Part I — Situation overview

The press day of 19 May 2026 brought three new, closely linked details in the Endre Kónya clemency case — the case whose internal anatomy MIAK discussed in the previous day’s blog. First: the politician Tamás Gaudi-Nagy, in his reaction to 444.hu, admitted that he had drafted the Curia review motion in Endre Kónya’s case as a lawyer, while distancing himself from the submission of the clemency request itself (Telex, 444.hu, 20 May 2026). Second: HVG and 444.hu, citing internal justice-ministry correspondence, reported that the Sándor Palace — more precisely Katalin Novák’s presidential office — repeatedly pressed within a single day former Justice Minister Judit Varga to sign the countersignature on the clemency decision as quickly as possible (HVG 19 May 2026; 444.hu 19 May 2026). Third: President Tamás Sulyok announced on 19 May 2026 that he would hand over the files of the case to the new government (24.hu, 19 May 2026) — at the time of yesterday’s MIAK analysis this was still an open presidential reaction.

Each of these three facts is noteworthy on its own; together, however, they sketch a procedural pathology. Gaudi-Nagy’s dual — legal and political — role is not in itself unlawful (legal representation and political office are not mutually exclusive in Hungary), but in the clemency procedure it makes it opaque whether the political channel or the legal-representation channel was the determining one. The absence of a pressure protocol is more serious still: if a presidential office can put pressure on a minister called to countersign several times within hours in an official case, the substantive ministerial control — which follows from Article 9(5) of the Fundamental Law — can be reduced to mere formality. Tamás Sulyok’s decision to hand over the files in turn strengthens the institutional side of disclosure: the Office of the President of the Republic chooses whether to become a partner to disclosure or an obstacle to it — and Sulyok chose the former. The Fidesz parliamentary group’s official answer (Gergely Gulyás in Mandiner) at the same time pushes the thesis that “the documents also revealed: the charges against the previous government are unfounded” (Mandiner, 20 May 2026) — with this, the question remains a matter of political dispute, while the quality and visibility of the constitutional procedure has to be settled, regardless of who claims what.

MIAK’s reading is therefore not the assignment of personal responsibility — that is the competence of the Central Investigation Prosecutor’s Office and the court — but the recording that the new facts name precisely those institutional weak points which yesterday’s base package only addressed in general terms: the declaration of the lawyer/interested-party relationship, the timestamped logging of pressure communications, and the extension of the Lobby Register (A4) to clemency cases — three additions that take the existing proposal package to operational level.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. Robert Klitgaard in his classic Controlling Corruption (1988) describes with the C = M + D − A formula how integrity risk is greatest where a public office combines monopoly, discretion and weak accountability — and this is precisely the situation in individual clemency, where the Sándor Palace is the sole decision-maker, the set of criteria is publicly unrecorded, and substantive ex-post control formally does not exist. Susan Rose-Ackerman in her Yale monograph Corruption and Government (1999) shows, along the principal-agent-client model, that political patronage is not a “bad apples” problem but a structural one: when an intermediary (here the political-legal dual role) bridges official control points, transactions are not verifiable — unless declaration and registration become institutional obligations. The Fundamental Law of Hungary (consolidated text in force as of 17 April 2026), in Article 9(4)(g), expressly assigns the right of individual clemency to the President of the Republic, and paragraph (5) prescribes the mandatory countersignature of a member of the Government (in practice, the justice minister) — this is the constitutional “double lock”, whose substantive operation can be reduced to formality in the absence of a pressure protocol and a declaration regime. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that extend the reform package of the 2026-05-19 base blog in response to the procedural dysfunctions now uncovered.

3.1 Lawyer/interested-party declaration alongside the clemency request (within 90 days)

The justice ministry should introduce — at decree level, or if it is deemed of constitutional character, by amendment of cardinal law — that every clemency request must be accompanied by a lawyer/interested-party declaration containing: who represents the applicant (name, bar registration number, capacity of representation: lawyer / relative / legal representative), what other (political, public, official) role the representative holds, and whether they have a conflict-of-interest statement. The declaration should not replace the clemency rulebook but be its precondition. Without it, the application would be incomplete. In the Klitgaard C = M + D − A framework this directly strengthens the A (accountability) component: making the representation relationship visible reduces the hidden influencing channels of discretion (see 6.4.1). A 90-day deadline for introduction is realistic, since neither a new IT system nor a new institution is required.

