Part I — Situation overview

According to Mandiner’s report, the new Hungarian government decided to adopt the European Union’s common migration and asylum pact — the rule package adopted at EU level in 2024, which unifies asylum procedures, the management of the external borders and the solidarity (burden-sharing) mechanism among member states. The previous Hungarian government position toward the pact was one of rejection; the present decision therefore marks a change of direction. The announcement was followed by a demonstration against the pact in Budapest (with the participation of Mi Hazánk, with speeches by László Toroczkai and Balázs Németh), and a sharp political debate broke out between Péter Magyar, Viktor Orbán and János Bóka.

It is worth fixing the legal framework precisely, because the debate often blurs the competences. The migration pact is EU law: the member state adopts the common rules and fits them into the domestic legal order, it does not “invent” them individually. On the implementation side, border policing and asylum fall within the competence of the Interior Ministry (the police as a law-enforcement body) — this is a law-enforcement, not a defence activity; military border protection, which is the task of the Defence Ministry, is distinct from it. This distinction is not a formality: public discourse on migration regularly confuses police border control with military defence, although the two are separate ministries, separate legal orders.

In the public sphere the topic typically appears as a symbolic, yes/no type of skirmish. MIAK’s reading, by contrast, is that the adoption of the migration pact is primarily a policy-implementation question: the stake is not whether we “accept” it at the level of principle, but on what data, with what impact assessment and with what human-rights guarantees we introduce its concrete provisions — the solidarity mechanism, the accelerated procedure, border registration.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. In his work 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism (2010), Ha-Joon Chang (an economist of South Korean origin teaching at Cambridge, a well-known author of heterodox development economics) points out that the regulation of immigration is never “free-market” but fundamentally a political decision, which shapes wages and the labour market more than almost any other rule — that is, it is a mistake to treat the debate over migration purely as an ideological or “natural market” question. In his work Diplomacy (1994), Henry Kissinger (an American diplomat and foreign-policy thinker of German origin, a modern interpreter of balance-of-power politics and the raison d’état — state interest as a guiding principle) provides the classic framework for balancing national interest and alliance obligation: functioning foreign policy is neither rigid principle-maximalism nor mere interest-chasing, but the transparent harmonisation of the two. Together the two works provide MIAK’s frame: migration policy is at once a labour-market-economic (Chang) and a foreign-policy-alliance (Kissinger) question, and in both dimensions data, not a slogan, is needed. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable steps that turn the adoption of the pact, instead of a symbolic debate, into data-driven, EU-compatible implementation.

3.1 A public impact assessment before the introduction of the pact (at the same time as transposition)

The domestic introduction of the migration pact should be preceded by a mandatory, public impact assessment: how many people, what types of procedure it concerns, how much implementation costs, and what burden it places on the settlements along the border, and on the immigration-enforcement and asylum systems. The insight stressed by Chang (see 6.4.1), that migration is primarily a political-economic decision, prescribes precisely that we base the decision on quantified impacts, not on mood. This builds directly on programme point KP3 (Transparent foreign policy — the public justification of international agreements), and is complemented by a mandatory legislative impact assessment — I3.

3.2 A principle-based, EU-compatible position in the solidarity mechanism (during the negotiation cycle)

The most contested element of the pact is the solidarity mechanism (burden-sharing among member states). Here MIAK proposes principle-based pragmatism: neither rigid rejection nor unconditional acceptance, but a transparent, value- and interest-based negotiating position that backs the Hungarian particularities (geographical situation, length of border, capacity) with data. According to Kissinger’s balance framework (see 6.4.2), credible foreign policy harmonises the national interest with the alliance obligation — it does not set them against each other. This is the practical application of programme points KP4 (Principle-based pragmatism doctrine) and KP17 (Issue-based coalition-building in the EU): on migration, the Hungarian position is worth representing together with similarly situated border countries.

3.3 Rule-of-law and human-rights guarantees in the accelerated procedure (during implementation, continuously)

The third step is that the pact’s accelerated border procedures, alongside efficiency, observe asylum-law and human-rights standards: effective legal remedy, the protection of vulnerable groups (unaccompanied minors) and the enforcement of the prohibition of refoulement. Border policing and asylum fall within the law-enforcement competence of the Interior Ministry; according to MIAK, a fast procedure and a rule-of-law guarantee are not opposites of each other but together ensure the predictability and legitimacy of the system. This directly serves inclusive institutional operation and the remedy guarantee protected by I4 (Judicial independence).

