Part I — Situation overview

On 27 June 2026 Telex reported that within a short time several well-known businesspeople had resigned from their university asset-management foundation posts. Sándor Csányi, chairman of OTP, departed as of 15 June from the boards of trustees of the foundation maintaining the Hungarian University of Agriculture and Life Sciences and of the Foundation for the University of Sopron; his place on the two bodies was taken by Tamás Éder and Péter Csóka respectively. Oszkár Világi, deputy CEO of Mol, stepped out of the board of the foundation maintaining the University of Miskolc (his successor is Pál Veres), and had earlier departed from the maintainer of the University of Theatre and Film Arts. József Váradi, head of Wizz Air, resigned from the board of the Maecenas Universitatis Corvini Foundation operating Corvinus University of Budapest — here the chairman’s duties were taken over by György Bacsa. The series was opened a few days earlier by Zsolt Hernádi, chairman-CEO of Mol, likewise at Corvinus. HVG also wrote that the senate of Tokaj-Hegyalja University had publicly signalled that board chairman György Wáberer and his circle should also depart.

The common background of the personnel movements is the transformation of the system of public-interest asset-management foundations performing public tasks — spelled out at first mention: KEKVA. At the 2020–2021 model change numerous state universities were placed under such foundation maintenance, with the assets and the decisions over operation entrusted to the boards of trustees. According to the regulation initiated by the new government and expected to be adopted soon, the non-university KEKVAs may continue to operate in their current form still this summer, and the university maintainers until 1 August 2027 at the latest; meanwhile the conditions for board and supervisory-committee membership are significantly tightened. The change also aims to settle the conflict-of-interest rules objected to by the European Union, which is one of the conditions for releasing the frozen EU funds. The affected foundations themselves have stated that the boards’ room for manoeuvre is expected to narrow significantly — this is what led to the resignations.

According to MIAK’s reading, the dismantling of the model-changing structure is in itself neither a merit nor a fault: the question is what replaces it. The main fault of the current system was that in the asset-management bodies high discretionary power was paired with an absence of accountability and transparency — it is precisely this combination that is risky. If the present transformation brings only a swap of names, or causes another rushed model-change shock with financing stalemates like that at Tokaj-Hegyalja University, then the character of the problem does not change, only the actors.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. In his book World Class, Andreas Schleicher (the father of the international student measurement of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the OECD — the PISA programme) shows with international data that institutional autonomy and accountability are not each other’s opposites but each other’s conditions: where independence is not accompanied by knowledge-sharing and genuine control, autonomy can even worsen performance. Robert Klitgaard’s (American economist, one of the founders of corruption research) C = M + D − A formula — corruption equals monopoly position plus discretionary power minus accountability — is a direct argument that emptying out the boards solves little in itself if the monopoly position and the discretionary power remain without accountability. According to Susan Rose-Ackerman (American legal scholar-economist, a leading researcher of conflict of interest and the anti-corruption institutional system), durable reform depends not on the replacement of persons but on institutionalised guarantees that survive changes of political coalition and personnel. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures so that the KEKVA transformation provides a stable framework, not new uncertainty.

3.1 Board membership tied to professional accreditation (until the August 2027 deadline)

The conditions for board and supervisory-committee membership should be determined not merely by the exclusion of political or business conflict of interest, but also by a positive professional yardstick: proven higher-education, scientific, asset-management or institution-governance competence, with public competition and pre-fixed eligibility criteria. In Klitgaard’s C = M + D − A framework (see 6.4.2) this strengthens the A, the accountability factor: membership comes into being not on a personal relationship of trust but on verifiable professional conditions. The proposal fits the 1 August 2027 statutory transitional deadline — the finalisation of the membership conditions must be completed by then, so that the new bodies are set up not in a transitional vacuum but with a clear yardstick. This connects directly to the strengthening of A6 checks and balances: the asset-management body fulfils its control role only if its composition is not the subject of political bargaining. Responsible: the portfolio responsible for higher education and the exerciser of the founder’s rights, with the mandatory opinion of the affected senates.

3.2 Public, machine-readable asset management (for the whole transitional period)

Every university asset-management foundation should publish — in machine-readable, not PDF, format — the composition of the managed assets, the use of the yields, the sums transferred to and withheld from the university, and the justifications of the board’s decisions. The case of Tokaj-Hegyalja University, where according to HVG the board is withholding 1.27 billion forints for an unknown reason, endangering the September start of the academic year, shows exactly what happens with opaque asset management. Publicity here is not an end in itself: it extends the logic of the A3 asset-declaration principle to the bodies managing public assets — it should be not a document but comparable data. This also points in the same direction as the accountability expectations required for releasing the EU funds. Responsible: the boards of the foundations, the disclosure standard set by the higher-education portfolio, deadline the start of the next financial year.

