Part I — Situation overview

On 12 June 2026 the Tisza group submitted to the National Assembly the bill on the complete transformation of public media. By the proposal the state background organisation operating public media — the Media Services Support and Asset Management Fund (MTVA) — is wound up, and two new institutions take its place: the Independent Public Media Board supervising public-service broadcasting and the Press Fund supporting the press. The legal frame is decisive here too: the package was submitted by the representatives, but adoption is within the competence of the National Assembly (Fundamental Law, Article 6) — the organisational order of public media is a statutory-level question, so the actual regulation is decided by the parliamentary debate and the text voted on, not by the fact of submission. At the same time the press reported a mass layoff of 180–190 people at the newspaper publisher Mediaworks, and that Magyar Nemzet may turn from a daily into a weekly.

The transformation of public media has appeared several times in MIAK’s analyses — most recently a few days ago, when the news was the resignation of the departing MTVA CEO and the announcement of the bill. Now, however, a qualitatively new situation has arisen: it is no longer a matter of a principled intention, but of a concrete, knowable statutory text that creates named institutions (Independent Public Media Board, Press Fund), and to which the reorganisation of a large newspaper publisher is attached. The earlier analysis placed the leadership-change versus institutional-guarantee question at the centre; the stake now is whether the submitted text actually contains the irreversible guarantees of independence, and whether the new financing channel (the Press Fund) operates transparently.

The public’s understandable reflex is to regard the overturning of the structure itself as the turn. MIAK’s reading, by contrast, is that the mere renaming of institutions is the easiest and at the same time least lasting step: if the composition of the Independent Public Media Board remains fillable by a single political majority, and if the Press Fund’s money distribution is not tied to an objective rule, then in a few years the same dependence is reproduced, only in another hand and under another nameplate. The character of the problem is therefore not who leads public media, but what structure excludes political capture — whichever side comes to govern.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. By the “propaganda model” developed in Manufacturing Consent (1988) by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky (American media researcher and linguist-social-critic respectively), media content is filtered not primarily by open censorship, but by the structural features of the media — the ownership background and the financing (above all advertising) dependence; that is, whoever provides the money exercises a bending force on content. Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman (economist and political scientist respectively, developers of the “spin dictator” model), in their work Spin Dictators (2022), describe the same mechanism from the side of power: modern authoritarian leaders do not always ban critical outlets, but steer the media with state advertising, support and ownership pressure — the book even cites a Hungarian example. The two works together give MIAK’s frame: the independence of public media and the press is not a question of the “good” board or the “good” leader, but of whether the structure of financing and the composition of supervision exclude capture. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that would fix in the submitted bill not the names of the institutions, but the irreversible conditions of independence.

3.1 A party-ratio-independent, irreversible Independent Public Media Board (the core of the package)

The Independent Public Media Board must be composed so that it cannot be filled by a single political majority, and its composition cannot be overridden by a simple parliamentary majority. MIAK proposes a fixed, pluralist delegation order: election tied to a qualified parliamentary majority, an opposition and civil-professional quota, and divided, overlapping mandates longer than the government cycle — so that no single cycle can pack the board. Against the capture described by Guriev and Treisman (see 6.4.2) only a divided structure designed for irreversibility protects. This is the operative unfolding of the A7 (Media pluralism as an institutional guarantee) and A6 (Strengthening checks and balances) programme points. The responsible party is the legislator; the timeframe is the parliamentary debate of the bill.

3.2 A transparent, formula-based Press Fund — excluding money distribution as an instrument of pressure

The new Press Fund is the most sensitive point of the reform: a press-financing channel supported from state funds can just as easily become an instrument of reward-and-punishment as the earlier state advertising market. MIAK proposes that the Press Fund’s distribution happen by a pre-fixed, objective, public formula and a transparent, justified application procedure, with a mandatory published beneficiary list and a criteria system that can be checked afterwards. The Herman–Chomsky propaganda model (see 6.4.1) warns of precisely this: content is bent by financing dependence, so the key to independence is that money not become a discretionary instrument of pressure. The credibility of the frame is confirmed by a mandatory, public statutory impact assessment — I3 (Legislative impact assessment); the related programme point is A7. The responsible parties are the legislator and the body managing the Press Fund.

3.3 The social and press-freedom guarantees of the Mediaworks transformation — separate from the political framing

The planned layoff of 180–190 people at Mediaworks and the turning of Magyar Nemzet into a weekly raise two questions to be kept apart. One is social and labour-law: the mass (collective) headcount reduction must take place in a fair procedure under the Labour Code, with the lawful entitlements of those affected and retraining-and-placement support. The other is press-freedom-related: the closure or thinning of a paper reduces the number of voices, so MIAK proposes that the public-media reform not be mixed up with the market reorganisation of a single publisher, and that editorial autonomy — the professional independence of news production and the obligation of balanced information — be protected by law, regardless of which side is in government. This connects to the A13 (Disinformation resilience) goal: a diverse, credible public sphere is the best defence against disinformation.

