On 19 June 2026 two developments in the Russo-Ukrainian war sharpened questions touching Hungarian interests: Ukraine launched its largest drone strike so far against Moscow, where, according to the mayor, 35 drones were shot down, while in parallel the Polish president revoked Poland’s highest state decoration from Zelensky. For Hungary the question is not which side we “cheer for” — but whether Hungarian foreign policy serves lasting European security.

Part I — Situation overview

The war is shifting ever more from the front line towards deep, strike-based warfare. On 19 June Ukrainian drones reached Moscow: according to the mayor, air defence shot down 35 incoming devices, but the key Kapotnya refinery in the city’s south-east was hit for the third time within a month. Russian refining capacity has fallen by some 20–22 per cent over a year because of Ukrainian drone strikes — one consequence of which is that Russia, formerly counted as the world’s largest fuel exporter, has seen fuel shortages emerge in several of its regions and has become reliant on imports. President Putin’s conspicuous silence aims to play down the failure, while even analysts loyal to the Kremlin are forced to admit the weakness of air defence.

At the same time, Polish–Ukrainian relations sharply deteriorated: Polish president Karol Nawrocki revoked the Order of the White Eagle (Poland’s highest state decoration) awarded to Zelensky in 2023, after Kyiv named a military unit after the “heroes” of the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA — the Ukrainian armed movement during the Second World War, responsible for the 1943–45 ethnic cleansing in Volhynia, where more than a hundred thousand Poles lost their lives). The step is symbolic but painful: Warsaw was one of Kyiv’s most committed supporters. The Hungarian dimension is tangible too: at the previous day’s European Union summit, at the initiative of Péter Magyar (the Hungarian prime minister elected in April 2026, aged 45), the clause referring to accelerating Ukrainian accession was removed from the joint closing statement — for the first time in a year and a half a joint text accepted by all member states was produced.

In MIAK’s reading, the character of the situation is dual pressure: escalation at the front and the straining of the alliance system in the background. For Hungary the stake is not which great-power narrative we echo, but whether Hungarian foreign policy remains a credible, predictable actor reinforcing European unity at a time when the chance of a ceasefire depends precisely on the combination of pressure and unity.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the strategic frame. According to Henry Kissinger (one of the 20th century’s most influential American diplomats and secretaries of state, the theoretical representative of an international order resting on the balance of power), every lasting order is built on two pillars: commonly accepted rules and a balance of power that enforces restraint where the rules fail — this is the frame that illuminates why European unity is the legitimate answer to pressure. Zbigniew Brzezinski (the Polish-American geostrategist, former national security adviser of the United States) held in his classic thesis that Ukraine is a “geopolitical pivot”: its mere existence transforms Russia, and therefore Ukraine’s fate is a strategic, not merely a moral, question. Carl von Clausewitz (the 19th-century Prussian military theorist, founder of modern military theory) and his thesis — that war is the continuation of politics by other means — interprets the Moscow drone strike: it is not destruction for its own sake but pressure towards the negotiating table. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable guidelines that place Hungarian foreign policy in the service of lasting European security.

3.1 Active participation in a unified European stance (ongoing)

MIAK proposes that Hungary shape European decisions not through veto politics but through issue-based coalition-building. According to the programme points KP14 active neutrality-avoidance and KP17 issue-based coalition-building, the aim is for Hungary to be inside the unity and to assert its own interests from there — for example securing the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia in the negotiations with Ukraine. In the logic described by Kissinger (see 6.4.1) the unified European message is itself the instrument of effective pressure: a divided Europe weakens, a unified one strengthens, the negotiating position that can lead to a ceasefire. On the question of Ukrainian accession, MIAK supports merit-based, conditional enlargement — neither unconditional acceleration nor principled refusal.

3.2 A scenario-based crisis-management protocol (within 12 months)

Every turn of the war carries direct Hungarian exposure — energy security, migration, border security. MIAK’s KP7 crisis-management protocol proposes that Hungarian responses be made not ad hoc but on the basis of scenarios worked out in advance: what is to be done in the event of an energy-price shock, a new wave of refugees or a regional escalation. Together with KP10 regional resilience-building, this ensures that Hungary reacts prepared, not by surprise, to the war’s unpredictable developments.

