Part I — Situation overview

On 20 May 2026 the Tisza party’s parliamentary group — signed by Justice Minister Márton Mellethei-Barna and parliamentary group leader Andrea Bujdosó — submitted to the new National Assembly its first Fundamental Law amendment proposal. The text touches three structural points at once: it retroactively limits the prime-ministerial tenure to 8 years (effectively excluding Viktor Orbán from any further position), abolishes the Sovereignty Protection Office set up in January 2024, and enables the state to take back the public assets (universities, hospital assets, cultural institutions) outsourced into public-interest asset-managing foundations (KEKVAs) since 2021.

The timing falls in the first week of the Tisza government. The party holds 141 mandates in the 199-seat National Assembly (see the National Election Office’s finalisation of 19 April 2026), so on its own it does not have the two-thirds (i.e. 134-mandate) majority needed for a Fundamental Law amendment — we will return to the difference between these two figures, because this is the main sticking point of the proposal. The proposal was submitted on a Friday, in a pace called “dumping” by Magyar Nemzet, in parallel with other major legislative initiatives (see our separate analysis of the investigative-committee package).

Constitutional lawyer Tamás Lattmann, quoted by 444.hu, summed up the professional concern in one sentence — “this drafting is rubbish” — referring to the fact that the proposed text is vulnerable on several points to constitutional-court review. MIAK’s reading: the political intent is right, the structural direction is indispensable, but the professional drafting quality and the sequence of execution deserve separate consideration — because competence withdrawal and asset return involve such technical depths that a poorly drafted paragraph can stall a substantive reform for years.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame. According to the inclusive and extractive institutional typology systematised by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson in Why Nations Fail (2012), the Hungarian set-up after 2010 clearly moved towards the extractive pole: political power was concentrated in a narrow group, and the economic rule system was also shaped so that rent-seeking (the drawing of state money without performance) became institutionalised — the KEKVA system and the Sovereignty Protection Office are precisely two sides of this process. According to the “21st-century spin-dictator” typology presented by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman in Spin Dictators (2022), the modern autocrat does not oppress openly, but does so with legal mimicry — ostensibly democratic institutions are built that functionally serve power concentration. The Sovereignty Protection Office is precisely such a legal-mimicry institution: its name is “protection of national sovereignty”, its operation is actually the financial screening of civil organisations and journalists. The dismantling experience associated with this — namely that elements of the spin dictatorship are dismantled not simultaneously but sequentially — plays a direct role in our proposals 3.1 and 3.2. The primary legal source — the Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force as of 17 April 2026) — regulates the constitution-amendment procedure in Article S), the pardon and representational right of the President in Article 1, the role of the President in Article 9, and the prime-ministerial and government role in Article 17; the now-submitted amendment formally builds on these. The detailed literature treatment can be found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures alongside the Tisza package which complement the intent-level support with executional quality and sequence.

3.1 Orbán-clause sequence — rule-of-law restoration before the Fundamental Law (starting within 60 days)

Capping the prime-ministerial tenure at 8 years is in itself a correct goal, but with retroactive effect it is challengeable from the perspective of the constitutional principle of legal certainty, and subsequent constitutional-court practice may easily hollow it out. MIAK’s proposal: the Tisza party should not build only on the Fundamental Law text, but also launch in parallel the independence audit of the Constitutional Court (I4 — Protection of judicial independence) and the transparency of the rules for the Constitutional Court members’ mandates. The “Orbán clause” will be durable only if the body interpreting it itself operates under rule-of-law guarantees. Concretely: within 60 days the government should submit a separate legislative package on reforming the appointment procedure of Constitutional Court members (two-thirds-nomination commission, professional judicial pre-screening), and only afterwards should the Fundamental Law amendment go to a substantive vote. According to the inclusive vs. extractive institutional frame (Acemoglu–Robinson) (see 6.4.1), “autocracy reversal” is stable if we also renew the rule-enforcement body (Constitutional Court) — otherwise the old body will reverse the new rule.

3.2 Sovereignty Protection Office staged abolition — before a new media-supervisory framework is set up (within 90 days)

The abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office is in itself a clear gain from the perspective of restoring checks and balances (A6) — a body is being wound up that, in the Guriev–Treisman sense (see 6.4.2), was the legal-mimicry instrument of the spin dictatorship. However, the Office is currently legally collecting and storing data on civil organisations, journalists and foundations — these data sets must, simultaneously with the abolition, be transferred to an appropriate authority or destroyed, in lawful procedure. MIAK’s proposal: within 90 days the government should submit a concrete data-management closing law: (a) full public disclosure of the list of data sets, (b) separate notification of those concerned and a right to request deletion, (c) post-abolition data-management monitoring assigned to the competence of the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (NAIH). From the perspective of media pluralism as an institutional guarantee (A7), the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office will be substantive only if its place is not filled by a renamed body with a similar function.

