Part I — Situation overview

At one o’clock on 7 September the first sitting of Parliament’s regular autumn session convened. The agenda brings together on a single day three items, each of which is of constitutional significance in its own right. Parliament is discussing the amendment of the acts connected with the use of the designations megye (county) and government commissioner: a proposal running, with its explanatory memorandum, to more than two hundred pages carries through the Hungarian legal system the seventeenth amendment of the Fundamental Law, under which the counties will again be called megye rather than vármegye, and the főispán will again be a government commissioner. The same proposal settles the prime minister’s salary, which is at present identical to the Speaker’s, at 3.8 million forints gross a month. Under the new rule the head of government’s salary will be 1.91 times the parliamentary remuneration, some 2.5 million forints, if the prime minister is also a member of parliament; if not a member, then 2.91 times the remuneration, that is, it remains the present 3.8 million forints. At the sitting the House also decides on the composition of the ad hoc committee nominating the president and members of the Media Council: to the ten-member body the governing party delegates three and the opposition two representatives with voting rights, while five members — without voting rights — are sent by professional organisations.

The background is known. The designations vármegye and főispán were introduced by Fidesz with effect from 1 January 2023, as a return to historical usage; the present proposal dismantles this. The third leg of the package is that of publicity: from 7 September the public media channel M1 again broadcasts the plenary sittings, on Monday between 13:00 and 18:30, on Tuesday from 9 o’clock until noon. Since the change of leadership in July the debates could be followed only on Parliament’s video channel; there, after the change of government, the long broadcasts regularly reached 150–200 thousand views, compared with earlier viewing figures below ten thousand. The House is also discussing, under an urgent procedure, the amendment of the rules of procedure that aligns the procedural order with the changed powers of the Fiscal Council: the body’s right of prior consent has been replaced by a right to give an opinion on compliance with the debt rule. The autumn legislative programme contains the adoption of 83 submissions by December.

MIAK’s reading: the three items derive from the same logic — the dismantling of the symbolic and tailor-made constitutional solutions adopted after 2010 — and all three are vulnerable at the same point. Dismantling is in itself a zero-forint gesture. It acquires policy value from whether measurable administrative simplification, clarified competences and a rule fixed in advance are attached to it. Restoring a designation is not institutional reform; the risk is that the symbolic settlement diverts attention from the fact that the structure behind it remains unchanged.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Today’s package poses three questions, and there is a classic answer to each. Mihály Bihari, the political scientist and one of the chroniclers of the legislative process of the Hungarian regime change, records in Alkotmányos rendszerváltás that the present form of the Hungarian middle tier of public administration derives not from the use of names but from the acts on local governments and on local government elections adopted in the summer of 1990. These abolished the Soviet-type council system, and it was after them that the county became a self-governing, not merely a state administrative, category. Today’s debate is therefore about a designation, not about the structure that Bihari describes as the completion of the regime change. Alexis de Tocqueville, the French political thinker and the first great analyst of American democracy, puts it more sharply in the pages of Democracy in America: in his view a nation may establish the external forms of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it will not have the spirit of liberty. Form and content can therefore come apart, and form in itself preserves nothing. And Arthashastra, the work of Kautilya, the fourth-century BC Indian theorist of the state, provides a model for the third question: the remuneration of officials — including the ruler — has to be fixed according to an itemised scale set in advance and tied to state revenue, because unregulated remuneration is the first gateway to abuse of office. The detailed treatment of the literature — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures.

3.1 A public transition cost balance alongside the name change (within 30 days)

Within thirty days of the adoption of the amending package running to more than two hundred pages, the legislator should publish the one-off cost of the transition and the basis of the estimate. The balance should contain four items: (1) how many pieces of legislation in force are affected by the change of wording, (2) how many government forms, printed documents and official templates are modified, (3) what the estimated cost is of rewriting the registers and IT systems, (4) what the price is of replacing the identity elements — signs, stamps, official letterheads — and how much of this can be scheduled to natural wear and tear. This is not a questioning of the decision: under MIAK’s programme point I3 every bill must be accompanied by a public impact assessment, and it is precisely with legislative packages such as this, which at first sight appear cost-free, that the impact assessment shows its real value. The Standard Cost Model methodology of programme point KI3 — measuring the cost of administrative obligations as the product of time, hourly wage, the circle of those affected and frequency — provides a ready instrument for this. The figure has to be published in advance so that it can be called to account afterwards.

