Part I — Situation overview

According to the government decree published on 2 July 2026, on 22 October 2026 certain secret-service files of the former regime will become public. A decision was also taken on the size of the commission assisting the disclosure — the body will have 13 members — and it was confirmed that an opposition expert will also take part in the work. The announcement is part of a wider transparency package that also includes the publicity of the agent files, the selection of the head of the NAV (the tax authority) through an open competition, and further amendments to the Fundamental Law.

The uncovering of the secret-service past is a transparency debt that has been postponed since the change of regime. Over the past three decades the question has come onto the agenda again and again, but has remained without a comprehensive, uniform settlement. The present decree is new in that it assigns a concrete date and an institutional frame — a commission, a headcount, opposition participation — to the disclosure; that is, the process moves from the level of a declaration of intent towards execution. The sensitivity of the question comes from the fact that two fundamental-rights considerations are pitted against each other: on the one hand freedom of information and historical justice, on the other the informational self-determination and the right to good reputation of those concerned.

In MIAK’s reading the direction of the disclosure is right, but the stake is procedural: the main question is not whether the files should be made public, but who accesses them, under what safeguards, and with what data-protection filter. The uncovering of the past serves public trust if it is governed by uniform legal criteria and overseen by an impartial body — rather than a case-by-case, political weighing deciding what comes to light and what stays hidden.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals it is worth fixing the scholarly frame. In her work Corruption and Government the corruption researcher Susan Rose-Ackerman interprets transparency primarily as an accountability tool: the publicity of information is not a goal in itself but a condition of controlling power, which works only if it is embedded in predictable, institutionalised rules. In their work Spin Dictators Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman show that modern authoritarian regimes sustain their power by manipulating the information space — from which follows directly the warning that selective disclosure can itself become a tool of manipulation. In her book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism Shoshana Zuboff analyses the boundary between data access and individual rights, which is directly relevant to protecting the informational self-determination of those concerned. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures with which the disclosure can be impartial, accountable and proportionate from a data-protection standpoint.

3.1 A uniform, statutory system of access criteria (before making the files public)

The key to the credibility of the disclosure is that uniform, pre-fixed legal criteria decide which file becomes public and with what filtering — not case-by-case weighing. Programme point A6 — strengthening checks and balances — requires that the rule of access apply identically to everyone, regardless of whom the file is about. The regulation must contain an explicit data-protection filter: the anonymisation of sensitive data on third, non-public persons, in line with the standards of the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (NAIH — the independent guardian of data protection and freedom of information). In this way publicity does not become a selective political weapon (see 6.4.2) — it is precisely the uniform criterion that guards against abuse.

3.2 An impartial commission model that also involves an opposition expert (throughout the disclosure)

MIAK approves the direction of the newly formed 13-member commission that also includes an opposition expert, and proposes reinforcing it with the principles of the I9 popular-sovereignty audit: let the commission’s work be transparent, its decisions reasoned and publicly traceable, and let there be a structured, documented procedure for disputed classifications. Impartiality is ensured by the composition of the body and by two-way control — the joint presence of government-side and opposition members acts as a check in itself. The aim is not for a single political camp to write the reading of the past, but for the disclosure to carry the widest possible professional and political legitimacy.

3.3 Data-based, proportionate transparency — embedding the disclosure into the wider transparency system (ongoing)

The disclosure is durable only if it is not a one-off event but part of a coherent transparency architecture. Programme point A3 — the publicity of asset declarations — and A13 — disinformation resilience — represent the same logic: publicity should mean machine-readable, verifiable data, and the disclosed facts should be accompanied by a source-critical, media-literacy frame, so that the files do not become raw material for disinformation campaigns. In this way learning about the past strengthens accountability, not political passion.

These three proposals are bound together by a single principle: the disclosure serves the common good only if a uniform rule, impartial oversight and data-protection proportionality guarantee it together — as Rose-Ackerman’s thesis holds, transparency becomes genuine accountability only in an institutionalised form.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Society Historical justice, repayment of the postponed transparency debt Harm to the privacy and good reputation of those concerned (and their family members)
Public administration A uniform, predictable regime of records management and access The danger of selective, politically driven publication
Rule of law Strengthening accountability, an impartial commission model The disclosure may become raw material for disinformation campaigns

The main consideration is the balance between freedom of information and informational self-determination: full openness may violate the rights of non-public persons concerned, while excessive closedness makes justice impossible. The proposal works if access is governed by a uniform statute and not by a case-by-case decision, and if the commission’s impartiality is ensured institutionally — in its composition and in its public procedure. Both the German (Stasi files) and the Polish (IPN) models show that the key is a pre-fixed rule that applies to everyone.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

The success of the proposal is worth tracking on the basis of a few suggested performance indicators (KPIs, from which it is visible whether it has succeeded):

