Part I — Situation overview

On 22 July 2026, at Rákospalota-Újpest railway station, Prime Minister Péter Magyar and Minister for Transport and Investment Dávid Vitézy presented the Gábor Baross Railway Development Plan: the total envelope of the ten-year programme, spanning government terms, is 3,550 billion forints, its aims being to make the main lines fit for speeds of 160–200 km/h, to renew the rolling stock (at least 35 new InterCity trainsets and 42 multiple units), the full reconstruction of the HÉV suburban lines from September with an envelope of more than 150 billion forints, and the renovation of the ten busiest stations. As part of the package they announced the extension of metro line M3 to Rákospalota-Újpest railway station — a “historic day” according to Mayor Gergely Karácsony, although the plans originally ran to Káposztásmegyer. The funding pillars: 1,100 billion forints of cohesion funds, 700 billion forints of recovery funds (RRF — the EU’s recovery facility), a 400-billion-forint loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and 400 billion in concession arrangements; in addition, a 950-billion-forint commitment underpins the projects of the post-2028 EU cycle.

The starting condition is the plan’s strongest argument: the average age of the MÁV and HÉV vehicles is 43 years, that of the non-InterCity carriages reaches 50; 46 percent of seats have no air conditioning, 73 percent of trainsets have no passenger-information screens, a speed restriction is in force on some 40 percent of the track, and a quarter of the vehicles are not operational. The announcement, at the same time, immediately drew professional criticism: according to the Urban and Suburban Transport Association (VEKE) the government “swept together the existing plans”, and the ~350-billion annual envelope is a fraction of road spending; the Hungarian Cyclists’ Club objected to the sidelining of the main cycling network; and Telex asked the question of how exactly the M3 extension suddenly got into the package — according to the engineers the paper asked, the reason for the curt, two-stop version is simple: only this fits into the EU funding cycle running to 2030.

MIAK’s reading: the ten-year planning horizon is in itself a change of outlook in Hungarian infrastructure policy, but the plan’s credibility hinges not on the announcement but on the publicity of the prioritisation methodology — on whether passenger-traffic data or political spectacle decides the order.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the theoretical frame. The magnum opus of John Maynard Keynes (British economist, founder of modern macroeconomics), The General Theory of Employment, provides the classic economic argument for public investment: because of the multiplier — the ratio of economic expansion triggered by one forint of state spending — the total effect of public works can be a multiple of the direct employment, but Keynes himself warns that the effect depends on the state of the economy and on the other investments crowded out. Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (economists, leading authors of institutional economics; they received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2024) treats the railway explicitly as an institutional test: where power blocked or distorted railway construction out of fear for political control — as in the Habsburg Empire —, the lag was coded in for decades. And Ha-Joon Chang (a Cambridge economist of South Korean origin, researcher of development policy) documents that behind successful catching-up economies there regularly stood a deliberate state infrastructure strategy — it was not the fact of investment but its quality and targeting that made the difference. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures to institutionalise the plan’s credibility.

3.1 A public prioritisation matrix for every flagship project (by the final vote on the law)

By the logic of programme point KO4, the development order must be ranked on the basis of passenger-traffic data, the absence of alternative transport, the economic multiplier effect and the cost-benefit ratio — the ranking updated annually, publicly. MIAK proposes that for every project of the Baross plan above 50 billion forints the ministry publish the ranking score and the calculation behind it, and explain departures in writing on a “comply or explain” basis. This is also an answer to VEKE’s “swept-together plans” criticism: if the projects are good, the numbers will defend them; if not, better that it comes out now. The Keynesian multiplier argument (see 6.4.1) holds only if the investment resolves a real demand and capacity bottleneck.

3.2 A public cost-benefit analysis and follow-up for the M3 extension and the concession pillar (within 6 months)

The question posed by Telex — why exactly this, why this way — is not malice but the basic requirement of the G1 data-driven budget. MIAK proposes that the M3 extension and every element of the 400-billion concession package receive a public cost-benefit analysis (expected passenger numbers, unit cost, comparison of alternatives), and that the performance indicators of the concession contracts be published — the concession is the funding form most exposed to hidden long-term liabilities. The announced audit of the Budapest–Belgrade railway line is to be fitted into this same frame: without the public disclosure of the result, the audit is merely a gesture.

