Part I — Situation overview

On 23 June 2026 the National Assembly adopted the new media law by a two-thirds majority (a political force above 134 mandates in the 199-member National Assembly, sufficient even for a constitutional amendment). The legislation abolishes the Media Service Support and Asset Management Fund (MTVA) and Duna Médiaszolgáltató Nonprofit Zrt., and creates the Independent Public Media Board. According to the latest, adopted version, three members of the nine-member board are nominated by media-professional organisations (they are elected by parliament for two years), while the remaining six members are political nominees. Under the board will fall the new Hungarian Radio and Television Nonprofit Zrt. and the transformed Hungarian News Agency. The new Media Council will have seven members — three nominated by governing-party representatives, three by the opposition, with the chair’s post put out to competition — and parliament, not the government, is responsible for the transition. The law also bans hate-inciting and dignity-violating political advertisements, restricts the self-promotion of the government and the parties outside campaign periods, and regulates the placement of commercial advertising carriers (street furniture, citylight) as well.

The topic is not new in Hungarian public life: the question of public media and media-market concentration has been one of the central issues of democratic debate for years, and MIAK too analysed the institutional stake of media pluralism in connection with the June Mediaworks layoffs. The present development, however, is qualitatively new: this is not about the reorganisation of one market actor, but about the complete re-regulation of the legal-institutional frame of public media — this is the point at which it is decided whether the change will be the ending of political directability or merely its rearrangement.

According to MIAK’s reading, eliminating the political directability of public media is the right and long-overdue aim — but the details of the execution decide whether this is a genuine increase in pluralism or a swap of power. If the six seats of the nine-member board continue to be filled by political nominees, there is a risk that it is not control that ceases, but only the circle of those exercising control that is swapped. For MIAK, media pluralism is not a matter of cultural taste but a democratic institutional guarantee — an indispensable element of the system of checks and balances.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the theoretical frame. According to the work Spin Dictators by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman (an economist and a political scientist, researchers of the modern operating mode of authoritarian regimes), today’s autocrats build, instead of open repression, on the subtle manipulation of the information space: the co-optation of the media (making it a fellow-traveller) and the squeezing-out carried out on seemingly non-political grounds are key instruments of maintaining power. The volume brings concrete Hungarian examples too of the indirect control of the media. Edward L. Bernays (the early-twentieth-century American pioneer of public-opinion shaping, one of the founders of public relations) in his work Propaganda describes the organised steering of public opinion as a technique of power — the metaphor of “the invisible governors who move the audience” remains the classic formulation of the danger of media concentration to this day. The common lesson of these two authors for the Hungarian media law: control over public media is a power resource, so the question is not who exercises it, but whether its appropriation by anyone can be institutionally constrained. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that turn the right aim of depoliticising public media into a genuine, measurable increase in pluralism — not merely a swap of those exercising power.

3.1 Board majority: limiting the share of political nominees

The Independent Public Media Board will be truly independent only if political nominees do not form a permanent majority on it. According to MIAK, the current 6:3 ratio (six political, three professional nominees) is the main risk to independence: this structure does not eliminate political control, it only rearranges it. MIAK proposes that the ratio of professional members (nominated by media-professional organisations) and political members be at least balanced, that members be elected by a two-thirds parliamentary majority (so that no single political force can dominate), and that a mandatory conflict-of-interest examination be attached to the appointments. This follows the logic of A6 (strengthening checks and balances): the aim is the actual, not nominal, independence of the institution.

3.2 HHI-based media-pluralism monitoring (annual report)

Pluralism must be measured, not declared. MIAK proposes an annual, public media-pluralism report that measures market concentration on the basis of the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI — a concentration measure computed from the shares of market actors) by television, online, radio and print segment, and reveals the ultimate ownership structure as well as the distribution of government advertising spending. This fits the frame of A7 (media pluralism as an institutional guarantee) and KU2 (media-pluralism monitoring): if the HHI of a segment exceeds a threshold, an automatic examination should be launched. Advertising restriction serves pluralism only if it also reduces concentration, rather than weakening the independent actors.

