Part I — Situation overview

On the evening of Sunday 28 June 2026, Prime Minister Péter Magyar publicly called on the boards of the public-interest asset-management foundations facing dissolution by 31 August — the “kekvák” in the press — to refrain until then from any decision, commitment or contract affecting the value, composition or ownership of state assets. The call would narrow the boards’ room for manoeuvre to transactions falling within “ordinary business operations”, and warns: whoever acts contrary to this may bear criminal and civil-law liability (MIAK press monitor, 28–29 June 2026 — Telex, 24.hu, ATV). In the days of the announcement, businessmen close to the NER left their board positions one after another: Sándor Csányi from the foundation responsible for the Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Sciences and the University of Sopron, Oszkár Világi from the maintainer of the University of Miskolc, József Váradi from the foundation managing Corvinus; and at the Tokaj-Hegyalja University the senate is pushing for the departure of board chair György Wáberer.

The topic is more than a personnel story, because the KEKVA model (the public-interest asset-management foundation — a foundation performing a public task, typically higher education, operating in a private-law form and endowed with state assets) is one of the most contested institutions of the post-2021 transformation. The essence of the model is that universities and significant asset elements — land, share packages, real estate — previously in state ownership were transferred into private-law foundations, typically with indefinite board mandates and narrow recallability. This transformation was built precisely on irreversibility: it locked the disposal over public assets into a private-law structure insulated from any change of public power. Now, as the announced deadline of the dissolution approaches, this construction has become one of the most sensitive financial-legal points of the transition of power — the question being how public assets can be protected from “last-minute” siphoning off without the protection itself overstepping the rule-of-law framework.

According to MIAK’s reading the protection of public assets is a legitimate and urgent goal, but the way of protecting decides whether we are speaking of a rule-of-law step or a precedent-setting instrument of power. A political call is in itself a weak legal basis: the boards can be bound with binding force by a statute or a court act, not by a communiqué. The goal is therefore not to replace the action, but to steer it onto a rule-of-law track — because what protects public assets today can, in the wrong hands, be turned against them just as easily tomorrow.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame within which the question of the kekva assets can be interpreted. The American legal scholar-economist Susan Rose-Ackerman, one of the founders of corruption research, describes precisely the risk of the post-socialist transition in her work Corruption and Government: when essentially the entire wealth of the state is “up for grabs”, the weakness of the institutions regulating access opens the gate to abusive asset acquisition. The famous formula of Robert Klitgaard, the classic of American corruption economics — corruption = monopoly + discretion − accountability (in English C = M + D − A) — describes exactly the situation of the boards facing dissolution: a monopoly position over public assets, broad discretion, weak accountability. And the volume Why Nations Fail by the economists Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (who received the Nobel Memorial Prize in economics in 2024) provides, with the opposition of extractive and inclusive institutions, the conceptual basis of the “rule-of-law guarantee, not revenge” frame: the sustainable solution is not the turning of power to the benefit of a narrow group, but the broad, predictable protection of property rights. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that turn the protection of public assets from a political call into a predictable, rule-of-law procedure.

3.1 A statutory-level, targeted asset freeze (immediately, for the transitional period)

The legal binding force of the prime-ministerial call is limited: the board of a private-law foundation is bound not by a statement but only by a legal rule or a court act. MIAK therefore proposes that the call be replaced by a statutory-level, targeted asset freeze for the transitional period, which itemises which transactions are forbidden (alienation of an asset element, encumbrance, long-term commitment) and which fall within the “ordinary business operations” unavoidable for operation. The freeze should be built on the logic of A6 (strengthening of checks and balances): a clear scope, a definite duration, and a clear liability rule attached to breach. Thus, for a board member it is not a question of interpretation what they may do — the prohibition is legally enforceable, not a moral appeal. In Klitgaard’s framework (see 6.4.2) this step strengthens the A (accountability) factor: the discretion is forced into bounds by an external, legal constraint.

3.2 A public, itemised asset inventory and due diligence (within 60 days)

For public assets to be protectable and later recoverable, one must first know what is in the foundations. MIAK proposes the preparation of an independent, auditor-certified, itemised asset inventory for every KEKVA facing dissolution: real estate, land, share packages, cash, contingent liabilities and a review of the asset movements of the recent period. The inventory — with the protection of business secrets and personal data — should be made public, so that the public sees what is being managed in its name. This is an extension of the principle of A3 (publicity of asset declarations) to the managed public assets: transparency is not a punishment but a tool for restoring trust. The public inventory at the same time also prevents endless insinuation — what is documented and accounted for need not be supplemented with assumptions.