The common principle of the three proposals is that we should treat the adoption of the migration pact not as a symbolic victory or defeat but as a policy task: the decision is grounded in data, the position is guided by principle-based pragmatism, and the implementation is accompanied by a rule-of-law guarantee.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Foreign policy A more predictable, EU-compatible position; growing alliance credibility The domestic symbolic battle may suppress the substantive policy negotiation
Public safety / law enforcement A unified, transparent asylum and border procedure The accelerated procedure may come at the expense of rule-of-law guarantees if badly regulated
Economy / labour market A more predictable frame for managing labour migration If the decision is built on a political slogan instead of data, economic and social tension may also arise

The main dilemma is whether the implementation remains data-driven or symbolic. The pact in itself is neither a panacea nor a catastrophe — the elaboration of the concrete provisions and the quality of the impact assessment decide how much it is worth. The proposals tip onto the risk side if the accelerated procedure entails the hollowing out of rule-of-law guarantees, or if the government accepts or rejects the solidarity mechanism purely out of political gesture, without weighing the actual capacities.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested performance indicators — KPIs)

  • Whether a public, quantified impact assessment appeared before the introduction of the pact (yes/no, and at what depth).
  • The average duration of asylum procedures and the share of cases affected by legal remedy — suggested aim: a faster procedure without a deterioration of the remedy rate.
  • The alliance coherence of the Hungarian position: in how many EU migration decisions the Hungarian side represented a justified position shared with the border countries.
  • The development of the actual burden placed on the settlements along the border, with objective indicators.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers and the public alike is that we should treat the adoption of the migration pact not as a symbolic yes/no battle but as a policy task: let it be preceded by a public impact assessment, guided by a principle-based, EU-compatible position, and accompanied by a rule-of-law guarantee in the accelerated procedure. The concrete request to the government is that it introduce the concrete provisions of the pact based on data, with precise observance of the order of competences (the separation of the law-enforcement and the military task). The topic moves two of MIAK’s foundational values the most: data-drivenness, because the question of migration can only be decided responsibly with knowledge of the quantified impacts, and freedom from ideology, because immigration is neither an unconditionally good nor an unconditionally bad slogan, but a policy with concrete, measurable consequences.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The adoption of the migration pact appeared across the entire media palette, with sharply different framings. The conservative band (Mandiner) presented the provisions of the pact in detail, in a “strict” reading, and put the political debate — János Bóka’s message to Péter Magyar — to the fore. The left-liberal and public-affairs band (444.hu, Telex) focused on the actors of the anti-pact demonstration (Mi Hazánk, László Toroczkai, Balázs Németh) and on the Péter Magyar–Viktor Orbán exchange. The difference shows well that the topic appears primarily in a symbolic political frame in every band: the emphasis is on the question of who debates with whom, not on the concrete provisions of the pact and their measurable impacts. The MIAK reading goes precisely beyond this when it directs attention to the policy details of implementation — impact assessment, the solidarity mechanism, rule-of-law guarantees.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The EU migration and asylum pact was adopted at EU level in 2024; the member states’ task is to fit it into the domestic legal order and to implement it.
  • The Hungarian government’s decision, according to Mandiner’s report, marks a change of direction compared to the earlier rejecting position; the decision was accompanied by a Budapest demonstration and a political debate.
  • Border policing and asylum are the law-enforcement competence of the Interior Ministry (police); military border protection is a distinct, defence task.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — the principle-based, EU-compatible position, issue-based coalition-building and the transparent justification of international agreements;
  • Public safety and law enforcement (background) — immigration enforcement and border policing as a law-enforcement, not a defence, competence;
  • Justice (background) — the rule-of-law guarantees of the asylum procedure, effective legal remedy.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Ha-Joon Chang: 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism

Chang argues that the concept of the “free market” is misleading: every market has its politically determined rules, and one of the clearest examples of this is precisely immigration. The level of wages in rich countries — he claims — is influenced more by immigration regulation than by almost any other factor; that is, our pay is fundamentally determined by politics, not merely by individual performance. This is a direct lesson in the debate over the migration pact: immigration is not a “natural market” process to be decided by ideological slogans, but a political decision that must, precisely for that reason, be based on data and a transparent impact assessment.

“In rich countries, immigration control has a greater effect on wages than anything else, even minimum-wage regulation. […] Immigration is above all a political question.”

📖 Source: Ha-Joon Chang: 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism

6.4.2 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

Kissinger derives the emergence of the modern state order from the concepts of raison d’état — state interest as a guiding principle — and the balance of power: functioning foreign policy flows neither from rigid principles nor from mere force, but from the harmonisation of national interest with responsibility toward the wider system. In the case of the migration pact this means that the credible Hungarian position is neither the in-principle rejection of the alliance obligation nor unconditional submission to it, but the transparent balancing of the two: the data-based representation of national particularities within the EU framework.

“According to raison d’état, the well-being of a state justifies any means that advances this aim; […] the universal moral norms of the Middle Ages were replaced by the national interest.”

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

6.5 International comparison

The migration-management experience of border countries in a similar geographical and capacity situation (for example the Mediterranean and the East-Central European member states) shows that the accelerated border procedure and the rule-of-law guarantees can be realised together — if the legal remedy remains effective and the protection of vulnerable groups is ensured. The lesson of the debates around the solidarity mechanism is that burden-sharing works if the member states arrive at the negotiating table with transparent, data-based positions, and represent their interests in issue-based coalitions — not in rigid blocs.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP4 — Principle-based pragmatism doctrine
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment
  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 7 June 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Ha-Joon Chang: 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

Note: in the visible text of the blog the local file path of the books does not appear — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP4, KP17)
  • MIAK policy area: Public safety and law enforcement (background)
  • MIAK press monitor, 7 June 2026 — topic 3, score: 86/100

Additional public data sources:

  • The official text of the EU migration and asylum pact, Eurostat asylum data, Frontex reports

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