Part I — Situation overview

On 15 June 2026 Judit Lannert, Minister for Education and Children’s Affairs, held a first consultation with the university rectors about reshaping the foundation system of higher education — the process by which, in recent years, the maintainer rights of the majority of Hungarian state universities were organised out into public-interest asset-management foundations (kekvák). A kekva is a private-law foundation that performs a public task and manages significant state assets; in the case of universities this meant that a board of trustees of a few persons — that is, the foundation’s decision-making body — decides about the institution’s assets and strategic operation. According to the minister the rectors arrived with numerous useful proposals; according to the government’s position the change is being made on an EU expectation, and its aim is for persons tied to the government to leave the boards of trustees.

The topic ran through the entire press spectrum. Telex highlighted the rectoral consultation and the phasing-out of the university kekvák; HVG and 24.hu quoted the rector of Corvinus, Bruno van Pottelsberghe, who holds that people tied to the government have no business on the boards of trustees; Portfolio framed the process as a “radical change”; and Magyar Nemzet stressed that the reshaping is being made on an EU expectation. The question sharpened now also because the conflict of interest of the government-tied politicians sitting on the boards had in recent years blocked Hungarian universities’ access to several EU research and mobility programmes — that is, depoliticisation is also a direct funding stake.

By MIAK’s reading the depoliticisation of the boards of trustees is a correct aim in principle, but the manner of implementation decides whether a lasting result is born. The real question is not who now sits on the boards, but what rule decides who may sit there under the next government too. If the reform is merely a replacement of the current members, then political influence does not cease, it only changes hands; if, however, a rule-based conflict-of-interest regime equally binding on both political sides is embedded, then academic autonomy — the university’s professional independence in the content of research and teaching — receives a lasting guarantee spanning the cycles.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the conceptual frame within which university governance and academic autonomy can be interpreted. The central thesis of Andreas Schleicher (the OECD’s education director, the intellectual father of the PISA assessments) is that the condition of quality education is the combination of professional autonomy and accountability: high-standard systems steer their institutions not by bureaucratic instructions but by the profession’s internal norms — but this independence is tied to professional standards and transparency, it is not unlimited. Daniel Kaufmann and his co-authors (governance researchers at the World Bank, the creators of the Worldwide Governance Indicators — the international indicator system measuring the quality of governance) showed that the measurable dimensions of governance — among them the rule of law and the control of corruption — are directly connected with development outcomes; this argues that conflict of interest must be handled with a measurable, rule-based regime, not with case-by-case weighing. The two theses together provide MIAK’s frame: autonomy protects if a rule guarantees it, and the rule is credible if it applies to everyone equally. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that turn the principled aim of board depoliticisation into a lasting, impersonal and irreversibly embedded guarantee.

3.1 A rule-based, mutually binding conflict-of-interest regime (codified immediately)

The core of MIAK’s proposal is that the conflict of interest of board membership be settled not by an ad hoc swap of persons, but by a statutory rule. Let the rule be mutual and cycle-independent: an active politician, party leader, government official and their close relatives may hold membership in no board of trustees — regardless of which party is in government. This duality is the essence: if the rule targets only the current members, then the next majority can seat its own the same way, and the depoliticisation hollows out. The rule-based regime carries the logic of the A6 checks-and-balances programme point into university governance: political influence can be lastingly eliminated not by moving persons, but by structurally excluding influence.

3.2 Professional, transparent selection of board members and fixing academic autonomy (within the legislative cycle)

Let the trustees be selected not by political weighing, but by a public, professional application, with the substantive participation of the university senate. MIAK’s O3 data-driven education-development programme point means here: the performance and composition of the boards must be tracked along public, comparable indicators (the professional background of members, the number of conflicts of interest, the proportion of senate vetoes). Academic autonomy — that is, the university’s independence in determining the content of research and teaching — must be fixed at the statutory level, so that the holder of the maintainer right (be it foundation or state) cannot intervene in the scientific content. Autonomy does not mean unlimitedness: by the Schleicher principle the counterpart of independence is accountability, so autonomy is paired with a public, professional performance-reporting obligation.

