Part I — Situation overview

On 15 June 2026 two mutually reinforcing processes converged on the Hungarian media market. On one hand Judit Grósz, ministerial commissioner for the public-service media, announced three concrete measures on reshaping the public media, and declared: whoever took part in dividing society, in “scaremongering”, must bear the responsibility. On the other hand — and this is the real novelty compared with the earlier public-media debates — the publisher Mediaworks announced the closure of Bors, Ripost and Metropol, as well as the halting of the print edition of three county dailies. The topic ran through the entire press spectrum: Telex, 24.hu, HVG, 444.hu, Mandiner and Magyar Nemzet all carried it.

The two processes can be interpreted together: the market collapse of the pro-government private media empire and the top-down reshaping of the public media pose the same question — what guarantees the diversity of the press if the political-advertising money flow that until now kept an entire family of papers alive dries up. For the sake of public-law precision: the reshaping of the public media is not decided in substance by a single announcement but by a statutory framework adopted by the National Assembly; the ministerial commissioner is the preparer of implementation, and Mediaworks is a privately owned market actor whose paper closures are business decisions, not official acts.

By MIAK’s reading the character of the problem is not which “side’s” media strengthens or weakens, but whether pluralism is an institutional guarantee or merely the momentary imprint of the political balance of forces. If the place of the now-departing one-sided content is filled by a one-sidedness pointing the other way, the reader is no better off — the goal is a lastingly diverse, reliable news supply.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the conceptual frame within which the operation of the media can be interpreted. According to the propaganda model of Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky (American media researcher and linguist–public intellectual), the content of the media is shaped by structural filters — above all the ownership structure and dependence on advertising revenue; this directly explains why a family of papers built on a political-advertising money flow collapses as soon as the money flow ceases. The classic description by Edward L. Bernays (one of the founders of modern opinion formation and public relations) of the conscious shaping of mass opinion frames the stake of the public-service media as an opinion-forming institution. Shoshana Zuboff (professor at the Harvard Business School, the creator of the concept of surveillance capitalism) describes the attention and advertising concentration of digital platforms — the dimension that traditional media-concentration measurement does not capture, even though pluralism today is in large part decided online. The detailed literature treatment can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that make media pluralism depend not on the persons of the leaders, but on structural guarantees.

3.1 The funding and governance autonomy of the public media — with a statutory formula (within the legislative cycle)

The independence of the public media is secured lastingly not by a change of leaders but by three structural guarantees, as MIAK’s A7 media-pluralism programme fixes: (1) funding by a statutorily fixed, GDP-proportionate (tied to gross domestic product, that is, the economy’s output in one year), automatic formula — independent of political bargaining; (2) multi-party and independent expert board oversight in appointments; (3) an editorial charter fixed in writing, which separates the ownership–political will from the day-to-day content. The aim is expressly not for a change of leadership to bring a new one-sidedness — the charter excludes precisely this, whoever is in charge.

3.2 Measuring and limiting media concentration (within the legislative cycle)

The closure of the Mediaworks papers sharpens the question of market concentration. MIAK proposes an annual, public measurement of media-market concentration on the basis of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI — the internationally established measure of market concentration), by segment (television, online, radio, print press). Above a threshold value (e.g. HHI 2500) the media authority automatically launches an examination, and reveals indirect, front-man-type ownership by connecting it with the ultimate-beneficial-owner register. The numerical goal: at least five independent, sustainable, nationally covering newsrooms, and the reduction of the television-market HHI below 2500 within three years (A7).

3.3 The digital space and disinformation resilience (within the institution-building cycle)

As the print papers retreat, the centre of gravity of the public sphere shifts into the online space and onto the global platforms, where traditional concentration measurement does not apply. MIAK’s A13 programme gives three answers to this: a national digital-media-literacy programme in public education; a fact-checking network financed from public funds but enjoying editorial independence; and a quarterly, public disinformation monitoring. This does not mean the market rescue of the private papers — the market collapse is a business consequence — but the protection of diverse and reliable information-seeking as a public good.

The common principle of these three proposals is that the freedom of the press is lasting if it rests on institutional guarantees, not on personnel constellations. A change of leaders is temporary; the funding formula, the concentration limit and the editorial charter survive the political cycle.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Public sphere / pluralism With structural guarantees, a lastingly more diverse, more reliable news supply If only a change of leaders takes place, the direction of one-sidedness changes but the structure does not — pluralism does not grow
Media market / economy Concentration measurement and ownership transparency can bring healthier competition Too aggressive regulation may deter investors and leave behind “news-free” regions (the loss of the county papers already signals this risk)
Digital space Media literacy and fact-checking strengthen resilience to disinformation The dominance of the global platforms is only partly reachable by domestic regulation; intervention may come at the expense of free speech if not precisely targeted

The main point to weigh is where the line runs between the protection of pluralism and market and free-speech freedom. The public-media reform works if the funding is formula-based and does not depend on political bargaining; the concentration limit, if it rests on transparent measurement and not on discretionary authority weighing. Where the intervention is aimed against a concrete content or actor, the protection of pluralism turns into its own opposite.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes the following performance indicators (KPIs) for tracking — not government decisions, but public handholds:

