is connected with the cohesion money. Népszava’s article-level reference this time pointed only to the portal’s front page (title-level reference only). The conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) did not raise this topic to top focus on this day — which is in itself telling: the framing of the debate around the anti-corruption institution was dominated by the left-liberal and economic bands.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The Integrity Authority was created by the National Assembly in 2022 within the EU conditionality procedure, as a condition of protecting the cohesion and recovery funds.
  • Hungary in the World Bank’s governance indicators (WGI, 2024): rule of law +0.35, government effectiveness +0.42, control of corruption −0.17 — the latter being the only negative value, which points precisely to the weakness of the anti-corruption institutional system (source: World Bank WGI 2024).
  • The ÁSZ’s constitutional power is oversight and initiation; it makes findings, but does not remove a leader on its own — the actual decision rests with another body.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the independence of supervisory bodies and institutional monitoring; concerned: A6, A10, A1, A14.
  • Administration of justice (background material) — judicial review as the guarantee of the lawfulness of the dismissal.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard condenses the drivers of corruption into a simple formula. In his own formulation: “Illicit behavior flourishes when agents have monopoly power over clients, when agents have great discretion, and when accountability of agents to the principal is weak” — that is, illicit behaviour proliferates where the official has a monopoly position and great discretionary freedom, but their accountability is weak; the stylised equation: corruption = monopoly + discretion − accountability. The debate around the Integrity Authority in this frame touches precisely the accountability factor: if a supervisory leader can be removed opaquely, on the basis of political weighing, accountability weakens and corruption risk grows — regardless of whether the intent of the removal is “clean-up” or “revenge”.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman treats in separate chapters the independent judicial and prosecutorial institutions, as well as the role of publicity and accountability in pushing back corruption. Her central thesis is that control institutions work not by the personal integrity of their leaders but by the protectedness of their legal status: an authority whose leader the majority of the day can swap at will is not independent, only independent as long as it suits the power. In the case of the Hungarian Integrity Authority this means that the rules of the leader’s removability — and not the fact of appointment — decide whether it really protects the EU funds from political influence.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

Kaufmann and his co-authors developed six aggregate governance indicators — among them the “rule of law”, “government effectiveness” and “control of corruption” indicators — and showed that these are measurably linked with development outcomes. The lesson of the frame for the Hungarian situation is that institutional quality is not a matter of mood but a state traceable over time and quantifiable: the weakening of an oversight authority’s independence can also show up in the deterioration of the “control of corruption” indicator — which is why it is worth tracking the procedural cleanliness of leadership changes as an objective indicator.

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

6.5 International comparison

The international models of strong-legal-status anti-corruption institutions illustrate well how the principle works. Romania’s National Integrity Agency (ANI) has, since 2007, been able to proceed against over a thousand public figures precisely because its legal status was not tied to the logic of changes of government. The operational independence of Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) — the model for MIAK’s A10 programme point — likewise rests on its embedded legal status. Both examples reinforce that lasting results depend not on selecting the right leader, but on the strictness of removability.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances (it names the ÁSZ and institutional health)
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)
  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A14 — International institutional participation and accountability

Suggested new programme point: A qualified dismissal regime for the heads of supervisory bodies — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area, which fixes the rules of removability separately.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 17 June 2026 — topic 9):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

Note: the books’ local file path does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Administration of justice (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 17 June 2026 — topic 9, score: 84/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024 — control of corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness
  • European Commission rule-of-law conditionality framework (conditionality regulation, 2020/2092)

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