Part I — Situation overview

On 14 July 2026 the National Assembly began, under an urgent procedure, the debate of the bill on the National Asset Recovery and Asset Protection Office (NVVH). The government’s proposal, submitted on 10 July 2026, would create a hybrid institution previously unknown in the Hungarian public-law system: the NVVH would receive public-asset-protection, administrative, investigative, prosecutorial and civil-law enforcement powers at once — in priority crimes affecting public assets it may itself investigate, bring charges and represent the prosecution in court, enjoying precedence over the prosecution service in public-asset cases. The office’s president is elected by the National Assembly with a two-thirds majority; no one may be nominated who in the past six years was a politician, a member of the government or a party employee. Tuesday’s sitting also put two further institutional reorganisations on the agenda: under the law-enforcement package submitted by interior minister Gábor Pósfai, from 1 October the Counter-Terrorism Centre (TEK) turns from an independent law-enforcement body into a territorial organ of the police, while the public-education amendment sponsored by education minister Judit Lannert removes the obstacles restricting the right to strike of those working in public education.

The debate on the NVVH is not taking place in a vacuum. Asset recovery was a central campaign promise of the government; in recent weeks the accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO — the EU prosecution service for crimes affecting the union budget) took place, five criminal complaints were filed in cases of suspected corruption, and the 17th amendment to the Fundamental Law, adopted on Monday, raised the new office to constitutional rank. According to HVG’s analysis, the NVVH will be an “Integrity Authority fattened on legal steroids”: it receives the roughly 6 billion forint budget of the wound-up Sovereignty Protection Office and may manage up to 10 billion forints a year, while according to the government its task is to track down the public wealth unlawfully outsourced over 20 years — by the paper’s estimate an asset mass of up to 30 thousand billion forints. Portfolio’s question-and-answer analysis records both the guarantee elements (two-thirds election of the president, conflict-of-interest rules, its own budget chapter) and the rule-of-law risks (extraordinarily broad powers; a fining power ranging from 50 thousand to 50 million forints, for companies up to 5 billion forints; and the institution of the asset supervisor intervening in companies’ operation before any investigation).

MIAK’s reading: recovering unlawfully acquired public assets is a legitimate and necessary aim; the question is not the aim but the structure. An office in which the control, investigative and prosecutorial functions hitherto divided among the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), the investigating authorities and the prosecution service are united — while adjudication naturally remains with the independent courts — creates exactly the power formula it is meant to act against — strong powers therefore serve accountability only together with proportionately strong external control, not instead of it.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the scholarly frame. According to the formula in Controlling Corruption by Robert Klitgaard (a classic researcher of anti-corruption policy, former professor at the Harvard Kennedy School), corruption flourishes where monopoly and discretion meet without accountability (C = M + D − A) — the NVVH plan concentrates precisely monopoly (case precedence) and broad discretion (fining, the asset supervisor), so everything hinges on the third factor, accountability. Corruption and Government by Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor of law at Yale, a leading researcher of the political economy of corruption) argues, on the basis of the Hong Kong and Singapore experience, that an independent anti-corruption agency can be an effective tool — but only as long as it embodies a credible, long-term commitment and does not become a tool of political score-settling. And From Third World to First, the memoir of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore’s founding prime minister), describes the practice of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB): the office concentrated on the “big fish” of the topmost circles, while at the lower levels the state, by simplifying permits, eliminated discretion itself — the breeding ground of corruption. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures for the parliamentary debate of the bill.

3.1 A control package into the bill (before the final vote)

MIAK proposes that during the debate parliament build three external controls into the normative text: (1) against every substantive act of the NVVH — a fine, the appointment of an asset supervisor, an asset-securing measure — there should be accelerated judicial remedy; (2) the office should report annually to the National Assembly with public, case-level statistics (cases opened, final results, assets recovered, lawsuits lost); (3) the institution of the asset supervisor should receive a time limit and a condition of judicial approval. In the Klitgaard formula (see 6.4.1) this is the strengthening of the A factor: monopoly position and discretion do not reproduce the corruption risk only if accountability grows in proportion with them. MIAK’s own programme (A10) proposes the Singapore model with exactly this duality — strong powers and strong external control.

