On 16–17 June 2026 the diplomacy aimed at ending the war entered a new phase: the Kremlin — the Russian presidential administration — signalled that it awaits Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in Moscow for negotiations, the American president hardened his tone toward Russia, and Ukraine’s European Union accession negotiations officially began. MIAK has already dealt in an earlier analysis with the opening of the accession process of Ukraine and Moldova and the lifting of the Hungarian veto; compared with that, the new element here is the direct summit diplomacy meant to end the war — which is why this post focuses on the question of the peace process and Hungary’s strategic role, and touches on the accession timetable only in passing.

Part I — Situation overview

The diplomatic movement is running along several threads. The Kremlin’s Moscow invitation — even if it is a gesture flowing from negotiating positions — formally opens the possibility of a direct leaders’ meeting, while Putin, according to press reports, is intransigent on the question of Donbas. The American president is at once trying to force the parties to the table and to widen his own room for manoeuvre; the European leaders (among them German chancellor Merz) are trying, on Zelensky’s side, to keep the process on track. In the background, Ukraine’s EU accession negotiation has actually started after the lifting of the Hungarian veto.

For Hungary the stake is twofold. On one hand the ending of the war is a direct economic interest: cheaper energy, declining security risk, a more stable region. On the other hand Ukraine’s EU integration rearranges the agricultural market, the distribution of EU funds and the question of border security — and here the Hungarian interest is not the blocking of the process, but the negotiation of favourable transitional conditions.

By MIAK’s reading the character of the situation is the choice of “participant or sufferer”: Hungary either shapes the regional settlement and the conditions of accession as an active, issue-based actor, or remains outside the decisions and is confronted after the fact with their consequences. Braking the peace process may, in the short term, promise domestic-political gain, but strategically it means giving up room for manoeuvre.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scholarly frame. According to Henry Kissinger (German-born American diplomat and foreign-policy thinker, the classic theorist of the balance-of-power order), lasting peace is born not from the complete victory of one side but from a mutually bearable balance-of-power order that the parties accept as legitimate — the aim of negotiation is therefore not to declare victory but to find a sustainable balance. Zbigniew Brzezinski (Polish-born American geostrategist) describes Ukraine, in his work The Grand Chessboard, as a key geopolitical pivot, and points out that the Russian great-power self-image is historically tied to the acquisition of territory — this explains the intransigence around Donbas. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that make Hungarian foreign policy a constructive participant in the peace process.

3.1 Constructive, issue-based participation in the peace process (immediate)

MIAK proposes that Hungary take part in the peace process not with a veto or passivity, but with concrete initiatives aimed at agreement: humanitarian and reconstruction engagement, energy-security cooperation, support for regional de-escalation. By the KP11 strategic balance-of-power policy, the aim is a foreign policy that stands on several legs, in which no single external power dominates Hungary’s room for manoeuvre — from neither east nor west. By Kissinger’s balance-of-power logic (see 6.4.1), it is precisely such a mediating role, keeping the balance in view, that gives lasting influence.

3.2 Establishing a geopolitical situation-analysis capacity (within 12 months)

MIAK’s KP13 programme point proposes the creation of an inter-ministerial geostrategic analysis unit, with a half-yearly situation assessment of Hungary’s position. The currently fast-changing diplomatic environment — the Moscow invitation, American pressure, the accession negotiation — shows precisely that, instead of a reactive foreign policy, a forecasting, scenario-based capacity is needed, one that assesses the Hungarian interest in knowledge of the geostrategic realities described by Brzezinski (see 6.4.2).

3.3 Negotiating transitional guarantees in the Ukrainian accession (within the negotiating cycle)

In connection with Ukraine’s EU accession the Hungarian interest is not the blocking of the process, but the negotiated settlement of agricultural and cohesion transitional guarantees, as well as the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia. By MIAK’s KP17 issue-based coalition-building programme point, this is worth asserting not alone, but in EU coalitions that vary by issue — in agriculture with the Mediterranean countries, in security with the Poles. And the KP20 Helsinki lesson reminds us that cooperative security can be institutionalised: confidence-building is not naivety, but strategy.

The common principle of the three proposals is that the strength of Hungarian foreign policy flows from predictable participation that strives for balance, not from isolation. A constructive presence in the peace process and the negotiated shaping of the conditions of Ukrainian accession are the two sides of the same strategic balance-of-power policy.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Security Regional de-escalation reduces the cross-border and energy-security risk A summit that ends in failure could launch a new wave of escalation, in which even the passive actor is affected
Economy The ending of the war brings cheaper energy and a more stable regional market Ukrainian agricultural competition, without transitional guarantees, hits Hungarian producers
External relations Issue-based participation increases Hungary’s negotiating weight The braking role isolates Hungary in EU decision-making

