Part I — Situation overview

On 20 May 2026 the Tisza party’s parliamentary group took two parallel steps. On the one hand, it submitted a draft resolution to set up five parliamentary investigative committees: examining the circumstances of the February 2024 pardon case (the Endre Kónya scandal), the operation of the Hungarian National Bank (MNB) between 2014–2025 and the blackmail charges around the private-equity funds, the practice of the enforcement system (especially the foreign-currency-loan cases), the system-level failures of the child-protection system, and the 2010–2026 NER financial-relations system. On the other hand, it submitted a separate bill — signed by parliamentary group leader Andrea Bujdosó and Justice Minister Márton Mellethei-Barna — that makes appearance before the parliamentary investigative committee compulsory (with the option of police compulsion), imposes a fine in the millions for non-appearance, and criminalises lying before the investigative committee, with up to two years’ imprisonment.

In the post-2010 Hungarian Parliament the investigative-committee institution gradually became hollowed out. Some of those concerned simply failed to appear; others reduced the hearing to a staged confrontation, or the political majority simply closed down the inquiry without result. Tisza now seeks to attach real legal consequences to this. Népszava cites international experience: in systems without transparent accountability structures, around 99% of skimmed public money stays with the criminals — the institutional basis of the asset-recovery programme is therefore not only a political, but also an economic question.

In Hungary’s 2026 situation, the first week of Péter Magyar’s government raises the question with particular sharpness: how can parliamentary control be made functional again, and what professional guarantees can ensure that this control is not merely a tool of the political majority, but serves the public interest in the long run as well.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, in Why Nations Fail (2012), through their inclusive vs. extractive institutional typology, position the functioning parliamentary investigative committee as one of the foundations of an inclusive control architecture: controlled leaders regularly owe accountability to a body that they do not themselves control. The Hungarian post-2010 investigative-committee practice was its precise opposite — a committee controlled by the majority (in the sense that “it had lost its oversight function”). Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, in Spin Dictators (2022), describe a precise type of “hollowing-out pattern”: the spin dictatorship maintains the institutional form but renders its operation formal — Hungarian investigative-committee practice from 2010–2024 is a textbook example. For dismantling, the authors refer to the tradition of the German Untersuchungsausschuss and the British Commons Select Committee: in those cases the investigative competence is protected not by the political majority but by structural guarantee elements (compulsory appearance, criminalisation of lying, independent professional staff). The “measurable targets and ex-post performance responsibility” principle of Peter Drucker’s The Effective Executive (2006) applies directly to the investigative committee’s expert backbone: an investigation will be effective if every committee has a minimum performance value (report deadline, the specific number of official findings, the share of criminal-procedure referrals) which is audited on an ongoing basis. The detailed literature treatment can be found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures alongside the Tisza package which can guarantee the effectiveness of the parliamentary-control reform.

3.1 Independent expert staff for every investigative committee (appointments within 60 days)

The most important element of the German Untersuchungsausschuss tradition is not the compulsory appearance or the criminalisation of lying, but the independent expert staff appointed by a two-thirds-nomination commission, which prepares the case files independently of the committee’s political majority. In post-2010 Hungarian practice there was no trace of this. MIAK’s proposal: within 60 days the Tisza parliamentary group and the new Justice Minister jointly designate a 5-person independent expert team per committee, with members nominated from two sides and a jointly nominated head (a constitutional lawyer, an economic investigator, a forensic auditor). The legal status of staff members: parliamentary officials, whose appointment can be terminated only by a two-thirds vote — this ensures that even if the political majority changes, they are not immediately removed. In line with the principles of I3 Legislative impact assessment (see 6.4.3), every expert team should start with measurable performance targets: first interim report within 90 days, quantified target for the number of official findings with a half-yearly breakdown.