3.3 KEKVA reversal — two-step protocol — first screening, then takeover (screening package within 180 days, takeover within 12 months)

The KEKVA system (public-interest asset-managing foundations) between 2021–2024 privatised the bulk of state university assets and the science-policy budget away from public-law control. Returning these to state ownership is politically a good decision, but a reverse-sequence implementation can result in serious errors: if the state simply takes back the KEKVAs without first screening them, then the investigation of the already-spent, disappeared or rerouted public assets becomes more difficult (the new owner’s liability limits the investigation of the old liability). MIAK’s proposal is a two-step protocol: (1) first step (within 180 days) — a comprehensive state forensic screening of every KEKVA, under the joint lead of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ) and an independent Anti-Corruption Bureau (A10); (2) second step (within 12 months) — the return to state ownership starts only after the screening closes, and the takeover contract records item by item the gaps already identified, so that civil-law recovery actions remain possible. Under the standard of Cohesion-policy accountability (A8) this sequence is mandatory — otherwise the documents on EU-fund use between 2021–2025 will be scattered in the takeover chaos.

The three proposals share a common principle: structural reform is effective if the sequence and the drafting quality also serve the requirements of long-term stability, not merely the symbolic political victory. The combined literature framework of Acemoglu–Robinson and Guriev–Treisman shows: “autocracy reversal” in successful countries (Poland 2024–2026, Czechia 2021–2024) has always been a multi-year, multi-stage, documented process — not a single constitutional super-measure.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Constitutional stability “Autocracy reversal” is embedded in a durable legal framework Retroactive effect is challengeable at the text level; the current composition of the Constitutional Court may hollow it out
Public-asset recovery KEKVA assets come under public oversight; a portfolio of roughly HUF 5,000 bn becomes transparent Without screening, transfers of 2021–2025 disappear and civil-law recovery becomes impossible
Restoration of civil space With the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office, the pressure-free working environment of civil organisations and journalists is restored Improper handling of the data set may cause a data-protection scandal; a successor body can be built with a name change
Political stability Retroactive regulation creates a political caesura (Viktor Orbán permanently excluded) The symbolic weight of the “Orbán clause” may erode if the constitutional-court procedure removes it; the opposition can rightly call it politically targeted legislation
EU rule-of-law compliance Based on the preliminary opinions of the Venice Commission, the changes are in line with the EU rule-of-law convention The drafting errors allow the new package to also fall under criticism from a legal-certainty perspective

The main dilemma of the table: symbolic political victory (immediate proclamation of the Orbán clause) versus legal durability (the prior renewal of the rule-enforcement body — the Constitutional Court). The balance between the two goals is attempted to be solved by the sequence in proposal 3.1: it does not abandon the ambition, but allows time for the foundations. With the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office the main risk is the data handling — here the 90-day closing law of proposal 3.2 is a mandatory precondition. For the KEKVA reversal the two-step protocol (3.3) prevents the loss of the forensic trail.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed key performance indicators (KPIs))

  • Start date of KEKVA screening: suggested that by 20 August 2026 (within 90 days) the audit led by the State Audit Office + the independent Anti-Corruption Bureau be launched, according to a published timetable. Measurable: the date of publication of the government decree launching the audit.
  • Legislation reforming Constitutional Court appointments: suggested that by 20 July 2026 (within 60 days) the government submit a separate legislative package. Measurable: the date of submission and the actual setting-up of the two-thirds-nomination commission.
  • Sovereignty Protection Office closing data-management law: suggested for adoption by 20 August 2026 (within 90 days). Measurable: in the NAIH annual report, the closing status concerning the Office’s data sets.
  • Venice Commission opinion: worth tracking whether the substantive opinion of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission on the now-submitted Fundamental Law amendment arrives within 6 months; this is an independent professional benchmark.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to the Tisza government and to the Hungarian public: the goal of the now-submitted Fundamental Law amendment is right, but the sequence and drafting quality of implementation weigh at least as much in the balance as the political decision itself. The “Orbán clause”, the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office and the KEKVA reversal are each, in themselves, structural reforms long awaited — together they form the backbone of democratic-infrastructure reconstruction. We ask the government to refine the now-submitted text in a short technical professional consultation, and to build the sequence proposed in points 3.1–3.3 into the parliamentary work plan before the substantive vote takes place.

