Part I — Situation overview

On 24 July 2026 the European Commission imposed a competition-law fine on Google: according to the data made public, around one billion dollars (roughly 900 million euros). According to the reasoning, the company designed its own search engine and the Google Play app store so as to steer users towards its own services and applications, to the detriment of competitors. This step is part of the Commission’s long-running enforcement that curbs the market power of the large technology companies; not long before, Google had lost an appeal against an earlier competition-law fine of around 4.5 billion dollars linked to the Android operating system. On the same day the EU also obliged Google to share its anonymised search data with rivals from January 2027, and to open the Android platform to competing artificial-intelligence companies (AI companies) — according to Henna Virkkunen, the European Commission’s vice-president for technology, so that real alternatives could emerge to Google’s search engine and AI assistant.

A day later, on 25 July, US President Donald Trump announced in a social-media post that the United States would launch a formal investigation into the EU’s trade practices — claiming that the bloc had unfairly hit American technology giants, including Google and Apple, with billion-dollar fines. Trump threatened a 100% tariff on any country that would introduce an “imminent” digital services tax (a special tax levied on digital services) on American companies, and suggested that the EU would pay a “big price”. The situation is nuanced by the fact that — according to Politico’s report — the EU side at the same time noted with relief that the American tariff actually applied had for now remained at the 10% threshold fixed in last year’s trade agreement, that is, the transatlantic truce formally held.

The story is composed of two threads that are sharply distinct from one another. One is competition-law enforcement: along the Digital Markets Act (DMA, EU 2022/1925) and the basic competition-law rules, the EU prescribes structural obligations on a market-shaping platform. The other is the trade-policy conflict: a great power threatens with a tariff over a regulatory decision. In MIAK’s reading, the most important thing is that the two threads not slide into one another. Judging the lawfulness of the competition-law fine and managing the tariff risk are two separate tasks — the first is decided by an independent competition authority and court according to a legal standard, the second is handled by trade and foreign-policy diplomacy. The character of the problem is thus not “who is right in the Google case”, but whether, under pressure, the predictable, rule-of-law regulatory framework can be preserved.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the theoretical frame. In his work The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2019), Shoshana Zuboff (emeritus professor at Harvard Business School, one of the best-known critics of the digital platform economy) shows that the power of the large platform companies is not merely classic market size, but an unprecedented asymmetry of knowledge and power: the platform “knows everything about us”, while its operation remains opaque to us. This diagnosis provides the background why, alongside the traditional, ex-post competition-law instruments, the DMA’s structural, forward-looking obligations (data sharing, opening the system) became necessary. Joseph E. Stiglitz’s (Nobel Memorial Prize-winning economist, former chief economist of the World Bank) book Globalization and Its Discontents (2002) illuminates the other thread: the rules of international trade are rarely neutral, the greater powers secure a disproportionately large share for themselves, and small, open economies are exposed to retaliation — precisely for this reason the rules-based, predictable framework is their protection, not their constraint. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK formulates three proposals kept separate from one another. The guiding principle: competition-law independence and trade-risk management are tasks running in two separate lanes that must not be linked.

3.1 Supporting consistent, rule-of-law EU competition-law enforcement

MIAK proposes that Hungary stand up for predictable EU competition-law enforcement applying equally to everyone — the interest is not the “defence” of a concrete fine, but the consistency of the framework. The DMA (the EU regulation on digital markets) was born precisely because market processes do not by themselves ensure that the markets of the large, “gatekeeper” platforms remain contestable and fair; the regulation serves this aim as a complement to the competition-law foundations laid down in Articles 101–102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), protecting a legal interest distinct from them. From the perspective of the Hungarian digital market and AI startups this is a vital question: the data-sharing and platform-opening obligations dismantle precisely those entry barriers that would exclude a small, capital-poor competitor. This is the practical implementation of the logic of KP1 EU digital vanguard and G5 competition policy, connected with the principles of D11 algorithmic transparency and the D1 responsible AI framework — domestic digital regulation applies the same structural, forward-looking logic that MIAK also expects of the EU level (see 6.4.1).

3.2 Managing the tariff risk with independent trade-policy instruments

The 100% American tariff threat is a real and serious risk: the Hungarian economy is strongly exposed to EU–American trade tension through the German automotive industry as well as the electronics and machinery supplier chain. According to MIAK, however, this risk must be managed separately from the fine. As a first step, a public, quantified export-exposure analysis is needed: which sectors, with what revenue and how many jobs depend on the affected export chains. On this can be built a diversification and supplier-resilience programme, as well as the targeted mobilisation of economic diplomacy. This is the framework of KP8 economic diplomacy integration, G9 strategic industrial policy and the deepening of the G14 single market in services. The key message: defence against the tariff cannot justify abandoning the competition-law framework — linking the two (“let us give ground on the fine to avoid the tariff”) is a bad bargain that would sacrifice the rules-based order for a short-term concession (see 6.4.2).