The main point to weigh is the relationship between domestic-political communication and strategic interest: braking the peace process or the showy waving of the veto can mobilise in the short term, but it comes with giving up strategic room for manoeuvre. The proposal tips to the risk side if, instead of negotiating accession guarantees, we choose the strategy of total blocking — then Hungary is left out of shaping the conditions. The proposal works if Hungary’s conduct is predictable, issue-based and aimed at agreement.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes the following performance indicators (KPIs) to watch over a 6–24 month horizon:

  • Number of Hungarian initiatives in the peace process: measurable by the number of concrete, documented Hungarian diplomatic proposals and mediating engagements.
  • Issue-based coalition participation: in how many EU dossiers Hungary builds varying, issue-by-issue coalitions (on the basis of an annual “Coalition Map”).
  • Transitional guarantees in the accession negotiation: whether documented agricultural and cohesion transitional conditions can be achieved in the Ukrainian accession timetable.
  • Energy-security indicators: the level of import diversification and strategic reserves after regional de-escalation.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers and the public is that Hungary must become a constructive participant in the diplomacy that ends the war, not the brake on the process. The concrete request: constructive, issue-based participation in the peace process, a forecasting geostrategic analysis capacity, and the negotiated shaping of the conditions of Ukrainian accession. This approach engages two MIAK foundational values: ideology-free governance, because it measures the Hungarian interest not along eastern or western commitment but along a balance that stands on several legs, and openness, because it approaches the regional settlement through dialogue, not isolation. The two values here ensure that Hungarian foreign policy widens its own room for manoeuvre rather than narrowing it.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the economic–public-affairs band, Portfolio gave the most factual frame: it conveyed the American pressure and the possibility of a Zelensky–Putin meeting as a daily situation report. 24.hu highlighted the conditionality of the Kremlin’s Moscow invitation (“if it wants to negotiate seriously”). ATV rather emphasised the strength of the Zelensky-side initiative. In the conservative band, Mandiner put Putin’s Donbas intransigence to the fore, that is, it focused on the obstacles to a settlement. The accession thread was carried by HVG’s EU programme block. The whole spectrum thus framed the same sequence of events with differing emphasis: the narratives of the chance of peace (Portfolio, ATV) and of the obstacle to peace (Mandiner) stood opposed — which is precisely what shows the need for a balance-seeking, fact-based MIAK reading.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The Kremlin signalled that it awaits Ukrainian president Zelensky in Moscow for negotiations (source: 24.hu, 16 June 2026).
  • The American president hardened his tone toward Russia; European leaders, on Zelensky’s side, are trying to keep the process on track (source: Portfolio, Mandiner, 17 June 2026).
  • Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations officially began after the lifting of the Hungarian veto (source: HVG, 14 June 2026).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — strategic balance-of-power policy, geostrategic analysis and issue-based coalition-building; affected: KP11, KP13, KP17, KP20.
  • Defence (background material) — the regional security situation and the military/NATO aspect (border policing, by contrast, is an interior, not a defence, task).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

Kissinger’s central thesis is that a lasting international order rests not on the complete victory of one side but on a mutually bearable balance (balance of power) that the participants accept as legitimate. The aim of negotiation is therefore not a humiliating victory but a sustainable balance-of-power order that can also handle the next crisis. Applied to the Russian–Ukrainian peace process: a settlement that completely squeezes out one party remains unstable; the Hungarian interest is a stable, predictable regional balance, to which a mediating role that strives for balance fits.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

6.4.2 Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

Brzezinski analyses Ukraine as a key pivot of Eurasian geopolitics. He also points out that the Russian great-power self-image is historically tied to the holding of territory: in his own formulation, “for centuries the definition of Russian national greatness was equated with the acquisition of territory” — that is, Russia identified its national greatness for centuries with the acquisition of territory. This frame explains the intransigence around Donbas, and warns that a settlement can be lasting only if it handles the parties’ perception of security — not merely the front line. Hungarian foreign policy must follow this deeper dynamic with a forecasting capacity.

📖 Source: Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

6.5 International comparison

The European model of cooperative security-building is the Helsinki process (1975), which, in the depths of the Cold War, institutionalised confidence-building between the opposing parties — MIAK’s KP20 programme point builds expressly on this. Hungarian diplomacy’s participation at the time showed that even a small country can be a substantive actor in a great-power settlement if it takes on a predictable, mediating role. By contrast, states that stay out of the peace process or brake it regularly become the sufferers of the conditions formed after the fact — this is the strategic price of the passive role.

Foreign policy

  • KP11 — Strategic balance-of-power policy
  • KP13 — Geopolitical situation-analysis capacity
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU
  • KP20 — Lessons of the Helsinki process — multilateral security-building

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 17 June 2026 — topic 5):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy
  • 📖 Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

Note: the books’ local file path does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP11)
  • MIAK policy area: Defence (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 17 June 2026 — topic 5, score: 95/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • EU enlargement package; the European Union’s global strategy (EU Global Strategy)
  • ISW front reports; EU budget (MFF) reform

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