3.2 A map of competences for the review of the government commissioner institution (within 90 days)

The debate on the fate of the főispán institution will become substantive if it begins not with the designation and not with a change of person, but with an itemised inventory of competences. MIAK proposes that within ninety days a public, itemised map be drawn up of exactly which case groups the head of the county government office acts in today, which of their powers derive from statute and which from government decree, in which of their competences they may be instructed and in which not, and in which matters they hold powers overlapping or competing with those of the local government. Without the map it is also impossible to settle the question that is the real subject of the debate: whether the present extent of the middle tier of state administration is warranted. The proposal builds on programme points KI7 (official selection and rotation system) and KI8 (outcome-based efficiency measurement), and follows Kautilya’s logic (see 6.4.3): first describe the office, then fill it. The result is valuable even if the review ultimately decides in favour of retention — a public inventory of competences is in itself an instrument of accountability.

3.3 A single salary formula, independent of any parliamentary mandate

MIAK approves the direction of the salary rule: the remuneration of the head of the executive should be settled in statute, by a formula tied to an objective reference point, rather than as an ad hoc political gesture — and parliamentary remuneration as a base is precisely such a reference point. The solution submitted is, however, inconsistent at one point: it fixes two different salaries for the same work depending on whether the prime minister holds a parliamentary mandate. The content of the prime ministerial task does not depend on this, and parliamentary remuneration is not the consideration for the work of the head of government. MIAK therefore proposes that the rule contain a single multiplier, and that in the case of a head of government holding a parliamentary mandate the rule on the aggregation or exclusion of parliamentary remuneration appear in a separate, transparent provision. The formula should also carry a compulsory public review every five years, recording whether the multiplier remains unchanged — in this way the question of salary is removed from day-to-day political bargaining. This approach continues the logic of programme points A6 (checks and balances) and A3 (publicity of asset declarations).

The three proposals are bound together by the same principle: constitutional dismantling is durable if it is measurable. The cost balance shows what we are paying for the symbol; the map of competences shows what the institution covers; and a uniform salary formula makes it impossible for the next government to settle this same question once more as a political gesture. Tocqueville’s warning (see 6.4.2) relates precisely to this: changing the external forms does not create a new practice.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Public administration Unifying the designations puts an end to the parallel usage running since 2023 in legislation, forms and registers; the map of competences reveals the overlaps between the government office and the local government The transition in itself generates administrative burden and a one-off cost; if it is not accompanied by legislative simplification, the balance remains negative
Public money Tying the salary rule to a formula makes the head of government’s remuneration predictable and comparable; publishing the cost of the name change sets a precedent for pricing symbolic legislation Retaining two multipliers builds in a questionable incentive; if the cost estimate is not made, the item becomes invisible in the budget
Publicity The return of parliamentary broadcasting to M1 widens the reach of plenary debates; the nominating committee holds a public hearing with the candidates for president The five members from professional organisations sit on the nominating committee without voting rights; the body’s substantive decision therefore turns on five political votes, three of them the governing party’s

The package’s main tension runs between tempo and depth. The change of name can be carried out quickly and visibly, the settlement of competences is slow and invisible — and the political incentive rewards the first. The proposal tips towards the risk side if the symbolic part is completed while the map of competences is left without a deadline; in that case public administration does the same as before, under a different sign. The second question for consideration is that of the salary rule: predictability and flexibility cancel each other out, and so a scheduled review has to be built into the formula, not an ad hoc exception. The third is that of the nominating committee: professional participation confers legitimacy, but without voting rights the professional opinion is worth exactly as much as the political majority incorporates from it — the committee has to handle this with a public, reasoned decision, otherwise the professional membership remains formal.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes four performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators) from which it will be visible in 6, 12 and 24 months whether the package produced a policy result:

  • The appearance of the transition cost estimate and its holding: a public estimate within 30 days of the promulgation of the act, then the publication of the actual outlay 12 months later; the aim is to keep the divergence below 20 per cent.
  • The number of pieces of legislation and forms affected: how many pieces of legislation in force and how many government forms the package actually modified — and how many of these it also managed to simplify or abolish. Suggested target: substantive simplification should also take place for at least 10 per cent of the forms affected.
  • The completion of the map of competences: within 90 days, a public, itemised inventory of the powers of the head of the county government office, broken down by source of law.
  • The development of the number of administrative steps at the county offices: the average number of steps and turnaround time measured by the “Simple State” index of programme point KI3 — the name change will have produced a return if this figure falls measurably within 24 months.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request in a single sentence: alongside the symbolic dismantling, the legislator should put the figures too. The first day of the autumn session is a good occasion to set the precedent — if a public cost balance is prepared even for a change of designation, then it will be harder to touch the far more expensive items among the 83 submissions planned by December without an impact assessment. Concretely: thirty days for the transition balance, ninety days for the map of competences, and a single salary formula independent of any parliamentary mandate.