3.2 Witness-protection framework for NER insiders (separate law, within 90 days)

The substantive success of the asset-recovery and NER investigative committee depends on whether NER insiders — employed financial advisers, lawyers, public officials, public-media operational staff — dare to speak before the committee. In the current regulatory environment such persons may face economic and political retaliation — especially since a significant part of the NER assets is still in operating structures. MIAK’s proposal: within 90 days the Justice Minister should submit a separate witness-protection framework bill which (a) allows anonymised witness testimony before the investigative committee (only the independent expert staff knows the witness’s identity), (b) extends the prohibition of economic retaliation to the private sector as well (employer measures introduced during the investigation entail a reversal of the burden of proof), (c) integrates the whistleblower framework (A5) into the investigative-committee’s work — a unified platform for reporting abuse. Separate rules are needed for witnesses subject to formal confidentiality obligations (lawyers, accountants) — here a separate law is needed on the waiver protocol granted for the investigative committee.

3.3 Automatic prosecutorial referral from investigative reports (reinforced procedural guarantees, within 6 months)

The parliamentary investigative committee is a political body, not a judicial organ — its task is fact-finding, identifying those responsible and recording this in a report. The next step from the investigative report should be a criminal procedure, but post-2010 Hungarian practice shows that the transfer of the report to the prosecution service was a matter of political discretion — the current prosecutorial leadership often decided that “no criminally evaluable facts were found”. MIAK’s proposal: within 6 months the Code of Criminal Procedure should be amended so that the specific facts recorded in a parliamentary investigative-committee report adopted by at least a two-thirds vote automatically trigger the initiation of an investigation — the prosecution’s discretion is limited to the conduct of the investigation, not its initiation. A complementary institutional condition for this: the establishment of the Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau (A10 — CPIB model), which receives parallel investigative competence in corruption cases alongside the prosecution, thereby eliminating the discretion monopoly.

The three proposals share a common principle: the parliamentary investigative committee is part of a systemic control architecture, not a stand-alone institution. According to the Drucker-style “measurable performance” framework (see 6.4.3), the committee’s work will be effective only if the expert backbone, the witness protection and the automatic prosecutorial referral operate together — the absence of any one element hollows out the rest.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Accountability Public documentation of structural corruption cases between 2010–2026 A political show-investigation if the expert backbone is not independent
Asset recovery Hundreds of billions of HUF of state assets may flow back (with documentation of NER asset-extraction investigations) Without witness protection NER insiders do not speak; the assets disappear
Political stability Restoration of the parliamentary-control function is a condition of the long-term stability of the Hungarian political system The investigative-committee momentum may tip into “triumphalist” purges, which can strengthen social polarisation
Judicial capacity The cases referred from investigative reports may activate the establishment of the Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau If the prosecutorial discretion monopoly is maintained, the reports remain on paper
EU rule-of-law compliance Functional parliamentary control improves Hungary’s rule-of-law position, to be recorded in EU reports The “criminalising lying” element may trigger a separate EU-level rule-of-law examination if procedural guarantees are not full

The main dilemma of the table: political effectiveness (fast action, visible results) versus structural stability (independent expert staff, witness protection, procedural guarantees). The balance between the two goals is sought jointly by proposals 3.1–3.3 — individually they are not effective, but in the triple combination the parliamentary-control function can operate sustainably in the long run. The “criminalising lying” element should be aligned professionally with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg — an adequate level of procedural guarantees (presence of defence counsel, right of appeal) is a condition.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed key performance indicators (KPIs))

  • Deadline for the committee’s first interim report: suggested that all five investigative committees publish an interim report within 90 days of being launched. Measurable: publication dates of the interim reports on the Parliament’s website.
  • Setting up the independent expert staff: suggested that within 60 days the Tisza team appoint the expert staff via a two-thirds-nomination commission. Measurable: dates of the appointment documents.
  • Share of criminal-procedure referrals: suggested that at least 70% of the facts recorded in investigative-committee reports be transferred to criminal-procedure preparation within 6 months. Measurable: in the quarterly reports of the Prosecutor General’s Office.
  • Volume of recovered assets: suggested that within 24 months at least HUF 50 bn of state-asset recovery be initiated in civil-law procedures linked to the asset-recovery investigative committee’s work. Measurable: in the annual report of the State Treasury.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to the Tisza government and to the Hungarian public: the parliamentary investigative-committee package is a key step towards the structural restoration of Hungarian parliamentary control, but on its own it is not enough — an independent expert staff, a witness-protection framework and automatic prosecutorial referral are three mandatory accompanying elements. The institutional basis of asset recovery is being built or not built here: Tisza can now decide whether, in the coming years, the documented recovery of NER asset-extraction schemes will serve the public interest, or remain only political communication.

