Part I — Situation overview

On 23 June 2026 the National Assembly adopted the legislative package that opens the way to part of the previously frozen EU funds. The package — which parliament adopted by a two-thirds majority (a political force above 134 mandates in the 199-member National Assembly, sufficient even for a constitutional amendment) — amends several laws: it tightens asset declaration and its audit, gives broader powers to the Integrity Authority, makes public procurement more transparent, and tightens corruption criminal proceedings. In the background is the May agreement between the President of the European Commission and the Hungarian Prime Minister, which ties the release of the frozen funds (the press cites an order of EUR 10–16 billion) to meeting the rule-of-law and anti-corruption expectations.

At the same time as the release of funds, the Hungarian government also acted in the foreign-policy field: according to press reports, on 24 June 2026 Hungary prevented the EU’s 27 member states from recording, in a joint letter, support for Ukraine’s (and Moldova’s) accession negotiations. According to the Hungarian position, opening the six negotiating chapters simultaneously would send the wrong message to the Western Balkan candidates, which have been waiting for years. The release of funds and the Ukraine braking are two sides of the same coin: the country is trying at once to meet EU conditionality (the conditional funds) and to assert its own foreign-policy priorities.

According to MIAK’s reading, the real question is not whether “we accept the money”, but whether the release of funds is also substantively a credible reform, or formal compliance towards Brussels. Without clawback (a recovery mechanism) and full, project-level monitoring, the released amount can flow to the old circle of beneficiaries just the same — this is precisely what is also signalled by the press’s claim that the beneficiaries of the previous system too can profit from the new funds. And the foreign-policy block is defensible only if it is publicly, data-based justified, rather than an unpredictable bargaining instrument.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the governance-theory frame. The work Governance Matters by Daniel Kaufmann and co-authors (governance researchers at the World Bank, creators of the Worldwide Governance Indicators methodology) distinguishes six measurable governance dimensions — among them accountability (voice and accountability), the rule of law and corruption control (control of corruption) — and shows that these are directly connected to development outcomes: good governance is not a luxury, but a condition of growth. EU conditionality makes precisely these dimensions a condition of funds. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) fixes the rule of law as an EU foundational value — this is the direct legal basis of the conditionality mechanism, that is, the withholding of funds has a constitutional, treaty-based foundation, not political arbitrariness. And the EU Economic Survey 2025 report of the OECD (the cooperation organisation of the developed economies) gives the practical thesis: the effectiveness of cohesion policy is limited by corruption and administrative capacity shortfalls — the solution is not less funding, but better control. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that turn the right step of releasing funds into genuine, substantive accountability and a predictable foreign policy.

3.1 Full, recoverable fund monitoring (clawback, by 2027)

The released EU funds are credible if every project has a public data sheet (beneficiary, amount, goal, deadline, performance), and where projects fail to meet the target indicator, a proportionate part of the amount is repaid. In the frame of A8 (cohesion-policy accountability) MIAK proposes 100% project audit, making an independent cost-benefit analysis mandatory for investments above HUF 500 million, and building clawback — that is, the recovery mechanism — into every support contract. In the Klitgaardian and Kaufmannian logic (see 6.4.1) this strengthens precisely the missing accountability factor: it does not eliminate the monopoly position and the discretionary power, but makes accountability a condition of the funds.

3.2 The substantive, not formal, fulfilment of the anti-corruption reform

The adopted package strengthens the audit of asset declarations, the transparency of public procurement and the powers of the Integrity Authority — this is the right direction, but MIAK warns: the value of the reform depends on the execution, not on the text of the law. MIAK proposes that asset declarations appear in a machine-readable, automatically comparable form (A3), and that in public procurement an anomaly detector flag single-bid procedures and recurring winner-contractor pairs (A2). The aim is not a gesture to Brussels: reducing corruption is self-interest, because it is a growth and trust factor. The reform is credible if it is measurable — for example, if the share of single-bid public procurements genuinely falls.