3.3 Issue-based coalition-building in defence of the predictable framework

In the transatlantic conflict Hungary should act not with an isolated but with a coalition strategy. MIAK proposes the sharp application of KP17 issue-based coalition-building: on digital and competition-law questions a common position should be built with those member states (typically the Baltic and Scandinavian countries with a strong digital culture) that are likewise interested in predictable, rule-of-law competition-law enforcement. This is complemented by KP11 strategic balancing policy: the aim is not to join one side of the great-power conflict, but to preserve Hungarian room for manoeuvre and to strengthen the EU-level, unified negotiating position. The interest of a small, open economy is never the bilateral trial of strength, but the rules-based, multilateral framework — precisely this is underpinned by the literature foundation (see 6.4 Literature in detail).

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Digitalisation / competition The DMA’s structural obligations (data sharing, platform opening) reduce entry barriers, improve the competitive conditions of Hungarian AI startups Inconsistency of enforcement, or its loosening due to a political bargain, restores the gatekeeper advantage and undermines the rule’s credibility
Economy / trade The quantified export-exposure analysis and diversification reduce vulnerability to tariff shocks A 100% tariff, through the German automotive industry and the supplier chain, may cause sensitive Hungarian export losses and job risk
Foreign policy / rule of law The issue-based coalition and the unified EU position strengthen the predictable, rules-based framework Conflating the fine and the tariff leads to abandoning the rule-of-law competition-law framework and to long-term loss of credibility

The main deliberative question is the tension between short-term trade pressure and the long-term rules-based framework. The proposal works if the two threads remain in separate lanes: competition-law enforcement rests on a legal standard, and the tariff risk on trade-diplomatic instruments. It tips into risk if, for the sake of short-term political gain, the regulatory framework were made a subject of negotiating bargain — the lesson of Stiglitz’s analysis is precisely that for small, open economies the predictability of rules is a more valuable protection than any ad hoc concession.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

It is proposed that the following performance indicators (KPIs, in English Key Performance Indicator) be tracked over 12–24 months:

  • The share of the DMA’s structural obligations (data sharing, opening Android) that are actually enforced and fulfilled on time — compliance with the January 2027 data-sharing deadline as a milestone.
  • The quantified exposure of the affected sectors of Hungarian exports (vehicle, electronics and machinery supplier chain), in a public, machine-readable risk analysis — target: the completion of the analysis and its regular updating.
  • The number of EU dossiers in which Hungary acted in an issue-based coalition, with a documented common position, in favour of predictable competition-law enforcement.
  • The evolution of the American tariff level actually applied to the EU (relative to the threshold of last year’s agreement) — an indicator of the stability of the transatlantic truce.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: competition-law independence and trade-risk management are two separate tasks, and it is precisely this that distinguishes responsible policy from improvised bargaining — that it does not conflate them. MIAK asks the decision-maker to stand up for predictable, rule-of-law EU competition-law enforcement — not for a fine, but for the consistency of the framework — and to manage the tariff risk with independent, data-based trade-policy instruments and issue-based coalition-building. This approach moves two MIAK foundational values together: transparency, because it places both the predictability of regulation and export exposure on a public, verifiable basis, and data-drivenness, because the decision is guided not by political reflex but by a quantified risk analysis. These two are decisive precisely here because the stake of the topic is not the outcome of a single case, but whether the Hungarian digital market and exports remain, in the long term, within a predictable, rules-based framework.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The international news-agency band (AP News) applied a factual, dual framing: it reported in separate articles on the one-billion-dollar fine against Google, on the obligation to share search data and to open Android, as well as on Trump’s investigation announcement and 100% tariff threat. AP highlighted that, according to Google, the fine hurts European businesses and consumers, and that the step is part of the Commission’s long-running enforcement targeting the large technology companies.

The European public-affairs-analytical band (Politico Europe) focused on the trade consequences and on de-escalation: according to its report, the EU side noted with relief that the American tariff actually applied had remained at the 10% threshold of last year’s agreement, that is, the transatlantic truce held. This frame kept the conflict in a manageable, negotiated channel.

The reports of the German public-service and global-south band (Deutsche Welle, and Al Jazeera respectively) could not be publicly downloaded in the MIAK press monitor’s source selection that day (the articles were not publicly downloadable), so the present analysis does not quote from them; the frame emerging from their headlines was organised around the tariff investigation and the threat of the “big price”. For MIAK it is important that the difference of framings (competition-law enforcement versus trade retaliation) illuminates the same real stake that the present analysis also places at the centre: the predictability of the regulatory framework must not be made a subject of trade bargaining.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
EU competition-law fine on Google (Play + search) ~1 billion USD (roughly ~900 million EUR) AP News, 24 July 2026
Earlier Android fine (rejected appeal) ~4.5 billion USD AP News, 24 July 2026
Deadline for sharing anonymised search data January 2027 AP News, 24 July 2026
Trump’s tariff threat on countries introducing a digital services tax 100% AP News, 25 July 2026
American tariff actually applied to the EU (agreed threshold) 10% Politico Europe, 25 July 2026

