Part I — Situation overview

On 29 May 2026, at a Brussels press conference held with the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, Péter Magyar announced that, with the exception of those maintaining universities, the public-interest asset-management foundations (KEKVA) — including the one maintaining the Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC) — will be abolished by the end of summer, with an August 31 deadline; for the foundations operating universities there will be a transitional period running until 31 August 2027. KEKVA is a legal form created by Act IX of 2021, into which — according to press reports and the data of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ) — a total of roughly 3,000 billion forints of state assets passed into the management of boards close to the government — of which the MCC alone received more than 500 billion (444.hu). The MCC reacted the same day, in a Facebook statement: it indicated that if the National Assembly abolishes the KEKVA form, the institution will continue its talent-nurturing and educational activity as an ordinary foundation — according to 24.hu’s summary, the institution denied that it would cease to exist.

The announcement is a further station in a longer institutional debate. The KEKVA model is one of the most contested public-law innovations of recent years: its critics hold that the construction withdrew part of the public assets and the associated future budgetary payments from the oversight of the sitting parliament, while securing lasting influence for the boards in place at the time of establishment. Its defenders hold that this same permanence means predictable financing, protected from political fluctuation, for the universities and cultural institutions. The fresh announcement now sharpens the question: in the shadow of the released EU funds and the Brussels reform expectations, in post-government-change Hungary the transparency of public-asset management has become one of the watershed topics.

In MIAK’s reading the stake is not the “liquidation” of the MCC as an institution, but leading public assets back into transparent, accountable management — in such a way that, meanwhile, the balance between foundation autonomy and public-money control is settled in a rule-of-law manner. The character of the problem is twofold: parliamentary accountability must be restored and at the same time the professional independence and plannability of the functioning educational-scholarly institutions must be preserved.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the conceptual framework in which the KEKVA question can be interpreted. According to the famous formula of Robert Klitgaard (American economist, one of the founders of the economic-institutional theory of corruption), C = M + D − A (corruption = monopoly + discretion − accountability), the risk of abuse is greatest where an actor decides about resources in a monopoly position, with broad discretionary power, alongside weak accountability. The KEKVA construction embodies exactly this combination: the boards received a lasting, practically irrevocable right of disposal over public assets, while parliamentary and public accountability weakened — that is, the A (accountability) term of the formula decreased. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that restore the accountability of public assets without endangering institutional autonomy.

3.1 Itemised asset inventory and a public public-money data sheet (within 60 days)

The first step is full transparency: for every public-interest asset-management foundation marked for abolition, an itemised, machine-readable, public inventory should be drawn up of its assets — real estate, holdings, financial instruments, future budgetary commitments. This is not data publication for its own sake: in the Klitgaard framework (see 6.4.1) this directly strengthens the A (accountability) factor, because the public can verify what passed and what is passing back into public-asset status. The inventory is worth accompanying, in line with the logic of A2 public-procurement and asset-management transparency, with AI-based anomaly screening, so that no undocumented movements of value arise during the transfer and reclaiming of assets. Responsible: the government body in charge of asset management and the independent audit; the inventory should appear as a public data sheet in line with the principles of A8 cohesion/asset-management accountability.

3.2 The rule-of-law procedure of abolition — law, debate, deadline (in the first phase of the parliamentary cycle)

The legal form of abolishing the KEKVAs is a law, adopted by the National Assembly on the government’s proposal — not a government decree. This is not a formality: the asset-management foundations were originally created by law (Act IX of 2021) too, and the basis of the present settlement would be laid by the Tisza government’s first amendment of the Fundamental Law, which would declare that the assets of a public-interest asset-management foundation are national assets. Thus the reversal too must take place at the level of law, in a public parliamentary debate, with appropriate transitional deadlines. MIAK proposes that the bill contain a mandatory impact assessment on the operation of the affected institutions, and that it ensure a predictable transitional period (at least one full school year), so that institutions similar to the MCC or the foundation universities do not fall into a financing vacuum. The goal is to dissolve institutional state capture with rule-of-law instruments, not an opposite-signed, equally two-thirds-reliant swift power gesture.

3.3 Guarantees of educational-scholarly autonomy (as part of the law)

The restoration of public-money control must not conflate the maintainer structure with the professional content. MIAK proposes that the law on abolition contain separate guarantees for scholarly and educational autonomy: the professional independence of the curriculum, research directions and staffing decisions should not be affected by the change of maintainer. In the spirit of O5 civic and institutional awareness, the content of autonomy must be fixed with objective, public criteria, and according to the principle of KU5 cultural participation index and open culture-financing, the distribution of future state support should be placed on a data-based, non-discretionary platform. In this way the government-linked control is dismantled, but the plannability of the functioning institutions remains.

All three proposals are organised around a single principle: the disposal over state assets returns under the oversight of the public and parliament, while professional-scholarly independence remains intact. In the Klitgaard frame this means that the monopoly and the uncontrolled discretionary power are not taken over by another political actor, but accountability is institutionalised.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Public assets / finance The withdrawn state assets and future funds return under parliamentary budgetary control; transparent accounting Legal uncertainty around the status of the assets during the transition; protracted lawsuits
Education / science Clearer maintainer responsibility, more predictable public financing in the long run Disruption of the school year, damage to research and staffing plannability if there is no transitional guarantee
Public trust / rule of law Restoring the accountability of public-asset management strengthens institutional trust The appearance of a “settling of scores” if the procedure is not rule-of-law-based but a swift political gesture

The main dilemma is timing and form. The proposal works if the abolition takes place by way of law, with an impact assessment and a real transitional deadline. It tips to the risk side if the process is accelerated at the expense of rule-of-law guarantees: in that case the functioning institutions may fall into a financing vacuum, and the status of the assets may sink into protracted legal disputes — which would undermine precisely the goal of transparency. The key is that accountability be institutionalised, not merely that the personnel composition of control be swapped.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following performance indicators (KPIs) over the next 6–18 months:

  • Asset-inventory coverage: what percentage of the foundations marked for abolition have an itemised, public, machine-readable asset data sheet available (target: 100% by the entry into force of the law).
  • Rule-of-law form: whether the abolition took place by law, in a public parliamentary debate and with a mandatory impact assessment (yes/no, documented).
  • Institutional continuity: whether, in the affected educational institutions, the 2026/2027 school year started undisturbed, without a financing interruption.
  • Transition time: whether the law ensured the affected institutions at least one full school year of predictable transition.

