Part I — Situation overview

On 26 June 2026 President of the Republic Tamás Sulyok signed — that is, promulgated — the package of laws that fulfils the rule-of-law and transparency conditions needed for the release of the EU funds. The legislation (according to the press, Act XVIII of 2026) had been adopted a few days earlier by the National Assembly with a large majority — 142 in favour, 39 against and 3 abstentions — and appeared in the Hungarian Official Gazette (Magyar Közlöny) on Friday afternoon. Public-law precision matters: the law is enacted by the National Assembly, the head-of-state’s signature is an act of promulgation, not an independent governmental or substantive decision. The weightiest element of the package is the dissolution of the institution of public-interest asset-managing foundations performing public tasks (in everyday speech, the KEKVAs), the strengthening of the Integrity Authority — the anti-corruption body created in 2022 under the EU conditions — and the tightening of the asset-declaration system, which now extends to private equity funds and asset-managing foundations as well (MIAK press monitor, 27 June 2026 — Portfolio, Telex, HVG).

The stake is high because the frozen sum is some €16.4 billion, and time is pressing. The overwhelming majority — roughly 91 percent — of the resources of the Hungarian Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF — the EU’s post-pandemic recovery fund) remained frozen, while the unused non-repayable part — according to press analyses some €9.5 billion — could have been lost for good with the expiry of the 31 August 2026 deadline. The previous government had fulfilled 22 of the 27 so-called super-milestones (the accountable reform steps set as the condition of payment), but the last five stalled; the European Commission’s July 2025 rule-of-law report continued to flag systemic shortcomings in the independence of the judiciary, the fight against corruption and media pluralism. The aim of the present law is precisely to tick off these remaining conditions.

MIAK’s reading is that closing the veto policy and the opening of the resource is a real macroeconomic turning point, but the mere existence of the resource is not yet a result. The question is not “how much money comes”, but whether trackable, inclusive and accountable institutions manage it. The €16.4 billion will only pay off for the taxpayer if every forint of it can be tracked — otherwise the faults of the earlier system return in a new guise.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame. Joseph Stiglitz (Nobel laureate American economist, former chief economist of the World Bank) argues in his work Globalization and Its Discontents that external financial resources serve development when transparency — citizens’ awareness of where the money goes — and the say of those affected are ensured; conditionality in itself is not enough if the use remains closed. The work Governance Matters by Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay (governance researchers at the World Bank, creators of the Worldwide Governance Indicators) shows with data that the quality of governance — including control of corruption and government effectiveness — is directly linked to development outcomes: the return on the resource depends not on the size of the resource, but on the quality of the institutions. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook 2025 macro frame, meanwhile, warns that investment financing is sustainable if accompanied by fiscal space and a regulated debt path — otherwise the expansion financed from the resource remains temporary. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that shift the emphasis from the “the money has arrived” message to the quality and trackability of resource use.

3.1 Real-time, machine-readable public-money tracking (immediate launch)

From the first spadeful financed by the released EU forint, full, public tracking should be mandatory. Building on the A1 (public-money dashboard) and the G1 (data-driven budgeting) programme points, MIAK proposes that every project financed from an EU resource receive a public, machine-readable (fit for machine processing, not locked into a PDF) data sheet: beneficiary, amount, procurement history, schedule and performance indicator. This is not an administrative burden, but a condition of the payment — technically the system can be built on the model of the Estonian and Lithuanian real-time procurement platforms. The benefit of this is twofold: it reduces the scope for abuse even before disbursement, and gives the European Commission credible evidence that the conditions are fulfilled not only on paper.

3.2 Mandatory return calculation and clawback for big projects

The quality of the resource is decided at the selection stage. Building on the A8 (cohesion-policy accountability) programme point, MIAK proposes that for EU projects above 500 million forints an independent cost-benefit analysis be mandatory before the decision, and that a clawback clause be written into every contract: in case of irregularity the beneficiary repays the resource with interest. Enforcing the clawback requires a strong, independent enforcer — which is why MIAK’s A10 (Independent Corruption Investigation Bureau, on the model of the Singaporean CPIB) proposal connects here, under which the burden of proof reverses in case of unjustified enrichment. This is what makes the transparency promise of the present law accountable after the fact too.