  • Diversity: how many independent, sustainable, nationally covering newsrooms operate (goal: at least five).
  • Concentration: the evolution of the television and online media-market HHI by year (goal: below 2500 in television within three years).
  • Public-media funding: whether a statutory, GDP-proportionate formula comes into force, and whether the public media’s trust index (Eurobarometer) rises (goal: from 30% above 50%).
  • Disinformation resilience: the annual reach of the media-literacy programme and the number of independent fact-checking newsrooms.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers and the public: let us measure the freedom of the press not by the persons of the leaders but by structural guarantees. Concretely, we ask that the public media receive statutorily fixed, formula-based funding, multi-party oversight and an editorial charter, and that the media market be protected by transparent concentration measurement — while the market fate of the private papers should not be overridden by the state. This topic engages two MIAK foundational values directly: openness, because a diverse, accessible public sphere is the condition of democratic information-seeking; and ideology-free governance, because pluralism is credible if it does not tip in favour of the current political direction, but protects the independent voices the same way whoever governs.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The topic engaged the entire spectrum, with differing emphases. The left-liberal and public-affairs band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu, 24.hu) highlighted primarily the human and market side of the Mediaworks layoffs — the closure of Bors, Ripost and Metropol, the uncertainty of the county papers’ employees — as well as the ministerial commissioner’s statement about “bearing responsibility”. The government-party–conservative band (Mandiner, Magyar Nemzet) concentrated on the three announced measures of the public-media reshaping, in a governmental frame. The difference in itself points to the essence of the topic: the same process is read by one side as a narrowing of press freedom, by the other as a renewal of the public media. For MIAK the lesson is that the dispute steps beyond mutual suspicion only if we tie pluralism to measurable, institutional guarantees — not to a narrative.

6.2 Facts and data

  • On 15 June 2026 Mediaworks announced the closure of Bors, Ripost and Metropol, as well as the halting of the print edition of three county dailies (source: 24.hu, 444.hu, HVG, 2026-06-15).
  • The Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) serves internationally to measure media-market concentration; the commonly used “strong concentration” threshold is above 2500 points.
  • The international measures of trust in the public media are the Eurobarometer and the EU Media Pluralism Monitor (source: European Commission / European University Institute).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — media pluralism as a democratic institutional guarantee and disinformation resilience;
  • Culture (background material) — the cultural mission of the public-service media and the diversity of the public sphere;
  • Digitisation and AI regulation (background material) — the attention and advertising concentration of digital platforms, media literacy.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Edward S. Herman – Noam Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent

The central thesis of the propaganda model is that the content of the media is filtered by structural factors — above all the ownership structure and dependence on advertising revenue. In the authors’ formulation, among the decisive filters figure:

“Structural factors are those such as ownership and control, dependence on other major funding sources (notably, advertisers) […].”

The closure of the Mediaworks papers is a textbook illustration of this model: when the political-advertising money flow — which kept the family of papers alive beyond market logic — dries up, the structure sustained by the ownership and advertising filter collapses. Pluralism, then, is not solved by itself with the loss of one actor; the question is the structure of the remaining market.

📖 Source: Edward S. Herman – Noam Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent

6.4.2 Edward L. Bernays: Propaganda

Bernays described the conscious shaping of mass opinion as a basic operation of modern society:

“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society.”

The public media is precisely for this reason not a neutral technical infrastructure but an opinion-forming institution — which is why its fate is decided not by who its leader is, but by the structural limits within which it operates. In the case of the Hungarian public-media reshaping this means: the question of responsibility is legitimate, but the solution is the charter and formula-based funding, not a swap of persons.

📖 Source: Edward L. Bernays: Propaganda

6.4.3 Shoshana Zuboff: The Age of Surveillance Capitalism

By Zuboff, digital connection is not inherently communal or inclined toward the democratisation of knowledge — on the contrary, it has become an instrument of commercial aims, characterised by a concentration of knowledge, wealth and power “unprecedented in history”. For the Hungarian media market this is the warning: as the public sphere shifts from the print press to the online platforms, the question of pluralism is decided by the concentration of the global attention and advertising market — which traditional media-concentration measurement does not capture. This is why the A13 disinformation-resilience programme must treat the digital space separately.

📖 Source: Shoshana Zuboff: The Age of Surveillance Capitalism

6.5 International comparison

A good model for the institutional limitation of media concentration is the German KEK (the commission examining media concentration), which, through the regular measurement of market concentration, has prevented even mergers. For the formula-based, politically independent funding of the public media the earlier Danish model serves as an example, where the public media was fed by a stable, predictable source. The common lesson of these international patterns: pluralism survives where funding and concentration control are governed by statutory automatism, not by political bargaining (see the international precedents of A7).

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A7 — Media pluralism as an institutional guarantee
  • A13 — Disinformation resilience

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 16 June 2026 — top 10 topics, ranked 5th):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Edward S. Herman – Noam Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent
  • 📖 Edward L. Bernays: Propaganda
  • 📖 Shoshana Zuboff: The Age of Surveillance Capitalism

Note: the books’ local file path does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A7, A13)
  • MIAK policy area: Culture (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 16 June 2026 — topic 5, score: 85/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • European Commission / European University Institute — EU Media Pluralism Monitor
  • Eurobarometer — measurement of trust in the public media
  • Reporters Without Borders — press-freedom index

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