Two MIAK foundational values move together here. Data-drivenness, because a name change is precisely the type of decision whose political meaning is self-evident while it is in nobody’s interest to calculate the cost — and what we do not measure cannot be argued about afterwards. And accountability, because the salary formula and the inventory of competences both do the same thing: they take out of the sphere of case-by-case discretion what has hitherto been a gesture, and turn it into a rule fixed in advance and open to challenge. The yardstick remains the same even if the next government were to move in another direction: a rule is good if it is bearable in the hands of someone who did not write it.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 The framing of the press by spectrum

In the left-liberal band Telex and HVG rendered the full agenda of the sitting day, placing the emphasis on the two multipliers of the prime ministerial salary and on the change in the Fiscal Council’s powers. Telex reported in a separate article on how much the head of government’s pay falls; alongside the personalised reading it therefore also conveyed the technical content of the rule. 444.hu carried the MTI material essentially unchanged, with the same emphases; the paper’s framing here is that of relaying the news, not of interpretation.

In the public affairs band 24.hu highlighted the renaming and the pay cut in its headline, and was alone in recording in the text the background that the vármegye designation was introduced by Fidesz with effect from 1 January 2023 — it is this sentence that makes it intelligible to the reader why this is a renaming back. 24.hu also set out in the greatest detail the task of the Media Council nominating committee: the examination of the applications and the public hearing of the candidates for president. The publicity thread — the return of parliamentary broadcasting to M1 — appeared at two papers, but with different frames: HVG placed the viewing figures and the popularity of the broadcasts at the centre, while 24.hu treated the decision as the closing of the period following the change of leadership at the public media in July.

The economic and the conservative bands did not bring today’s first sitting day into separate, analytical focus: Portfolio did not deal with the agenda in its daily material, while Magyar Nemzet and Mandiner ran other topics in their early-week offering. This is in itself a signal: the political weight of the renaming would be a substantive subject of debate primarily on the side defending the symbolic legislation adopted after 2010, but there it did not come onto the agenda on this day. Népszava’s report was available at headline level only. By MIAK’s yardstick of freedom from ideology this does not exempt us from setting out the arguments: the argument for the designation — that historical usage is a value in itself — is legitimate, it is simply not cost-free, and this debate would be made decidable by the figures.

6.2 Facts and data

Indicator Value Source
The prime minister’s present salary 3.8 million HUF gross a month (identical to the Speaker’s) Telex, HVG, 24.hu, 7 September 2026
The proposed salary with a parliamentary mandate 1.91 times the parliamentary remuneration, some 2.5 million HUF the submitted bill, according to press reports
The proposed salary without a mandate 2.91 times the parliamentary remuneration, that is, 3.8 million HUF the submitted bill, according to press reports
The length of the amending package more than 200 pages including the explanatory memorandum after MTI: Telex, HVG, 444.hu
The introduction of the vármegye designation 1 January 2023 24.hu, 7 September 2026
The autumn legislative programme 83 submissions by December after Parliament’s website: MTI
The ad hoc committee nominating the Media Council 10 members: 3 governing-party and 2 opposition representatives with voting rights, 5 professional members without voting rights Telex, HVG, 24.hu, 444.hu
Regular sessions 1 February – 15 June, 1 September – 15 December according to MTI’s account of the act on Parliament
Parliamentary broadcasting on M1 7 September, 13:00–18:30; 8 September, 9:00–12:00 HVG, 24.hu, 6 September 2026
Viewing figures of the video channel broadcasts typically below 10 thousand views before the change of government; in August 150–200 thousand for the long broadcasts, in one case above 300 thousand HVG, 6 September 2026

One item in the table calls for a separate note: the press reports do not give the amount of the parliamentary remuneration itemised, only the multipliers and the result — the final sums of 2.5 and 3.8 million forints are the rounded values published by the papers, not MIAK’s calculation.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the middle tier of territorial state administration, the measurement of administrative burden and the description of officials’ competences: programme points KI3, KI7 and KI8 are directly applicable to measuring the name change and the review of competences;
  • Justice (programme points) — the quality of legislation: I3 (legislative impact assessment) is the basis of the cost balance, while I7 (legislative simplification programme) offers the opportunity for the two-hundred-page change of wording to be put to use at the same time as a coherence audit;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the rule-based character of the remuneration of holders of constitutional office and the system of checks and balances: A3 and A6 provide the basis of principle for the proposals on the salary formula and on the composition of the nominating committee.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Bihari Mihály: Alkotmányos rendszerváltás (Constitutional Regime Change)