3.3 A publicly justified, case-based EU position instead of blocking

The Hungarian braking around Ukraine’s accession may in itself be a legitimate position (the timing of enlargement is a real policy question), but according to MIAK the strategic error of unpredictable blocking is that it causes a credibility cost in every other matter too. In the frame of KP3 (transparent foreign policy) MIAK proposes that a public, one-page, data-based justification be mandatory for every EU Council vote — why we acted as we did. And blocking positions should be complemented, under KP6 (multilateral–bilateral strategy differentiation), with case-based coalition-building: the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia and the agricultural-market transition can be handled in an institutionalised, transparent set of conditions, not through ad hoc veto threats.

The common principle of the three proposals is credible accountability: the release of funds is a value if its use is traceable, the anti-corruption reform is genuine if it is measurable, and the foreign-policy step is defensible if it is publicly justified — in the Kaufmann frame all three are aspects of the same governance quality.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Economy / funds The release of the frozen funds brings development funds and growth momentum Without clawback and monitoring, the funds can flow to the old circle of beneficiaries, and the irregularity remains
Rule of law / corruption Tightening asset declaration and public procurement improves governance quality If the reform remains formal (exists on paper, not in practice), credibility is dented both at home and in Brussels
Foreign policy With public justification, the Hungarian position becomes predictable and defensible Unpredictable blocking causes a credibility cost, weakening the negotiating position in other matters

The main consideration is the relation of content and form. The release of funds tips to the risk side if the government contents itself with adopting the law, but the execution (project-level monitoring, clawback, anomaly detector) is missing — then the reform remains formal compliance, and the funds flow according to the previous pattern. The foreign-policy block works if it is publicly, data-based justified and tied to a concrete, communicable national interest; without this, allied trust erodes.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following performance indicators (KPIs) — these are recommendations, not government decisions:

  • Fund irregularity: the irregularity rate in the use of EU funds should fall substantively (according to the OECD this is below 0.5% in the leading group), and every cohesion project should have a public data sheet.
  • Procurement competition: the share of single-bid procedures should fall, and the average number of bids should rise — this is one of the best measures of corruption risk.
  • Clawback cases: in how many projects a recovery was launched because of the failure to meet the target indicator — a sign of a working mechanism is that there are any at all.
  • Vote justification: what percentage of Hungarian EU Council votes had a public, data-based justification (the goal is 100%).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request in a single sentence: the released EU funds must be spent with full, recoverable monitoring, the anti-corruption reform must be fulfilled substantively, and in Ukraine policy a publicly justified, case-based position is needed instead of unpredictable blocking.

This position follows from two MIAK foundational values. Accountability requires that every forint of public money — especially EU funds shared with other member states — be traceable to the beneficiary and to the fulfilment of the goal; clawback is not a bureaucratic burden, but the price of trust. Transparency, in turn, extends to foreign policy too: a blocking vote is legitimate if the citizen and the ally too understand its reason — public justification is the source of predictability, and thus of negotiating strength.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the liberal-left and public-affairs band, 444.hu highlighted the foreign-policy side of the Ukraine block, tying the Hungarian position to the restrained stance already signalled at the June Brussels summit; 24.hu focused on the fact of the fund-releasing legislative package, in a neutral, procedural frame. In the economic band, Portfolio and HVG weighed the content of the agreement — what the government undertook for the funds and what it did not — with HVG separately highlighting that one of the big beneficiaries of the previous system too can profit from the released funds. In the pro-government/conservative band, Mandiner, following Politico, presented the Hungarian “braking” as a foreign-policy instrument, emphasising the fairness towards the Western Balkan candidates. On this day the spectrum differed not on the value of the release of funds, but on its price and on the assessment of the foreign-policy step — this confirms MIAK’s framing that the real stake is accountability and predictability, not the false dilemma of “money yes or no”.