3.3 Meeting the EU conditionality framework and restoring funding access (within the institution-building cycle)

Settling the board conflict of interest is not an end in itself: it is a direct condition for Hungarian universities to regain their access to the EU research and mobility programmes. MIAK proposes that the government, along the principle of A8 cohesion accountability, make public which institution regained access to which programme, and what amount of funding thereby became available. The aim is for the meeting of the condition to be substantive and verifiable — not formal compliance that rewrites the board roster but leaves the actual channels of influence untouched. The restoration of funding access thus becomes the measurable outcome indicator of depoliticisation.

The common principle of these three proposals: academic autonomy is lasting if a rule guarantees it and not the goodwill of persons. The impersonal, mutually binding conflict-of-interest regime survives the political cycle; a mere swap of persons does not.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Education / science Depoliticised boards and fixed academic autonomy can improve the professional quality and international competitiveness of research and teaching If the reform is only a swap of names, political influence returns in a new form; autonomy without accountability can also bring fragmented, idiosyncratic operation
Public assets / funding Meeting the EU conditions reopens research and mobility funds; more transparent asset management Legal and ownership uncertainty when rearranging the kekva assets; a transitional funding gap if the transition is not predictable
Public administration / governance Rule-based conflict of interest can be a model at other public-task foundations too If the rule binds only one side, the next cycle reverses it — governance quality does not improve lastingly

The main point to weigh is where the reform tips over from depoliticisation into a new round of politicisation. The board reshaping works if the rule is mutual (binding equally on both political sides), rule-based (not a case-by-case swap of persons), and pairs autonomy with accountability. Where these conditions are breached, the legitimate goal — removing political influence — results merely in influence changing hands, and sacrifices long-term academic freedom for the short-term victory.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes the following performance indicators (KPIs) for tracking — these are not government decisions, but public, verifiable handholds:

  • Quality of selection: what percentage of the new members appointed to the boards were selected in a public, professional application, with the substantive participation of the senate.
  • Mutuality: whether the cycle-independent conflict-of-interest rule binding on both political sides was embedded in statute (yes/no, and whether it is still in force after 12 months).
  • Funding access: whether Hungarian universities regained access to the EU research and mobility programmes, and what amount of funding thereby became available (A8).
  • External perception: whether Hungary’s position improves on the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) “rule of law” and “control of corruption” measures (2024 baseline: rule of law +0.35, control of corruption −0.17).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers and the higher-education community: the depoliticisation of the boards of trustees is a correct aim in principle, but the lasting result is given not by replacing the members but by the quality of the rule. Concretely, we ask that the reshaping be not an ad hoc swap of persons, but a mutually binding, rule-based conflict-of-interest regime, paired with public, professional trustee selection and academic autonomy fixed at the statutory level. This topic engages two MIAK foundational values directly: accountability, because autonomy is credible only together with public, professional performance reporting; and ideology-free governance, because the conflict-of-interest rule protects if it works the same whichever party governs — serving not the exclusion of the current opponent, but the structural keeping-at-distance of all political influence.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The topic ran through the entire domestic press spectrum, with differing narrative choices. The left-liberal and public-affairs band (Telex, HVG, 24.hu) focused primarily on the rectoral consultation and the board conflict of interest, and highlighted the position of the Corvinus rector that people tied to the government have no place on the boards of trustees. The economic band (Portfolio) stressed the magnitude of the change — a “radical change” at the Hungarian universities — and the negotiated character of the process. The government-party–conservative band (Magyar Nemzet) chose the framing that the reshaping is being made on an EU expectation — that is, it presented it as an external compulsion, not an internal reform intention. For MIAK it is precisely this duality that is the lesson: the dispute is decided by whether the depoliticisation is perceived as an internal institutional reform or an external compulsion — and this is not a rhetorical question, but depends on whether the rule will be mutual and lasting.