3.3 Multi-year financing guarantee and senate powers independent of the political cycle

One of the promises of the model change was predictable financing; in practice, cases like that of Tokaj-Hegyalja University showed exactly the opposite. MIAK proposes a statutorily fixed, multi-year (at least three-year, rolling) financing guarantee that makes the university’s basic operation independent of the decisions of individual board cycles or changes of government, and supplements it with the element Schleicher emphasises (see 6.4.1): professional autonomy is guaranteed by the senate’s real, politically-cycle-independent power over teaching and research questions. This also connects to the O5 civic and institutional awareness programme point, insofar as university autonomy is a living example of institutional checks and balances. Responsible: the National Assembly by enacting the financing formula into law, on the government’s proposal.

These three proposals are bound together by a single principle: autonomy and accountability do not strain against each other but work together. The professional yardstick, public asset management and predictable financing together make the asset-management body a genuine control organ rather than a new form of opacity.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Education More predictable operation, strengthening of senate professional powers, more stable start of the academic year Another model-change shock: if the transition is rushed, financing stalemates (see Tokaj-Hegyalja) recur
Transparency Machine-readable asset management, meeting the EU conflict-of-interest expectations, release of funds The trap of name-swapping: the members change, but the opaque practice remains
Economy More efficient, verifiable asset management, more predictable research and development spending During an overly strict, slow transition the yield of the assets remains unused, the university underfinanced

The main trade-off is the pace and content of the transition. If by the August 2027 deadline only the personnel composition of the membership changes, but the boards’ room for manoeuvre and accountability are not settled, then the reform remains formal — according to the Klitgaard framework the monopoly position and the discretionary power still persist without accountability. The proposal tips to the risk side if the financing guarantee and professional accreditation are omitted, and the political logic simply replaces the previous actors. It works if the three elements are built in together: professional yardstick, publicity and predictable financing.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested performance indicators)

The success of the proposal is worth tracking with a few concrete, suggested performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators):

  • the share of new board members chosen on a public, professional eligibility criterion — suggested target: 100% by the August 2027 transition;
  • the share of university foundations publishing machine-readable asset-management data — suggested target: 100% from the next financial year;
  • the number of academic-year starts endangered by a financing stalemate — suggested target: 0 (prevention of Tokaj-Hegyalja-type cases);
  • the share of universities with at least a three-year, rolling financing guarantee — suggested target: durable rise until 2028.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message is simple: the dismantling of the KEKVA model is a step forward if a stable, professional framework takes its place, not another wave of transformation. MIAK asks the decision-makers that by the August 2027 deadline they settle not only the personnel composition of the boards but also the professional yardstick of membership, the publicity of asset management and the multi-year financing guarantee — and that the transition cause no operational disruption at any university. And it asks the public to measure success not by the swap of names but by transparency and predictability. Two MIAK foundational values move here directly: accountability, because a body managing public assets fulfils its genuine role only with a verifiable professional yardstick and public management; and transparency, because it is precisely opaque asset management that both the EU objections and the domestic scandals put at the centre.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the liberal-left and public-affairs band, Telex brought the case first, in a detailed, board-by-board breakdown (who departed, when, from which body, who is the successor), and placed the resignations clearly in the context of the dismantling of the model-changing structure. HVG’s domestic column took over and summarised the departures, separately highlighting the crisis of confidence around Tokaj-Hegyalja University linked to György Wáberer — here the framing places the emphasis on the financing stalemate and the endangering of the university’s operation. 24.hu passed on Telex’s report in a factual, shorter form.

In the economic band, Portfolio reported the resignations citing Telex, and — more emphatically than the other papers — highlighted the connection to the EU release of funds: the KEKVA transformation as the instrument for settling the rules objected to by the European Union. In the conservative band Mandiner framed the news more narrowly, focusing on Sándor Csányi’s resignation from the board chairmanship, without highlighting the full model-change-dismantling narrative. Across the spectrum as a whole there is no substantive dispute about the facts; the difference is in the emphasis — between highlighting the EU conditionality (economic band), the financing crisis (HVG), and the factual registration (public-affairs and conservative band).