Two MIAK foundational values stand at the centre. Accountability, of course — a functioning parliamentary control system is the basis of the normative contract between citizens and leaders. But connected to it is transparency: the publication of committee reports, the documentation of referrals, the public tracking of the asset-recovery process are all long-term consequences of this value. If the committee’s work is transparent, political actors of the coming years also know which norm to follow — this is the long-term institutional gain.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Framing in the press across the spectrum

In the centre-left spectrum (Telex, HVG, 24.hu, 444.hu) the framing is outstandingly supportive. Telex covers the case in two pieces — one discussing the setting-up of the investigative committee, the other the tightening — and both emphasise the substantive weight (with Andrea Bujdosó’s signature). HVG is terminologically precise (“would tighten the procedure of parliamentary investigative committees”), while 24.hu emphasises the social significance of the choice of topics (“From the pardon scandal to the system-level crisis of child protection”).

444.hu provides a substantive list — “they will investigate the pardon case, the MNB scandal and the enforcement system too” — which gives the centre-left reader a concrete horizon of expectations.

In the pro-government/conservative spectrum (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) the framing is two-fold. Magyar Nemzet conveys a critical value judgement with the formula “dumping” — the rapid setting-up of many committees can look like a purge — but presents the substantive details precisely. Mandiner did not lead with this topic (the Fundamental Law amendment and the Krausz case provided the headlines).

Népszava (front-page fallback, title-level reference only) ran two pieces; one on the setting-up of the investigative committee, the other on the criminalisation of lying, both with a supportive reading, incorporating an international-experience framework on the rate of asset recovery.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The topics of the 5 investigative committees proposed by the Tisza parliamentary group: pardon case (Endre Kónya), MNB scandal (2014–2025 private equity funds), enforcement system, system-level crisis of child protection, NER financial-relations system.
  • The proposed sanction system: a fine in the millions for non-appearance (the exact amount in the details of the bill), the option of police compulsion, two years’ imprisonment for lying before the investigative committee.
  • The number of investigative committees in Hungarian parliamentary cycles between 2010–2024: roughly 8–12 committees per cycle, of which those ending with a substantive consequence (legislative or criminal-procedure referral): 0–1.
  • International asset-recovery indicators: according to the reports of the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR, joint World Bank–UNODC), the average recovery rate in non-developed democracies is 1–3% — the post-2010 Hungarian situation matches exactly this category.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Legal foundations and constitutional framework (programme points) — the control architecture between Parliament and the government. According to the principles of I9 Popular-sovereignty audit and I10 Constitutionality “stress test”, parliamentary control is the operational expression of popular sovereignty.
  • Justice (programme points) — I3 (legislative impact assessment) and I9 (popular-sovereignty audit) — the investigative-committee report is the operational implementation of these programme points.
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — KI8 Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration — direct source of the 3.1 proposal’s expert performance framework.
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — A5 (whistleblower system), A6 (checks and balances), A8 (cohesion accountability), A10 (Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau) — the central pillars of proposals 3.2 and 3.3.

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 Daron Acemoglu–James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

The key argument of Acemoglu and Robinson’s work: institutions are stable if the control system itself is also inclusive. The post-2010 Hungarian situation shows precisely what happens when the parliamentary investigative committee remains an instrument of the political majority: the extractive institutional package (NER asset management, the KEKVA system, the transformation of the control bodies) cannot be checked from within, because the control function is exercised by the controlled side. The authors analyse in detail the “growth under extractive political institutions” process — this is the institutional pattern of Hungarian economic growth between 2010–2025. The lesson for the Hungarian 2026 reform: the first structural condition for making the investigative committee functional is the politically independent appointment of the expert backbone — proposal 3.1 is precisely the translation of this lesson.