Following through the legislative stages of the regime change, Bihari records that the last item of the constitutional transformation was precisely the settlement of the local level: the third group of regime-changing acts was already adopted by the Parliament elected in the spring of 1990, and the acts on local governments and on the election of local government representatives and mayors belonged here. In Bihari’s formulation these were the acts that “abolished the Soviet-type ‘council system’ in Hungary”. The author adds the quantitative picture as well: at the 1990 local government elections 2,930 mayors and 24,536 local representatives were elected, and 83 per cent of the directly elected mayors were independent, non-party figures. For today’s debate this data series is the essential point: the present character of the Hungarian middle tier of public administration was determined not by the designation but by this legislative package — the replacement of the word megye in 2023 did not touch this structure, and the present reversal does not touch it either. It is therefore warranted that MIAK should ask for an inventory of competences alongside the settlement of names: the substantive debate about the institution begins where Bihari’s analysis does too — at the level of powers.

📖 Source: Bihari Mihály: Alkotmányos rendszerváltás (Constitutional Regime Change)

6.4.2 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

Tocqueville regards local self-government not as an ornament but as an operating condition of free government. In his classic formulation local assemblies are to liberty what primary schools are to science — they bring it within the people’s reach and teach them how to use it. To this he attaches the warning that applies directly to today’s package:

“A nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty. The transient passions and the interests of an hour, or the chance of circumstances, may have created the external forms of independence; but the despotic tendency which has been repelled will sooner or later inevitably reappear on the surface.”

Tocqueville is describing precisely the coming apart of form and practice. In the Hungarian case this means that neither did the 2023 renaming add anything to the self-governing content of the counties, nor does the present reversal add anything in itself. The question is whether a change in powers and procedures is attached to the name. On Tocqueville’s reading a symbolic settlement is not neutral: it obscures the structural question, and creates the impression that the problem has been solved.

📖 Source: Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

6.4.3 Kautilya: Arthashastra

The fourth-century BC Indian work of state theory contains a regulation of salaries that is surprisingly detailed for a modern reader. The Arthashastra sets out itemised annual remuneration for each category of official — from the highest band of 48,000 panas down to the lowest level of 60 panas — and attaches two general rules to it. One is the coverage constraint: the state’s total wage and salary mass may not exceed one quarter of public revenue, and the level of remuneration has to be adjusted to the carrying capacity of the city and the countryside. The other concerns the nature of office: every official, the ruler included, counts as a servant of the community, and is paid for service, not for possessing something. To this Kautilya attaches a typology of abuses of office as well: he lists forty ways in which an official can defraud the state.

For today’s question the essential point is not the sums but the structure: the Arthashastra does not leave remuneration to case-by-case discretion but gives a scale fixed in advance and tied to a reference point, with an upper limit. The Hungarian proposal now under discussion chooses the same direction when it determines the head of government’s salary as a multiple of parliamentary remuneration. MIAK’s observation therefore concerns not the direction but the consistency: where there are two multipliers for the same office, the rule brings back a dose of discretion into the very place from which it was seeking to remove it.

📖 Source: Kautilya: Arthashastra

6.5 International comparison

The rule-based settlement of the head of government’s remuneration is not a Hungarian peculiarity. In the United Kingdom ministerial salaries are built up as a supplement, laid down in legislation, linked to the parliamentary basic salary, and the parliamentary basic salary is set by an independent body — the separation of the formula from the decision-maker is the element that takes remuneration out of day-to-day political bargaining. In New Zealand and Australia an independent commission likewise determines the remuneration of holders of public office, on the basis of a methodology published in advance. The Hungarian proposal realises half of the formula — it fixes the reference point — but not the other half, the regular and independent review. The compulsory five-yearly review in MIAK’s proposal 3.3 would supply precisely this missing element.

On the side of territorial administration the Polish reform of 1999 offers a lesson: there the transformation of the middle tier was based not on designations but on a redistribution of competences — the number of voivodeships was reduced from 49 to 16, and detailed preparatory work stood behind the reform. The lesson holds in both directions: a designation is not in itself a reform, but nor will a redistribution of competences be successful if its cost is not measured in advance. This is the joint justification of proposals 3.1 and 3.2.

Public administration and e-government

  • KI3 — Measurable reduction of bureaucracy
  • KI7 — Official selection and rotation system
  • KI8 — Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment
  • I7 — Legislative simplification programme

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

Suggested new programme point: Rule-based constitutional remuneration — a single salary formula and a compulsory five-yearly review for holders of constitutional office — for the Public administration and e-government policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 7 September 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge base references (specialist books):

  • 📖 Bihari Mihály: Alkotmányos rendszerváltás (Constitutional Regime Change)
  • 📖 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America
  • 📖 Kautilya: Arthashastra

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI3, KI7, KI8)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I3, I7)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A3, A6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 7 September 2026 — topic 1, score: 95/100

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