3.3 Case-based EU coalition for the long-term settlement of resource-conditionality

The present package saves the resources of the current cycle; the negotiation of the next seven-year budget (MFF), however, is still ahead. According to MIAK’s KP17 (case-based coalition-building in the EU) programme point, Hungary must argue not with a demonstrative veto threat, but with alliances that vary case by case: with the catching-up member states in defence of the cohesion envelope, with the thrifty states on the question of strict spending control. Credible, measurable accountability is the source of Hungarian bargaining power here: if Hungary is the most transparent resource-user, conditionality softens from a political instrument into a quality standard of which we are the frontrunners.

These three proposals are bound together by a single principle: the resource is worth something if it is trackable and accountable — the quality of use, not the fact of arrival, decides the return.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Economy The demand-boosting effect of the released ~€16.4 bn development resource, the saved RRF part If the quality of use is weak, the resource produces debt with no visible return
Society More transparent public-money distribution, more predictable developments If the control is only formal, the old rent-seeking mechanisms return in a new form
Public administration The KEKVA dissolution and the stronger Integrity Authority give cleaner institutional frames The clawback and the mandatory return calculation require serious administrative and audit capacity

The main trade-off is whether the transparency steps become real control, or remain at the formal ticking-off of the conditions. The proposal tips to the risk side if the resource arrives faster than the tracking and control system is built up — then the pressure of the 31 August 2026 deadline may come precisely at the expense of quality. The proposal, by contrast, works if the payment and the public data disclosure start at once: speed and transparency are not opposites here, but two sides of the same system.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

A few suggested performance indicators (KPIs, in English Key Performance Indicators) from which, in 12–24 months, it will be visible whether the direction is good:

  • Whether the European Commission actually releases the whole or a substantive part of the €16.4 billion.
  • The actual absorption rate of the RRF part spendable by 31 August 2026 (target: minimising the resource lost by the deadline).
  • Whether real-time, public, machine-readable public-money data sheets get under way for every EU resource.
  • Whether the share of single-bid procurements falls in projects financed from EU resources.
  • Whether Hungary’s control-of-corruption indicator rises (from the World Bank WGI 2024 level of −0.17).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers and to the public alike: the opening of the EU funds is an opportunity, not a goal; the real task begins now. MIAK asks the government to launch, simultaneously with the arrival of the resource, real-time, public public-money tracking, and to make the return calculation of big projects and the clawback mandatory. This approach moves two MIAK foundational values: transparency — because the public, machine-readable data sheet is the only thing that makes the use truly verifiable — and accountability — because it is precisely credible, measurable control that turns conditionality from a political dispute into a quality standard, and is thus the key to the resources not only arriving, but also paying off. The two are not abstract labels: the fate of the Hungarian taxpayer’s €16.4 billion hangs on them.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The topic moved the whole spectrum, with characteristically different emphases. The economic-professional band (Portfolio) framed the news objectively, with figures: the emphasis was on the opening of the €16.4 billion, the KEKVA dissolution and the transparency content of the law, supplemented by the analysis that continuing the earlier veto policy would have threatened the loss of some €9.5 billion. The liberal-left and public-affairs band (Telex, HVG, 24.hu, 444.hu) framed the resource release as the fulfilment of the Tisza government’s election promise and a sign of a rule-of-law turn. The conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) tended to highlight the “at what price” question and the sovereignty-loss narrative, conveying the criticism of the side that has gone into opposition. The Népszava article was available only at headline level (headline-only reference). Looking at the spectrum as a whole, there is no dispute about the facts — the law was passed — but in interpretation the difference is sharp: fulfilling the conditions is “bringing home the frozen money” or “a concession to pressure” — according to MIAK it is data-based use that makes it decidable which reading comes true.