Two MIAK foundational values are directly involved. Transparency stands at the centre on the KEKVA screening question: takeover alone is not enough; the documentation of the financial trail accumulated since 2021 is the condition that distinguishes public assets conceptually from privatised foundation assets. Accountability, in turn, is at the heart of the reform of Constitutional Court appointments — an autocracy-reversal package is worth only as much as the interpreting body can sustain in the long run; without renewing the interpreting body, the text-level victory erodes over the years.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Framing in the press across the spectrum

In the centre-left spectrum (Telex, HVG, 24.hu, 444.hu) the framing is clearly positive towards the Orbán clause and the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office — Telex highlights the political symbolism with a “Viktor Orbán can never again be prime minister”-style headline, while 444.hu uses the formula “the darkest side of the system” about the Sovereignty Protection Office, conveying a strong value judgement. The KEKVA reversal is also shown supportively, but the 444.hu headline (“the government reaches into the parallel reality of the NER: the outsourced KEKVAs are being taken back”) signals the structural dimension.

In the public-affairs spectrum (24.hu, ATV) the technical details of the Fundamental Law amendment (one can be prime minister for at most 8 years) are presented factually, while ATV chooses a format analysing the detailed text of the proposal.

In the economic spectrum (Portfolio) the framing is constitutional-professional: “The proposal has been submitted that would forbid Viktor Orbán from becoming prime minister again” — the focus is on the actor question; little is said about economic implications. The missing element of the Portfolio reading is the emphasis on the full economic weight (about HUF 5,000 bn) of the KEKVA assets.

In the pro-government/conservative spectrum (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) the framing is attacking-critical: Magyar Nemzet, with a Gergely Gulyás quote, raises the migration-pact argument (“Tisza would also bed down the acceptance of the European migration pact with the constitutional amendment”), which constructively links the now-submitted proposals to an earlier political conflict. Mandiner works in two pieces: one factually presents the 2/3 constraint (“Orbán can no longer be prime minister, only if he wins again by two-thirds”), the other lifts Tamás Lattmann’s professional critique as a lead title. The latter has been moved into a mainstream position: the professional concern has become publishable in the conservative band too, which is in itself interesting from the perspective of Hungarian media-market dynamics.

Népszava (front-page fallback, title-level reference only) also covered the case with a supportive framing.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The Tisza parliamentary group’s mandate count: 141 (National Election Office finalisation of 19 April 2026); the two-thirds threshold in a 199-seat National Assembly is 134 mandates (66.84%) — Tisza thus holds the two-thirds majority on its own, but only just (a 7-mandate cushion).
  • KEKVA-system estimated asset portfolio: ~HUF 5,000 bn (combined source: ÁSZ 2024 KEKVA report, MTA calculations; the exact value will be the result of the screening now proposed).
  • Sovereignty Protection Office setting-up date: January 2024 (under Act LXXXVIII of 2023); operation has lasted 2 years (the 444.hu “embodied for two years” formula refers to this).
  • Hungary’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 — rule of law: +0.35 (World Bank). The long-term aim of the changes is to raise this; the Hungarian value before 2010 was around +0.9.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Legal foundations and constitutional framework (programme points) — the I10 Constitutionality “stress test” methodology is directly applicable: a “could a later political majority reverse this?” type thought experiment should be run on the now-submitted text. Proposal 3.1’s Constitutional Court appointment reform operationalises this stress test.
  • Justice (programme points) — I4 protection of judicial independence and I10 Constitutional Court stress test jointly provide the policy basis for proposal 3.1.
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — A6 (checks and balances), A7 (media pluralism), A8 (cohesion accountability), A10 (Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau) — proposals 3.2 and 3.3 both build directly on the A-block tools.

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 Daron Acemoglu–James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

The great 2012 synthesis of Acemoglu and Robinson is based on the distinction between inclusive (open to all, controlled, competitive) and extractive (controlled by a narrow group, rent-seeking) institutional types. The authors emphasise: the transition from extractive to inclusive is never automatic, always organised around a “critical juncture”, and even after the critical juncture it may take several years for the old extractive rule-enforcement bodies (courts, supervisory authorities) to renew. Hungary’s 2026 situation is exactly such a critical juncture: the Tisza victory is politically secured, but the post-2010 extractive institutional system (KEKVA, Sovereignty Protection Office, long prime-ministerial tenure) still lives on at the level of laws and institutions. For autocracy reversal, the authors analyse in detail the “growth under extractive political institutions” process — the lesson is that the reversal of the wealth structure (KEKVA screening and reversal) is most effective in the early years after the critical juncture, because afterwards the new ownership structure consolidates. Projected onto the Hungarian case: the two-step protocol of 3.3 (screening → takeover) follows precisely this logic.