The common principle of the three proposals is that the independence of public media and the press should be secured not by an institution’s name or a leader’s person, but by the structure: irreversible, divided supervision, money distributed by an objective rule, and professional autonomy protected by law — a system that works even if the direction of the political wind turns.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Culture / public sphere Strengthening media pluralism, more predictable public-service information If only the institutions’ names change, the audience rightly feels it a “sign change”, not a reform
Public administration A statutorily fixed, objective supervisory and financing order Pluralist delegation may cause deadlock if there is no resolving mechanism
Society / employment Making press financing more transparent The social tension of the Mediaworks layoff and the drop in the number of papers may narrow press diversity

The main point to weigh is whether the reform touches the structure or only the actors. A bill that mainly institutionalises the renaming of institutions and the installation of new leadership is fast and spectacular, but by the pattern described by Guriev and Treisman it leaves the possibility of capture untouched — only the person of the captor changes. The proposals tip towards the risk side if, under the slogan of “independence”, a new, one-directional control or discretionary Press-Fund money distribution is in fact built; that is why MIAK holds the hardest condition to be the party-ratio-independent, irreversible composition of the Independent Public Media Board and the formula-based operation of the Press Fund.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK considers the following suggested performance indicators (KPIs, i.e. numerical indicators that show whether the measure has succeeded) worth tracking:

  • The proportion of members of the Independent Public Media Board attributable to a single political side — suggested goal: a lasting minority.
  • The transparency of the Press Fund’s money distribution: whether the beneficiary list and the reasons for awards are public, and whether there is an objective criteria system that can be checked afterwards.
  • An improvement in Hungary’s ranking on independent press-freedom indices (e.g. Reporters Without Borders).
  • The fulfilment of the lawful entitlements and retraining support of those affected in the Mediaworks layoff.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message — to decision-makers and the public alike — is that the transformation of public media should be measured not by the winding-up of MTVA or the names of the new institutions, but by the built-in, irreversible guarantees: a party-ratio-independent Independent Public Media Board, a Press Fund operating by an objective formula, and the fair handling of the Mediaworks transformation, kept separate from the political dispute. The concrete request to the legislator is that the submitted bill fix these three guarantees — otherwise the reform merely reverses the political sign. The topic engages two MIAK foundational values most of all: transparency, because capture lives in opaque appointments and discretionary financing, and openness, because a plural public sphere accessible to all is a basic precondition of democratic debate.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The announcement appeared across the entire domestic media palette, with differing emphases. The left-liberal and public-affairs band (444.hu, Telex, HVG, 24.hu) focused on the substantive details of the bill: 444.hu highlighted the winding-up of MTVA and the creation of the Press Fund and the Independent Public Media Board, Telex and 24.hu described the structure of the media-law transformation, while HVG, in a separate article, brought the Mediaworks mass layoff and the possibility of Magyar Nemzet turning into a weekly. The economic band (Portfolio) placed the emphasis on the course of the process (the announcement of the law amendment). The government-party–conservative band (Mandiner) focused on the framing of the reorganisation as a whole. Népszava (an article-level downgraded source) likewise brought the end of MTVA and the submission. The difference in framings is instructive: on one side the details of the institutional structure, on the other the political stake of the process — and MIAK’s reading steps beyond exactly this when it turns the question towards the irreversible, structural guarantees of independence: not who leads, but what system is built.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The bill on the complete transformation of public media was submitted by the Tisza group on 12 June 2026; the proposal winds up MTVA and creates the Independent Public Media Board and the Press Fund. Adoption is within the competence of the National Assembly.
  • At Mediaworks, by press reports, a mass layoff of 180–190 people may come, and Magyar Nemzet may turn into a weekly (HVG, 12 June 2026).
  • By the 2024 data of the World Bank’s governance indicators (Worldwide Governance Indicators, WGI), Hungary scored +0.35 points on the rule-of-law dimension — below the average of the developed EU member states, which signals the stake of strengthening institutional guarantees (📖 Source: World Bank WGI 2024).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — media pluralism as a democratic institutional guarantee, the composition of supervision and the transparency of the Press Fund’s financing;
  • Culture (background material) — the cultural mission of public-service media, diverse, quality content from public money, with editorial independence;
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — the appointment order of the new board and the institutional operation of the Press Fund.

6.4 Literature in detail

By the authors’ “propaganda model”, the performance of the media is explained not by open instruction but by structural features: the dependence on the ownership background and on the financing sources — above all advertisers — works as filters that steer content towards power and business interests. Translated to the public-media reform, this means that the new Press Fund and public-service financing serve independence only if money cannot be a discretionary instrument of pressure — otherwise the financing filter bends content just the same, only another hand moves it.

„Structural factors are those such as ownership and control, dependence on other major funding sources (notably, advertisers), and mutual interests and relationships between the media and those who make the news and have the power to define it and explain what it means."

📖 Source: Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent

6.4.2 Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

By the authors, today’s authoritarian leaders — the “spin dictators” — build on manipulation instead of open repression, and the primary terrain of this is the media. One of the most frequent, “non-political”-disguised instruments of capture is precisely financial pressure: loyal outlets are fattened with state advertising and support, while critics are — when the state coffers tighten — censored. This is a direct warning for the reform now being prepared: the independence of public media and the Press Fund is real only if the law excludes the very mechanism of capture — opaque appointment and discretionary financing.

“Other leaders — such as Peru’s Alberto Fujimori and Viktor Orbán — bribed the owners of privately held media outlets with money, exclusive information and state advertising. But when spin dictators are short of money, they set about censoring informed citizens.”

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

6.5 International comparison

The European models of public-service media independence — the British, the German or the Nordic models — have in common that they entrust independence not to the leader’s person, but to divided, pluralist supervision and statutorily fixed, predictable financing. EU regulation, the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA — the EU regulation protecting media freedom), reinforces the same principle: it prescribes the transparency of media-market ownership, the protection of editorial independence, and the predictability of the distribution of public media and state advertising. The lesson for the Hungarian reform is not the copying of a specific model, but the principle: independent public media is sustained by the structure — irreversible, divided supervision and objective financing — not by goodwill.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A7 — Media pluralism as an institutional guarantee
  • A13 — Disinformation resilience

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 13 June 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent
  • 📖 Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

Note: the books’ local file path does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A7, A6, A13)
  • MIAK policy area: Culture (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 13 June 2026 — topic 1, score: 84/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Reporters Without Borders (RSF) press-freedom index, European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), Media Pluralism Monitor (CMPF/EUI)
  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024 — rule of law

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