These are suggested indicators worth tracking — not government decisions, but MIAK’s evaluation framework.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message is simple: leading public assets back into accountable management that parliament can oversee is a legitimate and supportable goal, but exclusively by rule-of-law means — by law, with public debate, an impact assessment and a predictable transition —, with the simultaneous guarantee of educational-scholarly autonomy. MIAK asks the decision-makers to ensure the publicity of the asset inventory and institutional continuity at the same time. The topic moves two MIAK foundational values: accountability, because disposal over public assets must always stand under the oversight of the public and parliament; and transparency, because the rearrangement of assets is credible only if every element of it is itemised and verifiably documented — this is precisely what distinguishes the rule-of-law settlement from a power-based settling of scores.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the press of 29 May 2026, the topic clearly organised itself around the fact of the abolition and the MCC’s counter-move, but the framing sharply diverged along the political spectrum. In the left-liberal and public-affairs band, HVG highlighted the announcement and the deadline (“Péter Magyar: We are abolishing the foundation maintaining the MCC”), while another HVG article already put the MCC’s reaction — the possibility of continuing as an ordinary foundation — at the centre. The headline of 444.hu (“They die, yet they would survive”) captured the paradox: the institution formally ceases to exist, but in substance it wants to continue. 24.hu highlighted the denial narrative: according to the MCC, they are not ceasing to exist.

In the government-critical–conservative band, Mandiner emphasised the scale of the announcement (“they are abolishing the KEKVA standing behind the MCC and a further dozen or so similar foundations”), framing the Tisza government’s measure as a broader intervention affecting the foundation sector. The various bands thus presented the same fact — the intent to abolish and the MCC’s resistance — with different emphases: the government-critical side highlighted the breadth of the intervention, and the pro-government side the extent of the impact on the sector.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Date of announcement: 29 May 2026 (source: HVG, Mandiner, 24.hu, 444.hu).
  • Deadline: 31 August (end of summer).
  • Scope: with the exception of those maintaining universities, the public-interest asset-management foundations; the KEKVA maintaining the MCC + a further “dozen or so” similar foundations (those falling under Act IX of 2021).
  • Asset endowment: the State Audit Office (ÁSZ) detected a total of roughly 3,000 billion forints of asset endowment at the KEKVAs; of this the MCC received more than 500 billion (444.hu).
  • Legal basis: the basis of the settlement would be laid by the Tisza government’s first amendment of the Fundamental Law (the classification of the assets as “national assets”).
  • MCC’s reaction (the same day): it would continue operating as an ordinary foundation; it denied ceasing to exist.
  • For further background data on the KEKVA model: the ÁSZ’s KEKVA reports, the asset data of Átlátszó and K-Monitor, and the foundation chapter of the EU rule-of-law report provide public sources.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the accountability of public-asset management, the publicity of the asset inventory and parliamentary control are the gravitational centre of the topic (A2, A8).
  • Education (programme points) — the maintainer rearrangement of the MCC and the foundation universities in the context of the higher-education model change, with the question of institutional autonomy (O5).
  • Culture (programme points) — the data-based, non-discretionary distribution of the financing of cultural and scholarly institutions (KU5).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard’s central thesis is that the risk of corruption and the abuse of public assets is structural: it arises where a monopoly position and broad discretionary power meet the absence of accountability. The formula C = M + D − A (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion − Accountability) does not moralise but describes institutional risk. Read in this frame, the KEKVA construction is problematic because the boards received a lasting, practically irrevocable right of disposal over public assets (high M and D), while parliamentary and public control weakened (low A). MIAK’s proposal aims precisely at restoring the A factor: the itemised asset inventory, the statutory procedure and the public accounting are not directed against the institutions, but supply the missing accountability without which any asset-management form — both the present and the future one — carries the risk of abuse.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.5 International comparison

Structures performing lasting state asset management, similar to public-interest asset-management foundations, exist in several countries (for example public-foundation university maintenance in Western Europe), and experience shows that the model works sustainably if the predictability of the lasting financing is paired with strong, mandatory public accounting and independent supervision. The difference is not in the legal form, but in how accountable the asset manager is: where the board’s decisions are accompanied by a public asset inventory, mandatory audits and parliamentary oversight, there permanence is an advantage; where these are absent, the Klitgaard risk materialises. The Hungarian settlement therefore should not liquidate the institution of asset management, but should build in accountability.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency
  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability

Education

  • O5 — Civic and institutional awareness

Culture

  • KU5 — Cultural participation index and open culture-financing

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 30 May 2026 — topic 5):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A2, A8)
  • MIAK policy area: Education (programme points; programme point ID: O5)
  • MIAK policy area: Culture (programme points; programme point ID: KU5)
  • MIAK press monitor, 30 May 2026 — topic 5, score: 76/100

Additional public data sources:

  • State Audit Office — KEKVA foundation reports
  • Átlátszó / K-Monitor — asset-data databases
  • European Commission — EU rule-of-law report (foundation chapter)

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