📖 Source: Acemoglu, Daron – Robinson, James A.: Why Nations Fail

6.4.2 Sergei Guriev–Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

Guriev and Treisman’s 2022 book identifies a new type of 21st-century autocratic governance: in contrast to the classic, openly violent dictator, the spin dictator ostensibly operates democratic institutions, holds elections and formally respects press freedom — while hollowing out these institutions in context. The typical tools: “democratic” amendment of the constitution to extend the presidential/prime-ministerial term, the creation of “national security”-based media-supervisory bodies, the “foreign agent”-style categorisation of civil organisations. According to the authors’ categorisation, the Sovereignty Protection Office is a textbook spin-dictatorship institution: its name is national-sovereignty protection, its function is the financial screening of civil society and journalism. As an example for dismantling, Guriev and Treisman take the Polish 2023–2025 experience: the Tusk government handled similar bodies (TVP transformation, IPN reform) sequentially, together with the replacement of those responsible, not merely by formal abolition of the institution. Projected onto the Hungarian case: proposal 3.2 (the 90-day closing data-management law) seeks to translate this sequential logic — otherwise the Sovereignty Protection Office is abolished, but the data set built by it and the role of those in charge are left unresolved.

📖 Source: Guriev, Sergei – Treisman, Daniel: Spin Dictators

6.4.3 Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force as of 17 April 2026)

Article S) of the Fundamental Law regulates the constitution-amendment procedure: amendment requires the support of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly (134 people in the 199-seat Assembly). The reach of the now-submitted proposal directly touches the articles of the State chapter regulating the prime-ministerial and government roles, the articles concerning public assets and public finances, and the regulatory area establishing the Sovereignty Protection Office. Tisza’s 141 mandates are in principle sufficient, but the 7-mandate cushion means that in the event of internal defection or mandate hand-back the two-thirds majority would be lost — so political success requires not only fraction discipline but also professional drafting quality, so that the law does not become vulnerable before the Constitutional Court.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force as of 17 April 2026, www.njt.hu National Legislation Repository)

6.5 International comparison

Poland between 2023–2026 went through a similar type of “autocracy reversal” process: the Tusk government worked sequentially, in step with judicial review, with the recall of “IUSTITIA” judges, the transformation of the TVP public-media board and the IPN reform. The key lesson: some of the constitutional judges appointed by PiS still obstruct the changes, which is why in the Hungarian case the AB reform of proposal 3.1 (modifying the appointment procedure before the main substantive reform) is of particular importance. Czechia between 2021–2024 implemented the similar asset-recovery programme by attaching a mandatory financial audit phase to every takeover — the Hungarian 3.3 two-step protocol builds directly on this. After the abolition of institutions functionally akin to a “Sovereignty Protection Office” (the Kult/Soyer reform) set up during the Austrian ÖVP/FPÖ coalition period (2017–2019), the Kurz/Grüne government of 2020 adopted a separate data-protection closing law — this is the precedent for the Hungarian 3.2 proposal.

  • I10 — Constitutionality “stress test”

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A7 — Media pluralism as an institutional guarantee
  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability
  • A9 — Spin-dictatorship prevention index
  • A10 — Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau (CPIB model)

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 21 May 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Acemoglu, Daron – Robinson, James A.: Why Nations Fail
  • 📖 Guriev, Sergei – Treisman, Daniel: Spin Dictators
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force as of 17 April 2026)

Note: the press monitor also mentioned the works of László Sólyom (The Constitution of the System Change), Gábor Halmai (Hungary’s Constitutional Crisis) and István Bibó (On the European Balance and Peace), but the referenced texts of these are not now available electronically in the MIAK knowledge base; instead of quotation, the Acemoglu–Robinson and Guriev–Treisman framework provides the theoretical grounding.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Legal foundations and constitutional framework (background)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point IDs: I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point IDs: A6, A7, A8, A9, A10)
  • MIAK press monitor, 21 May 2026 — topic 1, score: 82/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • National Election Office finalisation of 19 April 2026 (mandate distribution)
  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 (rule-of-law indicator)
  • Council of Europe Venice Commission (expected professional opinion)

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