3.2 Pressure protocol with timestamps + minimum waiting period (within 180 days)

All communication between the Office of the President of the Republic and the justice ministry related to a clemency case (email, official letter, memo) should be logged with a mandatory timestamp and attached to the file. In addition, a minimum 3-business-day waiting period should be introduced between the arrival of the clemency submission and the act of countersignature — during this period the justice ministry is bound to a substantive review, and the communication log shows whether pressure was applied. In the present case this is important because, according to the correspondence published by HVG and 444.hu, the office pressed for the signature several times within a single day — exactly this kind of time-squeeze would be prohibited by the minimum waiting period. The timestamped logging breaks down the typical information asymmetry of the Rose-Ackerman principal-agent model (see 6.4.2): the principal (the public and Parliament as accountability authority) gains visibility of the agent’s behaviour (the presidential office and the minister). The 180-day deadline is realistic, since it affects the document-management system of the Sándor Palace and the Ministry of Justice.

3.3 Extension of the Lobby Register (A4) to clemency cases (within 12 months)

The existing Lobby Register (A4) programme point — which makes political-business and political-civil consultations public — should be extended to every clemency case. The institutions involved (Sándor Palace, Ministry of Justice, Parliament’s justice committee) should be obliged to log and publish every meeting, telephone call or letter linked to a specific clemency case. The register should be retrievable for life — clemency cases have the property that their substantive evaluation often takes place years later (see: the case was a 2023 decision, substantive debate began in 2024, closure in 2026). The 12-month deadline is realistic by building on the infrastructure of the Public-money dashboard (A1).

The three proposals are built on a common principle: they do not restrict the constitutional power of the clemency procedure (the President’s discretion remains untouched), only increase the visibility and retrospective verifiability of the procedure. This is the typically Klitgaard-style (C = M + D − A) approach: we do not abolish discretion, we put accountability alongside it.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Justice The transparency of the clemency procedure increases measurably; the channels of political patronage become identifiable. Increasing bureaucratic weight may hold back humane, swift clemency in genuinely justified cases.
Public administration Tightening of the document-management protocol sets a precedent for other discretionary cases (state honours, citizenship). IT-system catch-up between the Ministry of Justice and the Sándor Palace may take 6–12 months.
Society The victim and aggrieved side can rightly feel: the decision is not made in secret but is verifiable. Publicity may affect the privacy of those involved — strict GDPR-compliant anonymisation is needed.

The proposal tips toward risk if transparency is not coupled with proportionate procedural simplification — that is, if the 3.1 declaration and the 3.2 pressure protocol become bureaucratic burdens without providing substantive protection. For this reason every new requirement is targeted: not a general “transparency package”, but a response to the concrete dysfunctions uncovered. The proposal works well if (a) document handling between the Sándor Palace and the Ministry of Justice is in fact digitally integrated, and (b) the parliamentary justice committee substantively reviews the accumulated logs every year — without that, the new protocol remains formal.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

The success of the proposals can be tracked over a 12–24 month horizon with four indicators:

  • Coverage of the lawyer/interested-party declaration: 100% of submitted clemency requests come with a completed declaration (by end of 2027).
  • Application of the timestamped log: every clemency case opened after 20 May 2026 has an accessible communication log (by mid-2027).
  • Observance of the minimum waiting period: the share of failures to observe the 3-business-day waiting period is 0% (by end of 2027).
  • Lobby Register clemency entries: in the A4 register 100% of meetings are documented annually (from Q4 2027).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: the clemency practice is a constitutional power, but its procedural pathologies can be regulated without restricting the power. The three new proposals (lawyer/interested-party declaration, timestamped pressure protocol, A4 extension) take yesterday’s base package to operational level — the request is addressed to the justice ministry of the Tisza government and to Parliament’s justice committee: submit the regulatory package within a 90-, 180- and 12-month schedule.

