Part I — Situation overview

On 26 May 2026 Zoltán Tarr, minister for social relations and culture, announced in a Facebook video that the government — jointly with the finance minister — is appointing a fiscal commissioner to the Media Services Support and Asset Management Fund (MTVA, the organisation producing the public media’s content) and to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH, the media authority). A fiscal commissioner is a financial supervisor appointed to oversee an institution’s management of finances. The direct trigger of the step is that the National Assembly’s Finance and Budget Committee on Tuesday did not accept the two organisations’ 2025 budget accounts. According to Zoltán Tarr, “our aim is that the public media operate honestly and in a balanced way, and that in its operation it strive not only for the full observance of the media law but also for the observance of budgetary discipline”. The commissioner’s task is to prevent steps that would constitute unjustified commitments or the alienation of assets.

The topic is significant because the financial control of the public media and the media authority concerns one of the central resource- and narrative-distribution machines of the past decade and a half. At the committee meeting, the report of NMHH president András Koltay revealed that in 2025 the MTVA had HUF 155.1 billion in budget revenue and HUF 6.9 billion in commercial revenue, while its total expenditure was HUF 157 billion. Andrea Bujdosó, the Tisza Party’s parliamentary group leader, objected that the report did not contain all the necessary information — on the material and personnel expenditure they received only a one-page document. The government also announced a full screening of the public media: of the management of finances, the contract portfolio, the managerial decisions, the procurements, the news-editing practice and the institutional relationships with Dunamédia and the NMHH.

In MIAK’s reading the making transparent of public-money use and the holding to account are justified. But the intervention has its boundary where the financial oversight would turn into a limiting of substantive or editorial independence: the NMHH is formally an autonomous public-administration body, not a government office, and therefore the control must confine itself to financial-accounting supervision and must rest on a legally clearly delimited authorisation.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive framework. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky (American media researcher and linguist–social critic) describe the operation of the media in their work Manufacturing Consent with a system of filters, the first and strongest of which is ownership and funding dependence — that is, whoever maintains the media indirectly shapes the content too. Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman (economist and political scientist) present, in their book Spin Dictators, media control as a key instrument of modern authoritarianism, and explicitly mention the Hungarian practice (the squeezing out of Klubrádió and Tilos Rádió) as an example of manipulative media policy — which is precisely why the boundary line between cleaning up the public media and restoring manipulative control is the stake. Edward L. Bernays (one of the founders of public relations) describes, in his classic Propaganda, “the conscious manipulation of the organised habits and opinions of the masses” as an invisible mechanism of the exercise of power — a warning of how easily state media influence becomes an instrument. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures so that the financial clean-up does not spill over into a limiting of editorial independence.

3.1 The fiscal commissioner’s mandate exclusively for financial-accounting supervision (fixed in the appointment document)

MIAK proposes that the commissioner’s appointment document expressly and narrowly delimit the competence: oversight of the management of finances, the procurements, the contract portfolio and the alienation of assets — yes; intervention in news editing, programming policy and personnel-editorial decisions — no. This fits the A1 (public-money dashboard) programme point: the public media’s HUF 155 billion use of public money should be publicly trackable and itemised. The Herman–Chomsky-style ownership filter (see 6.4.1) warns precisely that financial control and content control meet on a slippery boundary — which is why the authorisation must be written with an explicit limit.

The NMHH is an autonomous public-administration body whose budget is approved by the National Assembly and which is not under the government’s direction — the frame of the intervention must preserve this. MIAK therefore proposes that the government make public and legally unambiguous the precise legal basis of the fiscal commissioner’s appointment, and that it separate the supervision of the authority (NMHH) from the oversight of the management of finances of the public-media-producing fund (MTVA). This follows the logic of the KI8 (Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration) programme point: the control should be targeted, results-based and documented. Respect for the legal status is no obstacle to accountability — it is precisely what makes it rule-of-law-based.

3.3 Long-term aim: a genuine, pluralist public-service media with institutional guarantees

Beyond the financial clean-up, MIAK proposes a lasting, institutional reform of the public-service media: a board-of-trustees and funding model that guarantees editorial independence and political balance, regardless of who is in government. This is what the A7 (media pluralism as an institutional guarantee) programme point describes. The lesson of Spin Dictators (see 6.4.2) is that dismantling media control does not mean that the new power takes over the machine — but that we take the machine itself apart, replacing it with institutional guarantees. This also coincides with the spirit of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA).

The shared principle of the three proposals is that transparency and independence are not each other’s opposites: financial accountability serves media freedom when it stops precisely where editorial autonomy begins.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Public money / finances Making transparent the public media’s HUF 155+ billion management of finances, preventing unjustified commitments If the control remains formal, the screening produces no real accountability
Media pluralism / freedom The dismantling of the manipulative media machine, movement towards institutional guarantees If the intervention extends to content too, independence is harmed, and only the direction of control changes
Public administration / legal status A clarified supervisory frame, the strengthening of the autonomous body’s legal status If the legal basis is unclear, a constitutional and EU (EMFA) concern affecting the NMHH’s autonomy may arise

The main judgement question is the separation of financial oversight and editorial independence. The financial clean-up of the public media is legitimate and necessary, but crossing the boundary — intervention in news editing — would backfire: it would restore precisely the control logic that the reform seeks to eliminate. The proposal tips to the risk side if the commissioner’s mandate is not narrowly delimited; and it works if the authorisation contains an explicit financial limit and the NMHH’s autonomous legal status remains legally clean.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