The public-law logic of the DMA (EU 2022/1925): the regulation prescribes structural, forward-looking obligations (interoperability, ban on self-preferencing, data access) on the “gatekeeper” platforms, and as a complement to the ex-post, case-by-case competition-law enforcement laid down in Articles 101–102 TFEU — protecting a legal interest distinct from it — ensures that the affected markets remain contestable and fair.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Digitalisation and AI regulation (programme points) — the structural obligations of DMA enforcement, algorithmic transparency and the responsible AI framework form the backbone of improving Hungarian digital competitive conditions;
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — issue-based coalition-building, the integration of economic diplomacy and strategic balancing policy are the framework for handling the transatlantic conflict;
  • Economy (programme points) — competition policy, strategic industrial policy and the deepening of the single market in services are the instruments for the simultaneous handling of export exposure and market competition;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the predictable, rules-based framework and the public, quantified risk analysis are the precondition of accountable decision-making.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Zuboff: The Age of Surveillance Capitalism

Zuboff’s central thesis is that the power of the large platform companies is qualitatively new: they are not simply large market players, but possess an unprecedented asymmetry of knowledge and power. As she writes:

„Surveillance capitalism operates through unprecedented asymmetries in knowledge and the power that accrues to knowledge. Surveillance capitalists know everything about us, whereas their operations are designed to be unknowable to us."

According to the author, this system creates “a concentration of wealth, knowledge and power” unprecedented in human history. From the perspective of the Hungarian and EU debate this provides the background why the traditional, ex-post competition-law instruments became insufficient on their own: if the source of market power is exclusive access to data, then competition can only be restored with structural, forward-looking obligations — precisely with the data sharing and platform opening that the DMA prescribes. MIAK uses this not as an ideological claim but as a diagnosis of market entry barriers: the interest of the small, capital-poor competitor is structural opening.

📖 Source: Shoshana Zuboff: The Age of Surveillance Capitalism

6.4.2 Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

Stiglitz — former chief economist of the World Bank — documents from the inside that the rules of globalisation are rarely neutral: the more developed, greater powers secure a disproportionately large share of the benefits for themselves, while requiring compliance with the rules from the smaller ones. As he puts it:

„the more advanced industrial countries declined to open up their markets to the goods of the developing countries… while insisting that those countries open up their markets to the goods of the wealthier countries".

Stiglitz also shows that while small countries “had to pay attention” to the assessments of international institutions, the large, developed economies could practically ignore them — this rule asymmetry is the source of the lasting exposure of small, open economies. In the transatlantic tariff conflict this is the most important lesson for the Hungarian position: against a 100% tariff threat a small, export-dependent economy can defend itself not through the bilateral trial of strength, but through the rules-based, multilateral framework and coalition action. The predictable rule here is not a constraint but the safety net of the weakest player — precisely for this reason it must not be made a subject of trade bargaining.

📖 Source: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

6.5 International comparison

EU digital competition-law enforcement is one of the world’s most advanced frameworks: the DMA and the Digital Services Act (DSA, EU 2022/2065) together prescribe structural obligations on the gatekeeper platforms that go beyond classic, ex-post competition-law enforcement. The American approach is traditionally more restrained, case-law based; the current conflict is precisely the clash of these two regulatory philosophies. On the question of the digital services tax, several European countries (for example France) had previously introduced or planned such a tax, which is a recurring source of transatlantic tension. The lesson from the Hungarian perspective: a predictable, pre-announced and consistently applied rule gives greater protection to the small players in the long term than an ad hoc bargain resting on power relations — regardless of which great power happens to be exerting pressure.

Digitalisation and AI regulation

  • D1 — Responsible AI framework
  • D11 — Algorithmic transparency register
  • D4 — AI sandbox
  • D18 — Data governance and open data intermediaries

Foreign policy

  • KP1 — EU digital vanguard
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU
  • KP8 — Economic diplomacy integration
  • KP11 — Strategic balancing policy

Economy

  • G5 — Competition policy and anti-monopoly
  • G9 — Strategic industrial policy
  • G14 — Single market deepening — services
  • G4 — Innovation ecosystem and active development policy

Proposed new programme point: Transatlantic trade-risk monitor — a public, machine-readable export-exposure measurement system for the sectors most exposed to American tariff measures — for the Economy and the Foreign policy areas.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 25 July 2026 — top-10 international topics):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Shoshana Zuboff: The Age of Surveillance Capitalism
  • 📖 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

Note: the local file path of the book does NOT appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Digitalisation and AI regulation (programme points; programme point ID: D11)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP17)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G5)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points)
  • MIAK press monitor, 25 July 2026 — topic 1, score: 93/100

Additional EU legal sources:

  • Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 — the Digital Markets Act (DMA)
  • Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 — the Digital Services Act (DSA)
  • Articles 101–102 TFEU — the basic competition-law rules

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