  • whether, before publication, a uniform, public statutory system of access criteria with a data-protection filter appears;
  • the documentation and public traceability of the disclosure commission’s decisions (the share of reasoned classifications);
  • the enforcement of the anonymisation of sensitive data on non-public, third persons (by the standards of the NAIH);
  • whether any complaint arrives about selective, politically driven publication — and whether it is investigated by an independent forum.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: the uncovering of the secret-service past is justified and cannot be postponed, but its credibility depends on the procedure. MIAK asks the decision-maker to let publication be governed by uniform, pre-fixed legal criteria and data-protection safeguards, and to have the process overseen by an impartial commission that also involves an opposition expert — so that justice does not slip into selective political score-settling. In this two MIAK foundational values move together: transparency, because learning about the past is a condition of democratic accountability; and accountability, because the publicity of the files becomes genuine control only if it is governed by a uniform rule that applies identically to everyone — not by case-by-case weighing.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The public-affairs and economic band (24.hu, Portfolio) highlighted the fact of the government decree and the concrete date (22 October) in a factual, procedural frame. The centre-left liberal band (HVG, 444.hu) foregrounded the opposition expert’s participation in the commission and the wider Fundamental-Law/transparency package (the open competition for the head of the NAV) — emphasising the question of control and openness. The pro-government conservative band (Mandiner, Magyar Nemzet) focused on the government spokesperson’s briefing and the increased, 13-member size of the commission, placing the emphasis on the executional details of the decision. The framings thus differ not in the fact but in what they consider the essence of the news: openness, control or execution. MIAK’s ideology-free reading ties all three into a single question: is this a uniform, impartial disclosure operating with data-protection safeguards?

6.2 Facts and data

  • Government decree (2 July 2026): on 22 October 2026 certain secret-service files of the former regime will become public.
  • The commission assisting the disclosure has 13 members (instead of the earlier 11), with the participation of an opposition expert.
  • The package includes the selection of the head of the NAV through an open competition and further amendments to the Fundamental Law.
  • Hungary’s governance-quality indicators 2024 (World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, WGI): rule of law +0.35, control of corruption −0.17 — the disclosure is one element of restoring institutional trust.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the gravitational centre of checks and balances, public data and disinformation resilience;
  • Justice (programme points) — the frame for the popular-sovereignty audit and for the procedural weighing of freedom of information vs data protection.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

The central thesis of Rose-Ackerman’s work is that transparency alone is not enough — it becomes genuine control of power only if it is embedded in institutionalised, predictable accountability mechanisms. Publicity gives information, but information exerts a disciplining effect only if there are rules about who answers for the disclosed facts, when, and with what consequences. In the case of the Hungarian agent-file publicity this is a direct argument for a uniform, statutory access frame: selective, case-by-case disclosure produces not accountability but fresh mistrust.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

6.4.2 Guriev and Treisman: Spin Dictators

According to Guriev and Treisman, modern authoritarian regimes sustain their power not primarily through open repression but through manipulating the information space — through co-opting the media and selectively shaping publicity. From this an important warning follows for the disclosure of the past: the selective publication of secret-service files can itself become a tool of information manipulation if it is not governed by a uniform, impartial rule. The Hungarian disclosure serves democratic publicity if it realises precisely the opposite: a verifiable procedure that applies the same standard to everyone.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

6.4.3 Shoshana Zuboff: The Age of Surveillance Capitalism

Zuboff analyses the boundary between data access and individual autonomy: power over data is power over people, and therefore data handling must be given limits. Although Zuboff’s analysis is aimed at market data collection, its lesson can be transferred to state disclosure of the past: secret-service files too contain sensitive personal data, often about non-public, third persons. The disclosure must therefore be proportionate — protecting informational self-determination is not the opposite of openness but the condition of responsible openness.

📖 Source: Shoshana Zuboff: The Age of Surveillance Capitalism

6.5 International comparison

Two established European models are available for uncovering the secret-service past. The German solution (the authority set up to manage the Stasi files) has developed, within a uniform statutory frame, a practice of several decades built on the right of those concerned to inspect and on the protection of third persons’ data. Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) operates a similar system built on statutory criteria. The common lesson of both examples is that the disclosure is successful and legitimate if it is governed by a pre-fixed rule that applies to everyone, and if access is overseen by an independent institution, not by day-to-day political decision.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A13 — Disinformation resilience

Justice

  • I9 — Popular-sovereignty audit — legislation with citizen feedback

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 3 July 2026 — topic 5):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government
  • 📖 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators
  • 📖 Shoshana Zuboff: The Age of Surveillance Capitalism

Note: in the blog’s visible text only the author and the title appear for the books; the local file path is an internal matter of the generation process.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I9)
  • MIAK press monitor, 3 July 2026 — topic 5, score: 83/100

Additional public data sources:

  • ÁBTL (Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security) access statistics; NAIH opinions; German (Stasi-file) and Polish (IPN) models of uncovering the past.

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