3.3 Statutorily fixed, automatic public-media funding

The material condition of public media’s independence is predictable funding, free from political bargaining. MIAK proposes that public media’s budget be determined by a statutorily fixed, GDP-proportional (tied to gross domestic product, GDP), automatic formula — so that the funding does not become an annual instrument of political blackmail. In the spirit of A9 (spin-dictatorship-prevention index), the model strengthens manipulation resistance: an independent editorial office cannot be blackmailed by shutting off the money tap. As a complement, KU7 (disinformation resilience) and D8 (disinformation-recognition AI system) strengthen the supply side: not through censorship, but through context and media literacy.

The common principle of the three proposals is actual, measurable independence: the composition of the board guarantees that no one can appropriate it, the monitoring measures whether the market is genuinely diverse, and the funding takes public media out of political bargaining — in the Guriev–Treisman frame this is precisely what distinguishes an increase in pluralism from a swap of power.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Democratic public sphere Board direction of public media can moderate direct political directability Because of the 6:3 political majority, control does not cease but is only rearranged (a swap of power)
Media market Advertising restriction and concentration monitoring can increase pluralism The advertising rules may hit small, independent actors disproportionately, if they are not targeted
Society / trust Independent, predictable public media can increase trust in the news source If the change is only a leadership swap, trust erodes further

The main consideration is the composition of the board and the predictability of the funding. The reform tips to the risk side if, behind the rhetoric of depoliticisation, the political majority remains, and the funding remains an annual political decision — then the label “independent” is formal, and the actual directability persists. The reform is successful if independence is measurable: a balanced board, falling market concentration, automatic funding.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following performance indicators (KPIs) — these are recommendations, not government decisions:

  • Board independence: the ratio of professional and political nominees on the Independent Public Media Board, and whether the election of members is tied to a two-thirds majority.
  • Media concentration: whether the HHI indicator of the television and online segment falls — worth tracking whether diversity genuinely grows.
  • Independent editorial offices: how many independent, nationally-covering news editorial offices operate sustainably.
  • Public-media trust: whether trust in public media (an Eurobarometer-type survey) rises.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request in a single sentence: the political directability of public media must genuinely be ended — with a balanced board elected by two-thirds, HHI-based pluralism monitoring and statutorily fixed, automatic funding — rather than by swapping those who exercise control.

This position follows from two MIAK foundational values. Transparency requires that the ownership structure of the media market, its concentration and the distribution of government advertising spending be publicly measurable — pluralism is not a matter of faith, but of data. Ideology-free operation, in turn, means that MIAK does not ask which political side should control public media, but how its appropriation by anyone can be excluded: the aim is not a swap of power, but an institutional structure that preserves diversity under every future majority too.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the liberal-left and public-affairs band, 444.hu presented the entire legislative package in its context (public media, inquiry committees, advertising rules, the EU-funds package), detailing the 6:3 composition of the Independent Public Media Board; 24.hu put the scant transition time of public-media leaders in the headline, focusing on the personnel consequences. In the economic band, Portfolio reported the personnel and organisational changes factually, as a fact of lawmaking. HVG placed the question in a broader, European context, noting that the crisis of public media is topical across Europe. ATV conveyed the news of the parliamentary adoption. On this day the spectrum differed not on the necessity of public-media reform, but on the assessment of the board’s composition and the persistence of political control — this confirms MIAK’s framing that the real stake is not the fact of reform, but the measurability of independence.