3.3 A credible defence capability embedded in a European framework (from the next cycle)

The drone war rewrites the logic of warfare: cheap, mass-deployable devices achieve strategic effect. MIAK’s HV3 defence-innovation programme and HV8 credible-deterrence programme point propose that Hungary, embedded in NATO’s collective defence, prepare for the changed security environment through joint European procurement and domestic capability development. The aim is not escalation but a predictable, credible defence capability that, within the HV7 social resilience frame, strengthens the preparedness of the whole country.

The common principle of the three proposals is that the Hungarian interest can be asserted most effectively within European unity, as a predictable ally — it is not standing aside but reliable participation that gives real influence.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Foreign policy An active role within the unity increases Hungary’s actual influence over Ukraine- and energy-policy decisions Aligning with the unity can be framed domestically as “self-abandonment”, and breeds pressure for showy go-it-alone gestures
Energy security Scenario-based preparation cushions the domestic impact of an energy-price shock The rapid dismantling of dependence on Russian energy is costly in the short term and politically sensitive
Defence A capability adapted to the drone age and embedded in a European framework gives credible deterrence Raising defence spending may compete with social and development funds

The main consideration is the balance between Hungarian room for manoeuvre and European unity. The proposal tips towards risk if aligning with the unity becomes the surrender of one’s own legitimate interests (the Transcarpathian minority, energy security) — then the “reliable ally” position may be experienced as self-abandonment. The proposal works if Hungary simultaneously stays inside the unity and asserts its interests within its frame — as the shaping of the joint closing statement also showed, that participation gives influence.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK considers the following performance indicators (KPIs) worth tracking over a 6–24-month horizon:

  • Ceasefire proximity: whether a substantive negotiation process advances, whether a ceasefire agreement or its framework is produced.
  • Hungarian participation in the unity: at how many joint European decisions Hungary remains part of the consensus, instead of blocking with a veto or a go-it-alone path.
  • Energy-security diversification: whether the share of dependence on Russian energy falls, and whether replacement capacity is built.
  • Defence preparedness: whether the capability developments adapted to the drone age are realised within a joint European framework.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers and the public alike is that Hungary’s interest is the earliest possible ceasefire and a lasting European security order. The concrete request: Hungary should be an active, predictable actor in a unified European stance, prepare with scenarios for the war’s domestic impacts, and build a credible defence capability embedded in a European framework. This approach moves two MIAK foundational values: ideology-free conduct, because foreign policy is driven not by narrative-cheering but by the Hungarian interest and the facts; and openness, because reliable allied conduct is the source of actual influence, as against isolation. Here the two values secure the credibility without which a small country is squeezed out of the very decisions that concern its own security.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal and public-affairs band, Telex and HVG placed the military-strategic turn at the centre (the size of the Moscow drone strike, the fall in refining capacity, the weakness of Russian air defence), in an objective, analytical tone. 24.hu highlighted the Hungarian domestic dimension (Péter Magyar’s role in shaping the closing statement). In the economic band, Portfolio brought two important contexts: European Commission president von der Leyen’s statement that sanctions pressure will ultimately force Putin to the negotiating table, and a poll showing that Ukrainians themselves are more cautious about rapid accession than their leadership. In the conservative band, Mandiner elevated the Polish–Ukrainian rupture to a leading theme, emphasising the Ukrainian side’s responsibility (the provocation of the UPA naming). Across the whole spectrum it emerges that the war’s military, economic and alliance dimensions move at once — which is precisely why it is warranted to build the Hungarian position not on a single theme but on the whole picture.