This proposal package can be directly connected to two of MIAK’s foundational values: transparency stands at the centre because the pathologies uncovered (dual lawyer-political role, pressure time-squeeze, unlogged communication) all flow from the same source — the invisible parts of the clemency procedure; and accountability, because the protocol elements now proposed do not create new powers but secure the retrospective verifiability of the existing constitutional power that, when missing in the 2023 case, gave rise to such public outrage.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Framing in the press across the spectrum

Left-liberal band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu): the disclosure frame dominates. Telex (20 May 2026) confronts Gaudi-Nagy’s distancing with the facts: the politician-lawyer may distance himself from the submission of the clemency request, but the Curia review motion was, admittedly, drafted by him. HVG (19 May 2026) puts at the centre the ministry correspondence quoted by Róbert Repassy — this is where it first appears that “the office of Katalin Novák pressed Varga several times within a single day”. 444.hu, in two articles, documents the pressure and Gaudi-Nagy’s admission, in both cases focusing on the procedural dysfunction.

Mainstream-market band (24.hu, ATV): institutional-procedural reading. 24.hu (19 May 2026) focuses on the Sulyok announcement (handover of files), while on ATV Judit Varga’s deputy reacts to Péter Magyar’s claim — the band emphasises the institutional handling of the case, less in a politically accusatory mode.

Economic band (Portfolio): on this day the clemency topic was not among Portfolio’s top-5 leading policy articles — the band highlighted the economic (EU funds, Kármán talks) agenda.

Conservative / government-aligned band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner): defensive-disputing framing. According to Magyar Nemzet (20 May 2026), “Péter Magyar was called on to end the hate campaign”, and on the clemency case he allegedly “made a false claim”. Mandiner publishes Gergely Gulyás’s interpretation: “the documents also revealed that the charges against the previous government are unfounded”. The two papers do not substantively confront the new factual claims (Gaudi-Nagy’s lawyer role, official pressure) — the framing remains at the level of political-intent attribution.

Népszava (front-page fallback): the topic received several titles, including the quote “I have realised that Katalin Novák reached over the head of the justice minister in my application too” (title-level reference only; the specific URL of the article could not be retrieved by the press monitor).

6.2 Facts and data

Fact Value Source
Date of the clemency decision concerned 2023 Press monitor 20 May 2026 #1
Document drafted by Gaudi-Nagy Curia review motion Telex, 444.hu 20 May 2026
Pressure communications from Novák’s office within a single day “several times” (exact number not currently public) HVG, 444.hu 19 May 2026
Signing head of state Katalin Novák (2023) Hungarian Gazette, press monitor 19 May 2026
Signatory of the negative ministerial submission Judit Varga Péter Magyar government briefing 18 May 2026
Announcement of Sulyok handing over the files 19 May 2026 24.hu 19 May 2026
Applicable constitutional rule Fundamental Law, Article 9(4)(g) + (5) Hungarian Gazette — consolidated text in force as of 17 April 2026

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Justice (programme points) — formal control points of the clemency procedure, substantive content of the countersignature institution. Related programme points: I3 (legislative impact assessment — here: the need for a substantive audit of the clemency rulebook), I4 (judicial independence — adjacent: the cleanliness of the Sándor Palace–MoJ relationship).
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — making the clemency procedure visible discloses the channels of political patronage. Related: A4 (Lobby Register — to be extended to clemency cases), A1 (Public-money dashboard as infrastructure), A6 (strengthening checks and balances).
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the technological-organisational preconditions of document handling and timestamped logging.

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard’s 1988 classic introduces the C = M + D − A (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion − Accountability) formula as an explanatory frame for analysing public-office integrity risks. Through the examples of the Hong Kong ICAC (Independent Commission Against Corruption) and the Singaporean CPIB (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau) the author shows that the common feature of successful anti-corruption reforms is: preserving discretionary powers while building accountability mechanisms at institutional level. As Klitgaard writes: “Illicit behavior flourishes when agents have monopoly power over clients, when agents have great discretion, and when accountability of agents to the principal is weak.” In the case of Hungarian clemency practice this picture transposes directly: the constitutional power is monopolistic (only the head of state may exercise it), discretion is almost unlimited (Article 9(4)(g) sets no substantive content condition), while accountability was essentially non-existent at the time of the 2023 case. The three measures MIAK now proposes (lawyer/interested-party declaration, pressure protocol, A4 extension) strengthen precisely the A component, without touching the M and D components (the constitutional integrity of the clemency power).