On the basis of the following performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) it will be possible to judge in 6–18 months whether an independence-respecting financial clean-up has succeeded:

  • whether the fiscal commissioner’s appointment document granted exclusively financial-accounting competence (yes/no);
  • whether the public media’s (MTVA’s) management of finances became public and itemisedly trackable;
  • whether the NMHH’s autonomous legal status was preserved, with a clarified legal basis;
  • whether the balance of the public media’s news programmes improved according to an independent measurement (e.g. source- and topic-balance monitoring).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message: we support the financial screening of the public media, but we ask the decision-maker that the fiscal commissioner’s mandate explicitly extend only to the management of finances, and that the NMHH’s autonomous legal status remain legally clean. Editorial independence is not a matter for bargaining — neither in the hands of the old nor of the new power. This request stems from two MIAK foundational values: from transparency, because the public, itemised tracking of the HUF 155 billion use of public money makes accountability real; and from openness, because a pluralist public-service media, protected by institutional guarantees, is the precondition of democratic publicity. These two values together mark the boundary at which financial control stops and where media freedom begins.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The liberal and public-affairs lane (Telex, 444.hu, 24.hu) described the decision factually, as a step towards the financial transparency of the public media: Telex highlighted Zoltán Tarr’s justification and the committee figures (MTVA HUF 155.1 billion), while 444.hu and 24.hu brought the fact of the appointment and the full screening. The economic lane (Portfolio) analysed the financial-regulatory mechanism of the step and the background of the rejected accounts. The conservative lane (Magyar Nemzet) — as a substantive difference — framed the decision as “placing under guardianship”, giving a critical reading of the extension of government supervision. Népszava focused on the circumstances of the rejection of the report (serious concerns), with a title-level reference. The common point of the spectrum is the facts (the commissioner appointment, the rejected accounts); the difference is the frame: financial discipline versus the fear for independence — it is precisely this tension that forms the subject of MIAK’s analysis.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The MTVA’s 2025 revenue: HUF 155.1 billion budget + HUF 6.9 billion commercial; total expenditure HUF 157 billion (report of NMHH president András Koltay, 26 May 2026).
  • The National Assembly’s Finance and Budget Committee on Tuesday did not accept the MTVA’s and the NMHH’s 2025 budget accounts (Telex, Portfolio, 26 May 2026).
  • The government announced a full screening of the public media: management of finances, contract portfolio, managerial decisions, procurements, news-editing practice, Dunamédia and NMHH relationships (Telex, 26 May 2026).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — A7 (media pluralism as an institutional guarantee), A1 (public-money dashboard): the transparency of public-media funding and the guarantee of editorial independence;
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — KI8 (Drucker-style efficiency measurement): the fiscal commissioner as a targeted, results-based financial control instrument;
  • Culture (background material) — the cultural mission of public-service media and pluralist publicity.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Edward S. Herman – Noam Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent

The authors explain the operation of the media with a system of filters: “The structural factors are such things as ownership and control, dependence on other major funding sources (notably advertisers), and mutual interests and relationships between the media and those who make the news.” The first and strongest filter is ownership-funding dependence: whoever maintains the media indirectly shapes the frame of the content too. In the case of the public media this is double-edged: the financial control is legitimate, but it is precisely through the funding channel that it is easiest to influence editorial independence too — which is why the fiscal commissioner’s competence must be sharply separated from content.

📖 Source: Edward S. Herman – Noam Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent — The Political Economy of the Mass Media

6.4.2 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

The authors describe modern authoritarianism as a system that builds on manipulation rather than open violence, in which media control plays a key role. As a concrete Hungarian example they mention that the government squeezed out several radio stations: Tilos Rádió on the pretext of profanity, Klubrádió on the pretext of “too little Hungarian music” lost their frequencies — formally not on a political ground. The clean-up of the public media, in this frame, is successful if it does not reverse the direction of control but takes the manipulative machine itself apart — this is the difference between dismantling and takeover.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

6.4.3 Edward L. Bernays: Propaganda

Bernays describes propaganda as an invisible mechanism of the exercise of power: “The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country.” The warning regarding the public media is clear: state media influence easily becomes an instrument of shaping public opinion — which is why the aim of public-media reform is not a new “invisible government” but the institutional guarantee of pluralism.

📖 Source: Edward L. Bernays: Propaganda

6.5 International comparison

The European Union’s media freedom regulation (EMFA — European Media Freedom Act) obliges member states to ensure the editorial independence and predictable funding of public-service media, as well as to guarantee the autonomy of media authorities. Many European democracies separate the public media from day-to-day politics with an independent board-of-trustees model and a public funding formula. These practices illustrate the thesis of Herman–Chomsky and Spin Dictators: the independence of the media is stable when the funding and supervisory thread is protected by an institutional guarantee, not by the goodwill of the current government.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A7 — Media pluralism as an institutional guarantee
  • A1 — Public-money dashboard

Public administration and e-government

  • KI8 — Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration

Suggested new programme point: Independent public-media board-of-trustees and funding model — an institutional frame guaranteeing editorial independence — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy (and relatedly the Culture) area.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 27 May 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Edward S. Herman – Noam Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent — The Political Economy of the Mass Media
  • 📖 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators
  • 📖 Edward L. Bernays: Propaganda

Note: the visible text of the blog does not show the books’ local file path — only the author and title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A7, A1)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI8)
  • MIAK press monitor, 27 May 2026 — topic 3, score: 87/100

Additional public data sources:

  • European Union — media freedom regulation (EMFA — European Media Freedom Act)
  • Reporters Without Borders — press freedom index

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