3.3 A proportionate micromobility and branch-line funding floor (in the 2027 budget)

The Cyclists’ Club’s criticism raises a real allocation question: alongside the megaprojects, the cycling network under KO5 and branch-line services may receive disproportionately little funding, even though per unit these are often the most efficient investments. MIAK proposes that within the plan’s annual spending envelope a fixed minimum share (e.g. 8–10%) go to micromobility and feeder developments, and that the real-time data platform under KO1 measure the result. In the Acemoglu–Robinson frame (see 6.4.2) the test is whether the funding serves the network as a whole — not the spectacular nodes.

The three proposals are bound together by a common principle: the plan will be a “nation-building programme” if its decision rule outlives governments, not merely its announcement. The ten-year horizon offers a chance for exactly this — if the methodology is public, it will be costlier for the next government to rewrite the order on political grounds.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Economy Public-investment multiplier, improved labour mobility, 100 km/h average speed on the main lines Capacity-constrained construction industry → cost inflation; hidden long-term burdens of the concession pillar
Society Shorter commuting times, relief for agglomeration settlements, accessibility improvements A Budapest-centric ranking may deepen territorial inequality without an equity correction
Public administration National Transport Organiser + fleet manager: a unified purchaser system Institution-founding tied to the RRF deadline (31 August) incentivises haste

The main tension lies in the funding structure: of the 3,550 billion, 1,800 billion is EU funding — that is, the plan’s pace partly depends on whether the conditions of the cohesion and RRF disbursements are fulfilled. This is not a weakness but a built-in disciplining force: the EU project rules themselves demand the documentation that MIAK would extend to domestic funds as well. The tipping point is rolling-stock procurement: because of the time tenders take, the first new vehicles enter service at the earliest three years after the tender closes — if procurement slips, the programme consumes political capital without visible results.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

The proposed performance indicators (KPIs, in English Key Performance Indicator):

  • Prioritisation transparency: projects above 50 billion forints have a public ranking score and cost-benefit analysis (target: 100%, by mid-2027);
  • Track performance: the share of track sections affected by speed restrictions from the current ~40% to below 30% by 2029;
  • Rolling stock: the closing of the first new multiple-unit tender by the end of 2027; the share of air-conditioned seats from 54% to above 70% by 2030;
  • Passenger traffic: a 20% increase in passenger numbers on the developed suburban lines (HÉV, Lajosmizse, Veresegyház) in the two years following handover.

5.2 Summary

The Baross plan is the largest announced railway programme of the period since the change of regime, and its starting diagnosis — ageing rolling stock, slow track, unreliable service — is beyond dispute. MIAK asks the government to treat the plan not as an announcement but as a public methodology: publish the ranking of projects with the calculations, introduce the obligation to justify departures, and fix a proportionate funding floor for small-scale, high-impact developments. In this case, of MIAK’s foundational values, data-drivenness and transparency move together: a ten-year, 3,550-billion programme is exactly as credible as its decisions are publicly verifiable — and the cause of the railways is too important to be entrusted to the showcase-investment appetite of any government.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The economic band gave the most detailed, fact-reporting treatment: Portfolio relayed the full content of the press conference — funding structure, line-by-line projects, institutional timetable —, separately highlighting the RRF deadlines and the Győr developments. The left-liberal band chose a critical-curious framing: Telex probed the transparency of the decision preparation (“how did metro line 3 suddenly come into the picture?”), 444.hu highlighted the capital-city dimension and Gergely Karácsony’s reaction, while HVG gave space to the cycling advocacy group’s funding-allocation criticism (the cycling article was not publicly retrievable, title-level reference). The pro-government-conservative band struck two different notes: Mandiner reported matter-of-factly that “the capital also gets EU money”, whereas Magyar Nemzet put VEKE’s critique on its front page (“they swept together the existing plans”) — the professional criticism thus appeared primarily in a government-critical frame. There was no substantive debate across the spectrum about the plan’s necessity; the fault line runs along the questions of credibility and the order of priority.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Total envelope: 3,550 billion forints to 2035; funding: 1,100 bn cohesion + 700 bn RRF + 400 bn EIB loan + 400 bn concession; a further 950 bn commitment for the 2028–2034 EU cycle (Portfolio, the ministry’s briefing).
  • Rolling stock: average age 43 years (non-IC carriages: 50 years); 46% of seats without air conditioning; 32% with closed-system toilets; 73% without passenger-information screens; a quarter of the vehicles not operational (ministerial presentation, Portfolio/444.hu).
  • Planned procurement: at least 35 InterCity trainsets + 42 multiple units; HÉV reconstruction 150+ bn HUF from September; preparation of the V4 high-speed railway 17 bn HUF (from the CEF — the EU’s network-funding instrument), plans by 2030 — Vienna/Bratislava in under 2 hours, Prague in 3.5 hours instead of today’s 7.
  • Six development directions: county-seat InterCity network (min. 100 km/h average speed), regional network with hybrid vehicles, suburban rail, partnership with Budapest, freight, international connections (prime-ministerial introduction, Portfolio).