📖 Source: Klitgaard, Robert: Controlling Corruption (University of California Press, 1988).

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

Rose-Ackerman’s 1999 Yale monograph uses the principal-agent-client model for a structural analysis of political patronage. Her thesis: corruption and patronage are not a moral but an institutional-incentive phenomenon — the solution is therefore not to remove “bad apples” but to rewrite institutional incentives. In the current stage of the clemency case this frame is directly usable: at the time of the 2023 case the principal (Parliament as the authority empowered to hold the head of state accountable, and more broadly the voting public) lacked the information tools on the basis of which the agent’s (the presidential office’s and the justice minister’s) behaviour could later have been evaluated. The correspondence now uncovered — the pressure protocol, the lawyer/interested-party relationship — is precisely the information without which the principal is blind. The shared institutional spirit of MIAK’s proposals can be summed up by Rose-Ackerman: transparency is not virtue for its own sake but a tool against the principal-agent information asymmetry; the pressure protocol and the declaration requirement reduce exactly this asymmetry.

📖 Source: Rose-Ackerman, Susan: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Yale University Press, 1999).

6.4.3 Fundamental Law of Hungary (consolidated text of 17 April 2026)

Direct verbatim reference to the constitutional framework is indispensable, because the present proposals target the operative follow-up of an untouched constitutional power. Under Article 9(4)(g), the President of the Republic “exercises the right of individual clemency”; under paragraph (5) “all measures and decisions of the President of the Republic specified in paragraph (4) require the countersignature of a member of the Government”. The institution of countersignature in Hungarian constitutional law is a classic form of shared responsibility: the act draws its legal basis from the head of state’s competence, while the countersigning minister bears the political and professional responsibility. If the countersignature process unfolds under time pressure (as in the 2023 case), substantive responsibility-taking can be reduced to formality. MIAK’s proposal (3.2 — minimum waiting period + timestamped log) is not a new constitutional rule but a procedural guarantee for the substantive operation of the existing countersignature institution.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (consolidated text in force as of 17 April 2026), Article 9(4)(g) and (5).

6.5 International comparison

In Germany the Begnadigungsrecht (right of clemency) is a power of the Federal President, but the Bundesjustizamt (Federal Office of Justice) prepares a standardised submission for every clemency case in which the circle of those involved, the legal representation and the opinions are recorded with timestamps; this has been part of constitutional practice since 1953 and does not restrict presidential discretion. In the United Kingdom the Royal Prerogative of Mercy is a power exercised on the proposal of the Home Secretary; the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC, from 1995) sifts cases as an independent professional body. In Poland (negative precedent) clemency procedures became a channel of political patronage between 2015 and 2023 — the Venice Commission’s recommendation (CDL-AD(2019)033) finds that clemency-practice reform begins with timestamped logging of justice/head-of-state communication. The Hungarian proposal takes as a basis the German and the Venice-Commission-recommended models — the British CCRC’s separate professional body appeared in the proposals of yesterday’s base blog; the three operative elements of today’s blog are added here.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard (infrastructure base)
  • A4 — Lobby Register (direct extension of proposal 3.3)
  • A5 — Whistleblower system (the internal documents of the case may also surface through whistleblower channels)
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A11 — Civil-society partner programme (building on Venice Commission recommendations)

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment (substantive audit requirement of the clemency rulebook)
  • I4 — Defence of judicial independence

Proposed new programme point: Procedural guarantees of clemency practice — lawyer/interested-party declaration, pressure protocol, A4 extension — for the Justice area, alongside the existing I3–I4.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 20 May 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Klitgaard, Robert: Controlling Corruption (University of California Press, 1988)
  • 📖 Rose-Ackerman, Susan: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Yale University Press, 1999)
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (consolidated text in force as of 17 April 2026), Article 9(4)(g) and (5)

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and title.

MIAK internal materials:

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Venice Commission CDL-AD(2019)033 — recommendation on the reform of clemency practice
  • Council of Europe European Commission for Democracy through Law — country studies on clemency practice
  • Hungarian Gazette — publication practice of clemency decisions

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