6.2 Facts and data

  • On 23 June 2026 the National Assembly adopted, by a two-thirds majority, the legislative amendment package leading to the release of EU funds.
  • The package tightens asset declaration and its audit, expands the powers of the Integrity Authority, makes public procurement more transparent, and tightens corruption criminal proceedings.
  • In the background is the May agreement between the President of the European Commission and the Hungarian Prime Minister; the order of the frozen funds is cited in the press as between EUR 10–16 billion.
  • On 24 June 2026 Hungary — alone, in a step requiring unanimity — prevented the EU’s 27 member states from recording, in a joint letter, support for the accession negotiations of Ukraine and Moldova; the matter is to be discussed again next week.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — cohesion accountability, clawback and the public-procurement anomaly detector form the core of fund monitoring;
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — transparent vote justification and case-based coalition-building frame the Ukraine policy;
  • Legal foundations (background material) — the delimitation of EU conditionality and the domestic legal relation: the treaty-based legal basis of the fund condition is the EU foundational-value article.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Daniel Kaufmann and co-authors: Governance Matters

Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón break the quality of governance into measurable dimensions, and show that these are closely connected to development outcomes:

“they then construct six aggregate indicators corresponding to six basic governance concepts: voice and accountability, political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and graft. As measured by these indicators, governance matters for development outcomes.”

According to the work’s argument, the rule of law and corruption control are not values for their own sake, but a measurable condition of growth and development. In the case of the release of EU funds this means: conditionality makes precisely these dimensions a condition of funds, so the released amount is put to good use if its use itself also improves governance quality — that is, it is transparent, traceable and accountable.

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann – Aart Kraay – Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

6.4.2 The Treaty on European Union (TEU)

Article 2 of the TEU lists the rule of law among the foundational values of the union — this gives the treaty-based legal basis of the conditionality mechanism. The withholding of funds is therefore not political arbitrariness, but a legal set of conditions derived from the treaty ratified by the member states. The Hungarian release of funds is interpretable in this frame: the adoption of the package is an institutional step of approaching the values fixed in Article 2 (rule of law, corruption control), whose credibility is measured by the execution.

📖 Source: Treaty on European Union (consolidated version), Article 2

6.4.3 OECD: EU Economic Survey 2025

The OECD’s current analysis fixes the practical limit of cohesion funds: effectiveness is determined not by the quantity of the funds, but by the quality of the control.

“the effectiveness of cohesion policy is limited by corruption and administrative capacity shortfalls — the solution is not less funding, but better control.”

In the Hungarian release of funds this is a two-directional lesson: the released amount brings genuine catch-up if the control (project-level monitoring, clawback, anomaly detector) is strong, but the administrative burden should not hit the small beneficiaries disproportionately — strong control for the large projects, simplified accounting for the small ones, is the balanced solution.

📖 Source: OECD: EU Economic Survey 2025

6.5 International comparison

In the accountability of EU funds, Estonia is the benchmark: thanks to the digital registration system and strong internal audit, the irregularity rate in the use of funds is the lowest in the EU (below 0.5%). Poland, in the 2014–2020 cohesion cycle, moderated the share of suspicious procedures by introducing a public-procurement “red flag” (risk-signalling) system. The common lesson is that accountability is not the enemy of funds, but the condition of effectiveness — precisely the operational realisation of the principle “not less funding, but better control” formulated by the OECD. The Hungarian release of funds will be successful if it follows this digital, project-level control model, rather than making the rapid drawdown of funds the sole aim.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability (clawback, 100% project audit)
  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency (anomaly detector)
  • A3 — Machine-readable publicity of asset declarations
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy (public vote justification)
  • KP6 — Multilateral–bilateral strategy differentiation
  • KP23 — Allied credibility audit

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 24 June 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann – Aart Kraay – Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters
  • 📖 Treaty on European Union (TEU), Article 2
  • 📖 OECD: EU Economic Survey 2025

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A8, A2, A3, A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP3, KP6, KP23)
  • MIAK press monitor, 24 June 2026 — topic 3, score: 80/100

Additional public data sources:

  • European Commission — recovery plan milestones, EU rule-of-law report
  • OECD EU Economic Survey 2025; Transparency International CPI

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