Part I — Situation overview

The direction of American troop policy in Europe turned around within twenty-four hours. On Thursday, 21 May 2026, US President Donald Trump announced on his own social platform (Truth Social) that the United States is sending 5,000 further troops to Poland — he justified the decision by reference to his close relationship with Polish President Karol Nawrocki. The announcement is all the more surprising because a few weeks earlier Trump had still ordered the withdrawal of some 5,000 American troops from Germany, and a rotational deployment of nearly 4,000 planned for Poland was cancelled at the last moment. Poland currently hosts roughly 10,000 American troops, so the planned expansion would significantly increase the American presence.

The communication chaos around the announcement itself became a destabilising factor. According to Notes from Poland and The New York Times the decision “surprised Pentagon officials” and “left a great many unanswered questions” — the defence ministry did not comment publicly, the Pentagon directed journalists to the White House, and the White House to Trump’s social-media account. The AP’s report told of “NATO allies baffled by the about-face on American troop movements”; the foreign ministers meeting in Helsingborg, Sweden, reacted to the news on Friday, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio tried to reassure the allies by saying that “at a different pace, but in the long term the American troop presence in Europe will certainly decrease”. In Poland, despite the political divisions, both pro-government and opposition figures welcomed the news — while the first of the incoming Polish F-35 stealth fighters (combat aircraft hard for radar to detect) also arrived from the United States.

MIAK’s reading is that the lesson is not the number of troops but unpredictability as a new strategic constant. A position that reverses within 24 hours warns that the European NATO members — Hungary among them — must rely on their own, predictable defence planning, and that the consolidation of the regional security centre of gravity around Warsaw is worth not enduring but exploiting through active cooperation.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scholarly framework. In World Order, Henry Kissinger (a German-born American diplomat and foreign-policy thinker, a defining figure of 1970s American foreign policy) argues that lasting international order stands on two legs: on the balance of power and on a shared sense of legitimacy — the common, unspoken rules of conduct provide the predictability without which mere force does not create order. An alliance rests precisely on this predictability, which is why a sudden, unexplained about-face shakes it. In The Grand Chessboard, Zbigniew Brzezinski (a Polish-born American geostrategist, a former US national security advisor) describes Poland as Central Europe’s key geopolitical hub, whose only rational path is Western integration — and it is exactly this logic that is now reinforced by the increased American presence. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that steer Hungarian defence and foreign policy towards a predictable allied role.

3.1 Polish-Hungarian defence-cooperation roadmap (within 60 days)

The Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should jointly prepare a Polish-Hungarian defence-cooperation letter of intent that bilaterally deepens the recent Hungarian-Polish rapprochement in Kraków and Warsaw (the restart of regional relations). The regional centre of gravity is consolidating around Warsaw, which is why, under the KP10 regional-resilience-building and the KP24 alliance-maintenance programme point, Hungary must now build meaningful cooperation — airspace-defence coordination, joint exercises, procurement synergies. In Brzezinski’s geopolitical framework (see 6.4.2) this is not subordination to Poland but the active shaping of the Central European security architecture. On the foreign operational participation of the Hungarian armed forces, under the Fundamental Law the National Assembly decides as a general rule (within the NATO and EU framework the Government) — but the planning and preparation of the cooperation is clearly the competence of the Ministry of Defence, not law enforcement.

3.2 Restructuring the defence budget: air defence and drone defence first

According to MIAK the key question is not the mere sum of defence spending but its composition. Under the HV5 scheduled-spending-increase programme point, the largest economic and security return on the increment occurs if at least 40% of it is productive investment — domestic production, research and development, and infrastructure. The regional experience (the Baltic drone incidents and the Polish force expansion) points in one direction: Hungarian defence resources should be spent not on buying more tanks but on the modernisation of the air-defence system and on building drone and counter-drone capacity (HV12 geostrategic defence planning). Through the HV4 joint EU-procurement programme point this can be fed back into the domestic economy via the supplier integration of the Hungarian defence industry (including the Zalaegerszeg production capacity).

3.3 Radical transparency of defence spending

A growing defence budget serves security only if its use is verifiable. Under the HV2 programme point a public Defence Budget Dashboard must be created, which makes visible both the procurement contracts (contracting party, amount, performance) and the fulfilment status of the NATO capability targets — along the principle of “classification minimalism”: public by default, and classified only in concrete, justified cases. In an unpredictable allied environment, domestic accountability is what makes Hungarian defence planning credible in the eyes of allies and taxpayers alike — this is the logic of the KP23 alliance-credibility audit.

These three proposals are bound together by a single principle, formulated by the KP4 principle-based pragmatism doctrine: a predictable, value-based allied policy is not self-abandonment but the recovery of national room for manoeuvre. If the American commitment becomes uncertain, the rational response is regional cooperation and the reinforcement of one’s own capability — in Kissinger’s words, the restoration of predictability (see 6.4.1).