6.2 Facts and data

Fact Value / date Source
Report on the resignations 27 June 2026 Telex
Date of Sándor Csányi’s resignation 15 June 2026 Telex
Sum withheld at Tokaj-Hegyalja University HUF 1.27 billion HVG (25 June 2026)
Final deadline for the current form of university KEKVAs 1 August 2027 Portfolio / Telex
Transformation of non-university KEKVAs Summer 2026 Telex
Hungary government effectiveness (WGI) +0.42 World Bank WGI 2024
Hungary control of corruption (WGI) −0.17 World Bank WGI 2024

The negative control-of-corruption indicator (World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, WGI 2024) and the objected-to conflict-of-interest rules are directly connected: the EU release of funds expects precisely the strengthening of institutional control — the KEKVA transformation is one element of this.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Education (programme points and background material) — higher-education autonomy, the question of senate professional powers and predictable financing; the O5 programme treats university autonomy as a living example of institutional checks and balances.
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the conflict of interest of asset-management bodies, public asset management and the strengthening of checks and balances (A3, A6).
  • Economy (background material) — the efficient, verifiable management of public assets and the macroeconomic stake of the EU release of funds.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Andreas Schleicher: World Class

Analysing the common features of effective education systems, Schleicher shows that autonomy and accountability are not mutually exclusive principles. In the example of the Singaporean reform, greater school independence went hand in hand with new forms of accountability: the old supervisory system was replaced by a school-excellence model in which every institution sets its own goals and measures its progress annually, with an external review every six years. At the same time he warns:

„PISA data show that in school systems where knowledge is shared among teachers, autonomy is a positive advantage; but in school systems without a culture of peer learning and accountability, autonomy might actually adversely affect student performance."

Schleicher also proposes, on the model of the professions — medicine, engineering, the legal career — profession-led standard-setting and quality assurance that institutionalises “the two kinds of autonomy and public accountability”. For university asset-management bodies this translates directly into the point that autonomy is an advantage only if it is paired with a professional yardstick and public control — emptying out the boards does not by itself create this framework.

📖 Source: Andreas Schleicher: World Class — How to Build a 21st-Century School System

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

According to Klitgaard’s principal–agent–client model, abuse flourishes where the agent has a monopoly position and broad discretionary power, while accountability towards the principal is weak. This is condensed in the equation that became famous:

„CORRUPTION = MONOPOLY + DISCRETION − ACCOUNTABILITY"

The point is that the ownership form does not in itself decide the risk: as Klitgaard writes, “if the monopoly position and the discretionary power remain”, privatised distribution does not reduce the harm either — the key is competition and accountability. In the case of university asset management this means that, in the absence of control over the board (publicity, professional yardstick, financing guarantee), the mere dismantling of the model-changing structure does not reduce the risk of abuse — only the strengthening of the A factor does.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.3 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman regards the regulation of conflict of interest as a basic element of the anti-corruption institutional system, and stresses that durable reform depends not on the replacement of persons but on the institutionalisation of the guarantees:

„[Reforms] must … be institutionalized so that they will endure changes in personnel and changes in the political coalition. Policies that seem politically costly to reverse include those that increase the transparency and accountability of government operations …"

Translated to the asset-management bodies: if the transformation only settles the current composition of the boards but does not build in transparency and accountability guarantees fixed in law that survive changes of personnel and coalition, then in the next cycle the same problem can return. In MIAK’s proposal the multi-year financing guarantee and the machine-readable disclosure target precisely this institutionalised durability.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.5 International comparison

Schleicher’s Singaporean and English (academies) examples also give an operational model. In Singapore, greater institutional independence is counterbalanced by mandatory, regular external review and clear excellence criteria — autonomy and control grew at the same time. The English academy system shows that the increased independence of state schools works if at the same time they provide mandatory public performance data and remain accountable to the public. The lesson of both is the same as in the case of Hungarian university asset management: independence does not equal the absence of control — it is the institutionalised coexistence of the two that gives good governance.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations (the principle of machine-readable disclosure)
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

Education

  • O5 — Civic and institutional awareness (university autonomy as an institutional example)
  • O3 — Data-driven education development

Suggested new programme point: Transparency and financing guarantee framework for higher-education asset management — for the Education and Transparency and anti-corruption policy areas.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 28 June 2026 — top-10 topics):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Andreas Schleicher: World Class — How to Build a 21st-Century School System
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Education (programme points; programme point ID: O5)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Education (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 28 June 2026 — topic 4, score: 80/100

Additional public data sources (if used):

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 — government effectiveness, control of corruption

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