6.2 Facts and data

  • In recent years the maintainer rights of the majority of Hungarian state universities were organised out into public-interest asset-management foundations (kekva); the institutions are run by boards of trustees of a few persons.
  • The conflict of interest of the government-tied politicians sitting on the boards limited, on account of EU rule-of-law conditionality, Hungarian universities’ access to several EU research and mobility programmes.
  • Hungary Worldwide Governance Indicators (the World Bank’s governance-quality measures), 2024: government effectiveness +0.42, rule of law +0.35, control of corruption −0.17 (source: World Bank WGI 2024).
  • The OECD’s comparative higher-education indicators (entry and graduation rates, funding) also rank the quality of institutional governance among the factors of effectiveness (source: OECD Education at a Glance 2023).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Education (programme points) — academic autonomy, the quality of board governance and data-driven, transparent institutional performance measurement;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the rule-based conflict-of-interest regime, the extension of the checks-and-balances logic to public-task foundations;
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — the procedural order for reshaping public-interest asset-management foundations and exercising the maintainer right.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Andreas Schleicher: World Class

According to Schleicher’s thesis, high-standard education systems steer their institutions not by bureaucratic instructions but by the profession’s internal norms — independence, however, is tied to professional standards and a collaborative culture, it is not unlimited freedom. In his own formulation, in modern systems “control based on professional norms” must replace “bureaucratic and administrative forms of control”. On the Finnish example he also shows that a higher entry bar and greater professional autonomy together raised the prestige of the profession, and so “Finnish teachers won the trust of parents and of the wider society”. In the case of university boards of trustees this means: academic autonomy protects if its counterpart is accountability — that is, public, professional performance reporting. Depoliticisation in itself is only one side; the other is the institutionalisation of professional self-governance.

📖 Source: Andreas Schleicher: World Class — How to Build a 21st-Century School System

6.4.2 Daniel Kaufmann – Aart Kraay – Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

The authors compressed the quality of governance into six aggregate indicators — among them the “rule of law” and “control of corruption” dimensions — and showed that these measures are directly connected with development outcomes. In their formulation the six basic concepts — “voice and accountability, political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and graft” — together give the measurable picture of governance quality. The reshaping of the higher-education boards is successful in this frame if we translate it into a measurable rule: conflict of interest is decided not by case-by-case political weighing, but by an objective, verifiable criterion (the exclusion of an active political role, a public application). It is measurability that makes the reform accountable under the next government too.

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann – Aart Kraay – Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

6.5 International comparison

Several established European models offer a pattern for the balance of university governance and academic autonomy. In the Dutch and Finnish systems the institutions operate with broad professional independence, but alongside strict, public quality assurance and a transparent board/supervisory composition — autonomy and accountability go together. For handling board conflict of interest the key lesson is that the established systems regulate not the persons of the members but the procedure of selection: a public application, professional aptitude criteria and the exclusion of political roles ensure that the body’s composition does not depend on the government majority of the day. For Hungary this means that the present reshaping will be lasting if it takes from European practice not the swap of names but the rule-based, cycle-independent order of selection.

Education

  • O3 — Data-driven education development

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Reinforcement of checks and balances
  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability

Proposed new programme point: A rule-based conflict-of-interest regime in the boards of trustees of public-task foundations (kekvák) — for the Public administration and e-government area.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 16 June 2026 — top 10 topics, ranked 6th):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Andreas Schleicher: World Class — How to Build a 21st-Century School System
  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann – Aart Kraay – Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

Note: the books’ local file path does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Education (programme points; programme point ID: O3)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A8)
  • MIAK press monitor, 16 June 2026 — topic 6, score: 82/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • World Bank — Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 (rule of law, control of corruption)
  • OECD — Education at a Glance 2023 (higher-education entry, graduation and funding indicators)
  • EU rule-of-law conditionality documents (higher-education board conflict of interest)

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