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Defence The air-defence and drone-defence priority gives more targeted capability; regional cooperation increases deterrent strength Rapid restructuring may run into capacity shortage; defence inflation reduces the actual capability gain
Foreign policy The predictable allied role recovers Hungarian room for manoeuvre and negotiating capital Too rapid a Polish orientation may breed the distrust of the other V4 partners
Economy The integration of domestic production and R&D creates jobs and technological knowledge Increasing defence spending draws resources away from other sectors if it is not paired with fiscal discipline

The main consideration is the degree of commitment. Regional resilience works if Hungary regards the V4 (the Visegrád Four — Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia — cooperation framework) as the primary framework, but also builds coalitions issue by issue with other partners. The proposal tips to the risk side if the Hungarian side spends on prestige procurements instead of the air-defence priority, or if it answers unpredictable American policy with an unpredictable Hungarian reaction.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

The following performance indicators (KPIs — Key Performance Indicators) will show in 12-24 months whether the direction is good:

  • the share of productive investment (domestic production, R&D, infrastructure) within defence spending (suggested target: above 40%);
  • the share of domestic/EU procurement within total defence procurement (suggested target: from 30% to 50%);
  • the share of the budget publicly accessible on the Defence Budget Dashboard (suggested target: from the current below 30% to above 70%);
  • the number of documented Polish-Hungarian (and V4) joint defence exercises and coordination events per year.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers: unpredictable American troop policy must be answered not with complaint but with predictable Hungarian planning. Let us strengthen Polish-Hungarian and V4 defence cooperation; let us spend the defence forint on air defence and drone defence, not on prestige procurement; and let us make the spending public. In this approach two MIAK foundational values move together: accountability, because the transparency of defence spending is what makes the growing budget credible; and data-drivenness, because the priorities of capability development are driven by the actual threat (airspace, drone), not by symbolic procurement. Predictability — in Kissinger’s sense — is not weakness but the basic precondition of the alliance order.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The international press handled the announcement with different emphases. The American-international lane (AP, The New York Times) brought to the fore the chaos and the allies’ bafflement — the “about-face” and “unanswered questions” frame emphasises the unpredictability of the decision. The British BBC focused on the reassurance attempt (Rubio), highlighting the announced fact of the long-term American withdrawal. The Polish press (Notes from Poland) gave a domestic-political reading: it interpreted the matter in the frame of the Nawrocki-Tusk rivalry, who owes the result to whom. The Central European analysts (Balkan Insight, Visegrad Insight) examined the shift of the regional security centre of gravity, and Politico analysed specifically the “chaotic communication”. From the full spectrum one common lesson can be read: there is no dispute over the facts (the announcement of +5,000 troops), the uncertainty is around the implementation and the durability — which is exactly what makes it a strategic risk.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Announced further American troops to Poland 5,000 Trump (Truth Social), 21 May 2026
Current American military presence in Poland ~10,000 Notes from Poland, 22 May 2026
Troops previously ordered withdrawn from Germany ~5,000 Notes from Poland, 22 May 2026
Cancelled rotational deployment (Poland) ~4,000 Notes from Poland, 22 May 2026

These data underpin the proposal of Part III: the sudden rearrangement of the presence justifies accelerating planning on the Hungarian side too.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Defence (programme points) — the composition of defence spending, the priority of air defence and drone defence, the transparency of procurement;
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — regional resilience, alliance credibility and issue-based coalition-building;
  • Economy (background material) — the integration of the domestic defence industry and R&D, fiscal sustainability.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Henry Kissinger: World Order

Kissinger sees the condition of a stable international order in the combination of the balance of power and a shared sense of legitimacy. Analysing the 18th-century European order, he writes that the calculations of power ran “against the mitigating background of a shared sense of legitimacy and unspoken rules of international conduct” — that is, predictability and common rules provided the durability of the order. Speaking of deterrence (a conflict prevented by the credibility of the threat), he warns: as uncertainty grows, “it becomes ever harder to determine who is holding whom in check and on the basis of what calculations”. Projected onto the current situation: if American troop policy becomes unpredictable, the alliance gives legitimacy and predictability through its strength — it is exactly this that the about-face within 24 hours shakes, and exactly why the rational Hungarian response is the reinforcement of its own, predictable planning.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: World Order

6.4.2 Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

Analysing the geopolitical map of Eurasia, Brzezinski identifies Poland as the key Central European state, which “has only one choice: to integrate into the West”. With the concept of the democratic bridgehead he describes how Central Europe — led by Poland — becomes the forward bastion of transatlantic and European integration. Increasing the American presence in Poland reinforces exactly this bridgehead role, and organises the region’s security centre of gravity around Warsaw. The Hungarian lesson is direct: if Hungary wants to step out of its earlier isolation, then it must become an active, predictable actor in the Central European architecture described by Brzezinski — alongside the Polish hub, not against it.

📖 Source: Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

6.5 International comparison

In 2023 Poland raised its defence spending to 3.9% of GDP (gross domestic product), and spent a significant part of it on domestic production (the PGZ group) — the revenue of the domestic defence industry grew by 40%. This shows that an increase in spending also brings an economic return if it finances domestic production and R&D, not merely imports. The Scandinavian and Baltic experience reinforces the same: the defence modernisation of small states is successful if it builds on NATO-level interoperability (cooperation compatibility) and prioritises air-defence and drone-defence capacity.

Defence

  • HV5 — Scheduled increase of defence spending
  • HV2 — Transparency of defence spending
  • HV4 — EU defence industrial base and joint procurement
  • HV12 — Geostrategic defence planning

Foreign policy

  • KP10 — Regional resilience-building
  • KP24 — “Year of EU/NATO” — cyclical maintenance of alliance relations
  • KP23 — Alliance-credibility audit
  • KP4 — Principle-based pragmatism doctrine

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 23 May 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: World Order
  • 📖 Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Defence (programme points; programme point ID: HV5)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP10)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (background material)
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 23 May 2026 — topic 1, score: 87/100

Additional public data sources:

  • NATO capability-target documents, IISS Military Balance — defence-spending and capability comparison

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