6.2 Facts and data

  • According to the mayor, Moscow’s air defence shot down 35 Ukrainian drones on 19 June 2026; according to the Russian defence ministry, some 1,000 drones were destroyed across the country in 24 hours (source: Telex, HVG, 19 June 2026).
  • Russian refining capacity fell by some 20–22% over a year because of Ukrainian drone strikes (source: Telex, 19 June 2026).
  • The Order of the White Eagle was given to Zelensky in April 2023, and revoked by Polish president Nawrocki on 19 June 2026 (source: Telex, Mandiner, 19 June 2026).
  • According to a winter 2026 survey, 65% of Ukrainians support EU accession, but only 19% consider it realistic within 5 years; they see corruption as the main obstacle (70%) (source: Portfolio, 19 June 2026).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — active participation within European unity, issue-based coalition-building and strategic balance politics; affected: KP4, KP11, KP14, KP17, KP10, KP7.
  • Defence (programme points) — defence innovation adapted to the drone age and credible deterrence embedded in a NATO framework; affected: HV3, HV8, HV7.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Henry Kissinger: World Order

According to Kissinger, every lasting international order is built on two pillars: commonly accepted rules that mark the limits of permitted action, and a balance of power that enforces restraint where the rules prove insufficient. In his own words: “a balance of forces does not in itself secure peace, but if thoughtfully assembled and invoked, it can limit the scope and frequency of fundamental challenges” — that is, a balance of forces does not in itself guarantee peace, but if carefully built it reduces the scale and frequency of fundamental challenges. In the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war this is a direct argument for European unity: a divided Europe breaks up the balance, while the unified European message represents precisely that restraining force which can steer the process towards a negotiated settlement.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: World Order

6.4.2 Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

Brzezinski’s classic thesis is that Ukraine is a geopolitical pivot: “without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire” — that is, without Ukraine Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. It follows that Ukraine’s fate is not simply a moral but a strategic question — one of the cornerstones of the European security order. Translated to the Hungarian position: Hungary cannot remain indifferent to the outcome of a war in its neighbourhood, because its result directly shapes the region’s balance of force and Hungary’s room for manoeuvre — this warrants the KP10 regional resilience-building programme point.

📖 Source: Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

6.4.3 Carl von Clausewitz: On War

According to Clausewitz’s thesis, war is the continuation of politics by other means: the political aim determines both the military objective and the scale of the effort to be expended. In this frame the Moscow drone strike is not destruction for its own sake but an instrument of pressure — a demonstration of the vulnerability of the Russian hinterland and oil-industry capacity, which raises the cost of the war and thereby pushes the calculus towards the negotiating table. The same logic applies to von der Leyen’s sanctions–negotiation argument: the aim of pressure is not endless escalation but forcing a political solution — Hungarian foreign policy must therefore work towards a ceasefire and a lasting settlement.

📖 Source: Carl von Clausewitz: On War

6.5 International comparison

The lessons of the war concern the room for manoeuvre of smaller countries. The example of the Baltic states and Poland shows that an active, initiating role within EU and NATO unity gives greater actual influence than standing aside — which is precisely why the Polish–Ukrainian rupture is so grave, signalling a crack between key allies. According to the daily assessments of the independent institute analysing the war (Institute for the Study of War, ISW), the growing vulnerability of the Russian hinterland also shapes the negotiation dynamic. The common lesson: a small country fares well if it shapes decisions within the unity, as a predictable partner, not if go-it-alone gestures squeeze it out of them.

Foreign policy

  • KP4 — Principle-based pragmatism doctrine
  • KP11 — Strategic balance politics
  • KP14 — Active neutrality-avoidance doctrine
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU
  • KP10 — Regional resilience-building
  • KP7 — Foreign-policy crisis-management protocol

Defence

  • HV3 — Defence-innovation programme
  • HV8 — Deterrence on the principle of “victory without battle”
  • HV7 — Social defence resilience

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 20 June 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: World Order
  • 📖 Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard
  • 📖 Carl von Clausewitz: On War

Note: the local file path of the book does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP4)
  • MIAK policy area: Defence (programme points; programme point ID: HV8)
  • MIAK press monitor, 20 June 2026 — topic 3, score: 84/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Institute for the Study of War (ISW) — daily situation assessment
  • European Council conclusions; EU sanctions packages

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