3.3 A rule-of-law redesign of the KEKVA regulation (in parallel with the dissolution)

The fault of the current model is not the foundation form in itself, but the built-in unaccountability: the indefinite mandate, the narrow recallability and the locking of public property into a private-law structure. MIAK proposes that, in parallel with the dissolution, a new, rule-of-law framework for public-asset management be prepared: fixed-term, renewable mandates, a mandatory annual disclosure and accounting order, parliamentary and audit-office control, and a prohibition on the irreversible alienation of managed assets without a separate statutory authorisation. This does not harm the autonomy of higher-education institutions but protects it: the academic self-government of the university and the transparency of asset management are not opposites. Building the framework also fits the institutional logic of A10 (independent anti-corruption investigation office, CPIB model) — investigating unjustified asset growth is the task of an independent body, not of a political act.

These three proposals are bound together by a single principle: public assets are protected by a statute, not a call; and the protection is sustainable if the same predictable, transparent procedure binds today’s and the future government alike. This is the practical application of the inclusive-institutional logic described by Rose-Ackerman and Acemoglu–Robinson: the rules of property rights and accountability apply equally to everyone.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Public assets The statutory freeze and the asset inventory prevent “last-minute” asset stripping and document the public property Too broad a freeze could paralyse the daily operation of universities (wages, utilities, research contracts)
Rule of law Instead of the political call, the statutory basis makes the action predictable and challengeable before a court If the action appears as revenge, it sets a precedent for public power becoming a tool against assets
Higher education Transparent asset management strengthens university autonomy and the predictability of funding The transitional uncertainty may, in the short term, disturb planning and retention

The main consideration is the precision of the scope and the fairness of the procedure. The proposal tips to the risk side if the asset freeze is indiscriminate and boundless: then it also blocks the everyday transactions necessary for operation, and the measure creates the appearance of a political settling of scores. The proposal works, however, if the freeze is targeted (forbidding only the asset-stripping transactions), of definite duration (for the transition), and challengeable with a legal remedy — that is, the protection itself also proceeds according to the rules of the rule of law. The publicity of the inventory moreover builds self-fulfilling trust: a transparent procedure reduces suspicion in both directions.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

A few suggested performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) from which it will be visible in 6–24 months whether the direction is good:

  • Whether a statutory-level, targeted asset freeze for the transitional period, replacing the call, is born.
  • Whether the independent-auditor-certified, itemised asset inventory of every KEKVA facing dissolution is prepared and made public.
  • Whether the new public-asset-management framework contains fixed-term mandates, mandatory annual accounting and audit-office control.
  • Whether the number of disputed, suspicious asset movements falls during the transitional period (measured against the inventory).
  • Whether Hungary’s governance-quality indicator improves in the medium term (World Bank WGI — control of corruption, which was −0.17 in 2024).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers and the public alike: the protection of public assets is right and urgent, but the strength of the protection depends on the rule-of-law form. MIAK asks the government to replace the prime-ministerial call with a statutory-level, targeted asset freeze, to have a public and certified asset inventory prepared, and to redesign the whole framework of public-asset management in parallel with the dissolution — with predictable rules applying equally to everyone. This approach moves two MIAK foundational values: accountability — because the fate of public assets can be tracked only in a documented, verifiable procedure — and transparency — because the public asset inventory is the only thing that replaces suspicion with fact, and prevents asset protection from being distorted into a political settling of scores. The two here are not abstract labels: it depends on them whether holding to account stays within the rule of law or itself becomes a precedent.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The topic mobilised the whole spectrum, but with sharply differing emphases. The liberal-left and public-affairs band (Telex, 24.hu, ATV, Népszava) placed at the centre the prime-ministerial call and the intention to protect the assets, highlighting the warning of criminal-civil liability and the danger of “last-minute clearing out”. HVG approached more in a nuanced way: through the case of Wáberer’s Tokaj-Hegyalja University it showed precisely the opposite tension as well — when the board does not transfer the HUF 1.27 billion of the second-half budget figuring in the university’s budget — that is, that the conflict between asset management and university autonomy is not one-directional. The conservative band (Mandiner) reported typically in a factual, neutral tone on the board resignations, without substantive evaluation. Looking at the spectrum as a whole, it is striking that the question of legal form — whether a call is a sufficient basis for restricting the boards — barely appeared: the dominant framing was the intention (to protect or to siphon off the assets), not the rule-of-law quality of the action.