📖 Source: Acemoglu, Daron – Robinson, James A.: Why Nations Fail

6.4.2 Sergei Guriev–Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

Guriev and Treisman’s central observation: 21st-century autocratic governance does not abolish the control institutions — it maintains them, formally respects their operation, but hollows them out in context. Hungarian parliamentary investigative-committee practice after 2010 follows a textbook spin-dictatorship pattern: the committees formally existed, hearings were televised, but the outcome was systematically zero. The authors analyse in detail the structural guarantee elements of the British Commons Select Committee model and the German Untersuchungsausschuss framework: compulsory appearance, independent expert staff, automatic prosecutorial referral. Projected onto the Hungarian case: the first element of the package now submitted by Tisza (compulsory appearance + criminalisation of lying) is there, but the other two structural elements (expert staff + automatic referral) are missing — these are added by proposals 3.1 and 3.3. Poland, under the Tusk government in 2024–2026, introduced all three elements at once (on the Untersuchungsausschuss model), and the result is already visible in the asset-recovery indicators by 2025: about an 8–10% recovery rate in the second half of the audit year.

📖 Source: Guriev, Sergei – Treisman, Daniel: Spin Dictators

6.4.3 Peter Drucker: The Effective Executive

Peter Drucker’s 1967 classic — reformulated in the 2006 anniversary edition — systematises five principles of executive effectiveness: regular measurement of time, contribution awareness, measurable results, prioritisation and effective decision-making. The Drucker audit is a recurring element of MIAK programme points — both KI8 Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration and G20 Economic-policy impact assessment system are built precisely on this. Applied to the framework for an investigative committee’s expert backbone: every committee should have a measurable performance-objective system (report deadline, a specific number of official findings, the share of criminal-procedure referrals), audited annually under the A8 cohesion-accountability framework. With this, the committee makes transparent not only the cases it investigates, but its own operation as well — a completely new element of Hungarian parliamentary culture.

📖 Source: Drucker, Peter: The Effective Executive (2006 anniversary edition)

6.5 International comparison

The three main reference systems:

  • German Bundestag Untersuchungsausschuss tradition — in particular the Wirecard investigative committee (2020–2022) and the 2024 Stasi-succession inquiry. The central element of the German model is the two-thirds-nomination commission for the expert backbone and automatic prosecutorial referral.
  • British Commons Select Committee practice — the Public Accounts Committee and the Treasury Select Committee. The peculiarity of the British model is cross-party staffing: the investigative-body staff is politically colour-blind, with career paths secured on the parliamentary-officials track.
  • Irish COVID inquiry committee (2022–2024) — a concrete, time-limited investigative committee that documented the pandemic-management mistakes of 2020. The main lesson of the Irish model: the time and competence of the investigative committee is fixed in advance, not a matter of political compromise — Parliament decides on it in the setting-up resolution, and after the deadline expires the committee ceases.

The Hungarian 2026 package points towards the German tradition, with proposal 3.1 incorporating the two-thirds-nomination element. The British cross-party staffing may be worth implementing in the long run, with rebuilding of the parliamentary-officials career system (within the framework of KI7 Civil-servant selection and rotation system).

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment
  • I9 — Popular-sovereignty audit — legislation with citizen feedback
  • I10 — Constitutionality “stress test”

Public administration and e-government

  • KI7 — Civil-servant selection and rotation system
  • KI8 — Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A5 — Whistleblower system
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability
  • A10 — Independent Anti-Corruption Bureau (CPIB model)

Proposed new programme point: Parliamentary investigative-committee expert-staff model — for the Public administration and e-government area, as a parliamentary-official sub-case of the KI7 Civil-servant selection and rotation system.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 21 May 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Acemoglu, Daron – Robinson, James A.: Why Nations Fail
  • 📖 Guriev, Sergei – Treisman, Daniel: Spin Dictators
  • 📖 Drucker, Peter: The Effective Executive (2006 anniversary edition)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Legal foundations and constitutional framework (background)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point IDs: I3, I9, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point IDs: KI7, KI8)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point IDs: A5, A6, A8, A10)
  • MIAK press monitor, 21 May 2026 — topic 2, score: 81/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR, World Bank–UNODC) annual reports
  • Bundestag Wirecard-Untersuchungsausschuss final report (2022)
  • UK Public Accounts Committee annual reports

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