6.2 Facts and data

  • On 23 June 2026 the National Assembly adopted the new media law by a two-thirds majority.
  • The law abolishes the MTVA and Duna Médiaszolgáltató Nonprofit Zrt., and creates the Independent Public Media Board (nine members: three media-professional, six political nominees; the professional members are elected by parliament for two years).
  • The new Media Council will have seven members (three governing-party nominations, three opposition, a chair selected by competition); parliament is responsible for the transition.
  • The law bans hate-inciting and dignity-violating political advertisements, restricts political self-promotion outside the campaign period, and regulates the placement of commercial advertising carriers; advertisements not complying with the new rules must be removed by the end of the year.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — media pluralism as an institutional guarantee and HHI-based concentration monitoring form the core of the proposal;
  • Culture (programme points) — media-pluralism monitoring and disinformation resilience ground the social mission of public-service media;
  • Digitalisation and AI regulation (programme points) — the disinformation-recognition, open-source tool serves the strengthening of the supply side (media literacy, context).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Guriev–Treisman: Spin Dictators

According to Guriev and Treisman, modern autocrats build, instead of open violence, on the subtle handling of the information space, and media control often takes place on seemingly non-political grounds:

“Orbán’s team forced several radio stations to move from the airwaves to the internet, but they acted as if these were not matters of a political nature at all. One channel, Tilos Rádió, lost its broadcasting licence because swearing was heard in some of its programmes. The offence of another station, Klubrádió, was that it did not play enough Hungarian music.”

According to the authors’ argument, media control is a key instrument of the modern authoritarian system, which is effective precisely because it can be dressed in a technical-regulatory guise. In the case of the Hungarian public-media reform, this lesson holds in the reverse direction too: depoliticisation is credible if it institutionally excludes the appropriation of the media by any political force — otherwise the instrument of manipulation merely changes hands.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spindiktátorok (Spin Dictators)

6.4.2 Edward L. Bernays: Propaganda

Bernays describes the organised steering of public opinion as a technique of power, with the image of the “invisible governors”:

“»invisible governors«, »they who pull the wires which control the public mind«, »shrewd persons operating behind the scenes«”

According to Bernays’s analysis (and critique), control over mass communication is an instrument of shaping public opinion — the question is always who exercises it and with what transparency. In the frame of the Hungarian media law this means: the independence of public media is realised not when the “right” side controls it, but when the institutional structure itself constrains the formation of any version of the “invisible governors” — this is served by the balanced board and the public concentration measurement.

📖 Source: Edward L. Bernays: Propaganda

6.5 International comparison

In the institutional protection of media pluralism, Germany’s KEK model (the commission examining media-market concentration) is the benchmark: in 2006 the regular, professional concentration examination even blocked a large media merger. In public-media funding, Denmark (and several other Western European countries) moved towards the predictable model separated from annual political bargaining, which is the material condition of editorial independence. At EU level, the Media Pluralism Monitor and the media-freedom regulation (EMFA) provide the measurement and legal frame. The common lesson is that the independence of public media is not a one-off legislative amendment, but a measurable institutional state — precisely what HHI monitoring and a balanced board operationally realise.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A7 — Media pluralism as an institutional guarantee (HHI monitoring)
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A9 — Spin-dictatorship-prevention index

Culture

  • KU2 — Media-pluralism monitoring
  • KU7 — Disinformation resilience and media-literacy programme

Digitalisation and AI regulation

  • D8 — Disinformation-recognition AI system

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 24 June 2026 — topic 4):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spindiktátorok (Spin Dictators)
  • 📖 Edward L. Bernays: Propaganda

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title. Herman–Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent is available in the knowledge base only from a non-authentic source, so no verbatim quotation from it appears.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A7, A6, A9)
  • MIAK policy area: Culture (programme points; programme point ID: KU2, KU7)
  • MIAK policy area: Digitalisation and AI regulation (programme points; programme point ID: D8)
  • MIAK press monitor, 24 June 2026 — topic 4, score: 78/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Media Pluralism Monitor (CMPF, Florence); EU media-freedom regulation (EMFA)
  • Eurobarometer — media-trust surveys

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