6.2 Facts and data

Indicator Value Source
Frozen resource opening up ~€16.4 bn Portfolio, 26/06/2026
National Assembly vote 142 in favour / 39 against / 3 abstentions Portfolio, 26/06/2026
Frozen RRF share ~91% Portfolio (Terták analysis), 25/06/2026
RRF part at risk by deadline ~€9.5 bn Portfolio, 25/06/2026
RRF use final deadline 31/08/2026 European Commission / Portfolio
Super-milestones fulfilled 22 / 27 Portfolio, 25/06/2026
Hungarian digital RRF multiplier 1.13 (EU average: 1.47) European Commission, 26/06/2026
Hungary WGI control of corruption 2024 −0.17 World Bank WGI

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Economy (programme points) — data-driven budgeting (G1), the capital markets union (G13) and the deepening of the single market (G14) give the economic frame of resource use and return;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the public-money dashboard (A1), cohesion accountability (A8) and the Independent Corruption Investigation Bureau (A10) are the tools of controlling the use;
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — case-based coalition-building (KP17) is the core of the Hungarian strategy for the next MFF negotiation.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Joseph Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

The Nobel laureate American economist Joseph Stiglitz turns the relationship of external resources and reform into a question of awareness and say. By his argument, the formal fulfilment of conditions is not enough for credible development: the resource serves the common good if citizens know where the money goes and those affected can have a say in the decisions.

“…I emphasize the necessity for increased transparency, improving the information that citizens have about what these institutions do, allowing those who are affected by the policies to have a greater say in their formulation.”

In the Hungarian case this means that after the arrival of the €16.4 billion the substantive yardstick is publicity: the ticking-off of the conditions becomes a real rule-of-law turn only if the use is machine-readably trackable — which is why MIAK builds the A1 and A8 programme points on this idea.

📖 Source: Joseph Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

6.4.2 Daniel Kaufmann – Aart Kraay: Governance Matters

Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay, researchers at the World Bank, developed six aggregate governance indicators — among them the rule of law and control of corruption (graft) — and showed that these are closely linked to development outcomes. Their message is terse: the quality of governance matters. The return on the resource depends not on the size of the resource, but on the quality of the institutions: the same €16.4 billion finances rent-seeking under weak control of corruption, and real development under strong control. This gives the principled basis of MIAK’s A10 (Independent Corruption Investigation Bureau) proposal — Hungary’s WGI control-of-corruption indicator was −0.17 in 2024, that is, it is precisely in this field that there is the most ground to make up.

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann – Aart Kraay: Governance Matters

6.4.3 IMF: World Economic Outlook 2025

The IMF (International Monetary Fund) annual world economic report gives the macroeconomic frame: investment financing is sustainable if accompanied by fiscal space and a regulated debt path. The recurring warning of the report is that expansion financed from an external resource remains temporary if not paired with credible medium-term consolidation. In the Hungarian reading this means that the EU funds can give the backbone of the development budget, but do not substitute for rule-based fiscal discipline — the two together make durable the opportunity now opening up.

📖 Source: IMF: World Economic Outlook 2025

6.5 International comparison

For real-time resource tracking the most instructive is the Estonian and Lithuanian practice: through digital, machine-readable procurement and payment disclosure, the irregularity rate can be kept durably low, and resource use can be continuously audited. For the institutional backing of the clawback, the model of the Singaporean Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) is the reference: a directly accountable, independent investigative bureau that can proceed against any public figure. Both models can be built into Hungarian resource use — not as an abstract principle, but as an accountable, technical commitment that makes the transparency promise of the law now promulgated operational.

Economy

  • G1 — Data-driven budgeting
  • G13 — Capital markets union implementation
  • G14 — Deepening of the single market

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Bureau (CPIB model)

Foreign policy

  • KP17 — Case-based coalition-building in the EU

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 27 June 2026 — top-10 topics, ranked 1st):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Joseph Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents
  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann – Aart Kraay: Governance Matters
  • 📖 IMF: World Economic Outlook 2025

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G1, G13, G14)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A8, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP17)
  • MIAK press monitor, 27 June 2026 — topic 1, score: 94/100

Additional public data sources:

  • European Commission (Cohesion Open Data Platform, RRF Scoreboard); Hungarian Official Gazette (Magyar Közlöny); State Audit Office; Integrity Authority; World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators

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