6.2 Facts and data

Indicator Value Source
Announced deadline of the KEKVA dissolution 31 August 2026 Telex, 28 June 2026
Tokaj-Hegyalja University withheld 2nd-half funding HUF 1.27 billion HVG, 25 June 2026
Hungary WGI 2024 — control of corruption −0.17 World Bank WGI
Hungary WGI 2024 — rule of law +0.35 World Bank WGI
Hungary WGI 2024 — government effectiveness +0.42 World Bank WGI

Since the 2021 introduction of the KEKVA model, a decisive part of Hungarian state higher education has come into public-interest asset-management foundation maintenance, with significant asset elements (land, share packages, real estate). The precise, itemised asset stock is unknown in the absence of a public, certified inventory — which is precisely why the 3.2 proposal makes the inventory the first step of the process.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the publicity of asset declarations and of managed public assets (A3), checks and balances (A6) and independent investigative capacity (A10) provide the institutional framework of the action;
  • Education (background material) — the reconciliation of university autonomy and the transparency of asset management; the predictability of the funding of higher-education institutions;
  • Justice (background material) — the legal boundary between the private-law foundation and public assets, the statutory basis of the asset freeze and the provision of legal remedy.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Susan Rose-Ackerman describes the specific risk of the post-socialist transition: when in a country undergoing systemic change essentially the entire wealth of the state is up for distribution, the stakes are extremely high, and the weakness of the institutions regulating access opens the gate to the abusive acquisition of assets.

„The stakes are especially high in Eastern Europe and the countries formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nothing less than the entire wealth of the state is up for grabs. […] Both criminal groups and legitimate business concerns seek to share in the wealth."

In the case of the KEKVA assets this means that in the weeks before the dissolution public property is especially vulnerable — which is precisely why not the declaration of intention but the institutional framework legally restricting access (a statutory freeze, a public inventory) is the real tool of protection, as MIAK’s A3 and A6 programme points formulate it.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Robert Klitgaard’s influential formula summarises the structural conditions of corruption: abuse flourishes where the decision-maker is in a monopoly position, has broad discretion, and is weakly accountable.

„Illicit behavior flourishes when agents have monopoly power over clients, when agents have great discretion, and when accountability of agents to the principal is weak. A stylized equation holds: CORRUPTION = MONOPOLY + DISCRETION − ACCOUNTABILITY"

The boards facing dissolution are precisely in this situation over the managed public assets: a monopoly position, broad discretion, weak accountability. MIAK’s proposal acts precisely on the last term, accountability (A) — the statutory freeze and the public inventory set a legal constraint before the discretion, so that the assets do not depend on the judgement of a single body.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.3 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Acemoglu and Robinson explain, with the opposition of extractive and inclusive institutions, why some countries grow rich and others stay poor. According to them the source of poverty is the arrangement in which a narrow elite turns public power to its own enrichment at the expense of society.

„Egypt is poor precisely because it has been ruled by a narrow elite that have organized society for their own benefit at the expense of the vast mass of people. Political power has been narrowly concentrated, and has been used to create great wealth for those who possess it."

The stake of the KEKVA affair is precisely the reverse of this: the recovery of public assets strengthens inclusive institutions if it happens with predictable rules applying equally to everyone — and it reproduces the extractive logic if it becomes the tool of yet another narrow circle. This gives the conceptual basis of MIAK’s “rule-of-law guarantee, not revenge” position.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

6.5 International comparison

For the transitional protection of public assets, the rule-of-law pattern is the targeted, statute-based asset freeze, ordered by a court or legislative act, with a precisely circumscribed scope and a possibility of legal remedy — as opposed to a political appeal, which has no enforceable legal consequence. According to the established practice of public-asset recovery (the experience of international asset-recovery cooperations, for example the World Bank–UNODC StAR initiative), the key to success is not speed but documentation: the itemised asset inventory and the independent, evidence-based procedure. And the Singaporean and Hong Kong pattern of anti-corruption institution-building (the CPIB and the ICAC respectively) shows that the lasting result is brought not by a one-off settling of scores but by an independent, permanent institution — this is what MIAK’s A10 programme point carries forward.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations
  • A6 — Strengthening of checks and balances
  • A10 — Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)

Suggested new programme point: Rule-of-law framework for public-interest asset-management foundations (fixed-term mandate, mandatory annual accounting, audit-office control, alienation prohibition) — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 29 June 2026 — top-10 topics, 2nd place):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Note: the local file path of the books does NOT appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A3, A6, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Education (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 29 June 2026 — topic 2, score: 84/100

Additional public data sources:

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024; Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index; World Bank–UNODC StAR (Stolen Asset Recovery) asset-recovery practice

Generation metadata