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transport and infrastructure (programme points) — KO4 data-based railway prioritisation; KO1 real-time data; KO5 micromobility;
  • Economy (programme points) — G1 data-driven budgeting: the publicity of cost-benefit analyses in investment decisions.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 J. M. Keynes: The General Theory of Employment

Keynes derives the employment effect of public works through the multiplier: if society consumes nine-tenths of the increment in income, “the multiplier k is 10; and the total employment caused by increased public works will be ten times the primary employment provided by the public works themselves — assuming no reduction of investment in other directions”. In the same place he warns: in times of severe unemployment “even public works of doubtful utility may pay for themselves over and over again”, whereas close to full employment the effect shrinks. Translated to the Baross plan: in today’s capacity-constrained Hungarian construction industry, the multiplier argument gives no exemption from project selection — quite the reverse: with scarce capacity it matters all the more that the forint goes to the track section yielding the greatest benefit.

📖 Source: J. M. Keynes: The General Theory of Employment

6.4.2 Daron Acemoglu–James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

The authors use the railway as a litmus test of institutional quality. According to the case study of the Habsburg Empire, Francis I rejected railway construction for explicitly political reasons — “No, no, I will have nothing to do with it, lest the revolution might come into the country” —, and therefore on the first line a horse-drawn railway ran until the 1860s; the rulers “actively obstructed… such basic infrastructural investments as the railway”. The counter-example is North America, where the spreading railway network was both a product and a reinforcer of inclusive economic institutions. The lesson for today’s debate: the fate of the railway is always also an institutional question — the main risk is not that a government fails to spend on rail, but that political logic distorts what it spends on and where. This is precisely why public, data-based prioritisation is not technocratic decoration but the programme’s institutional vaccination.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu–James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

6.4.3 Ha-Joon Chang: 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism

Chang demonstrates on the historical examples of the developmental state — among them Alexander Hamilton’s 1791 report on manufactures — that behind the success of catching-up economies stood deliberate state engagement: Hamilton’s programme argued for “public investment in infrastructure… the development of the banking system and the promotion of a government bond market”. Chang’s thesis is not that every state investment is good, but that high-quality institutions and physical infrastructure are “the result of common construction carried through across generations” — productivity belongs largely to the system, not the individual. Translated to the Hungarian railway programme: the ten-year horizon is the right scale, because the return on infrastructure is generational; the yardstick is whether the programme raises the productivity of the network as a whole, or falls apart into politically spectacular point-like investments.

📖 Source: Ha-Joon Chang: 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism

6.5 International comparison

The Swiss “Bahn 2000” programme is the best precedent for the methodology MIAK proposes: it optimised not absolute speed but the regular-interval timetable and the transfers at nodes — passenger traffic doubled in twenty years, at a fraction of the cost of a high-speed network. The six development directions of the Baross plan (average speed, regular-interval suburban service, timetable coordination) follow a kindred logic, which is encouraging; the added lesson of the Swiss model is the discipline of project selection. The opposite precedent is well known in the region too: showcase-investment-driven programmes (high-speed prestige projects instead of suburban capacity) regularly leave behind low utilisation and high maintenance burdens — the audit of the Budapest–Belgrade line is therefore not a settling of the past but the creation of a methodological precedent.

Transport and infrastructure

  • KO4 — Railway development with data-based priority
  • KO1 — Real-time public transport data
  • KO5 — Micromobility and cyclist-friendly development

Economy

  • G1 — Data-driven budgeting

Proposed new programme point: Mandatory publicity of concession and PPP contracts — for the Transport and infrastructure area: the contractual terms, performance indicators and long-term payment obligations of every transport concession are to be published.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 23 July 2026 — topic 4):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 J. M. Keynes: The General Theory of Employment
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu–James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail
  • 📖 Ha-Joon Chang: 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transport and infrastructure (programme points; programme point ID: KO4)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G1)
  • MIAK press monitor, 23 July 2026 — topic 4, score: 78/100

Additional public data sources:

  • EU CEF/cohesion funding map; KSH transport statistics; EIB project appraisal methodology

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