3.2 A public case dashboard from the office’s launch (from the first day of operation)

The credibility of accountability comes from its results being visible. MIAK proposes that, on the model of the public-money dashboard (A1), the NVVH publish on a public interface from day one: how many cases are in progress (with anonymisation protecting the rights of those affected), how large the seized, secured and finally recovered assets are, and how much the office’s own operating cost is. According to Rose-Ackerman’s analysis (see 6.4.2), the Hong Kong office’s credibility came from the population turning to it with reports made under their own names — trust is measurable, and public accounting builds it.

3.3 Impact assessment of the TEK merger and the strike-right restoration (within 90 days)

The two further elements of the package are part of the same wave of institutional reorganisation, and both deserve an impact assessment. On the merger of TEK into the police, MIAK proposes that within 90 days the government publish: which duplications cease, how operational capability is preserved, and what internal control replaces independent organisational oversight — by the programme points on law-enforcement accountability (KB6, KB7) the reorganisation is a step forward if the control of the monopoly on force does not loosen but becomes simpler. On the restoration of teachers’ right to strike — which means abolishing the rules on minimum service that in practice hollowed out the right to strike, and ending exclusive consultation with the National Teachers’ Chamber — MIAK supports the restoration of collective interest assertion, and proposes that implementation be paired with the protection of pupils’ rights (a pre-announced strike order, exam-period guarantees).

The common principle of the three proposals is structural symmetry: every new or reshaped instrument of power — an investigative super-authority, a merged police force, a restored right to strike — should receive as much control as it receives power. This is not distrust of the present government, but the only guarantee that the tool serves the public good in the next government’s hands too.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Public finances Actual recovery of part of the unlawfully outsourced public wealth, a deterrent effect against future abuses Over-promising: if final results are scarce compared with the communicated magnitude, trust in accountability is damaged
Rule of law A case flow that can be carried through in one hand, faster procedures than under fragmented institutional responsibility The concentration of investigative, prosecutorial and fining powers can become a tool fit for political abuse in a later government’s hands
Policing Elimination of duplications, a simpler chain of command with the merger of TEK Loss of operational capability during the transition; the departure of the specialised staff
Education Restoration of teachers’ interest assertion, channelling wage disputes into an institutional track A strike wave in the short term; injury to pupils’ rights in walkouts without guarantees

The main matter for consideration at the NVVH is whether the exceptional tool remains exceptional: by international experience, anti-corruption super-authorities work well where the institution dismantles the law-breaking system — simplifying permits, narrowing discretion — and go off the rails where they become a permanent investigative weapon deployable against anyone. The tipping point is external control: without judicial review and public accounting, even every success of the office remains under suspicion.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK’s proposed key performance indicators (KPIs):

  • Final recovery: the value of assets recovered by final court decision after 12 and 24 months — seizure in itself is not a result;
  • Judicial confirmation rate: the share of the NVVH’s challenged acts upheld by the courts — proposed warning threshold: if the rate falls below 70%, the office’s application of the law is to be reviewed;
  • Transparency: the launch of the public case dashboard from the first day of operation, with quarterly updates;
  • Law-enforcement transition: the evolution of operational response times and staff retention in the first year after the TEK merger;
  • Educational interest reconciliation: the number of wage agreements concluded alongside the restored right to strike, and the share of lost teaching days.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to the legislator is simple: yes to asset recovery, yes to a strong office — but before the final vote let accelerated judicial remedy, annual public case statistics and judicial control of the asset supervisor be put into the normative text. What is today a tool of accountability can tomorrow — in other hands — be one of score-settling; the difference is made not by intent but by the built-in guarantee. Of MIAK’s foundational values, transparency and accountability prevail here together: the office becomes credible by its own operation being just as public and answerable as it demands the asset movements it investigates to be.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The press framing by spectrum

The public-affairs and economic band gave the topic its most detailed treatment: Portfolio presented the NVVH’s powers with the framing of a “public-law institution not seen before”, in question-and-answer form, expressly highlighting both the guarantee elements and the rule-of-law risks; 24.hu and ATV worked with a factual presentation of Tuesday’s parliamentary agenda (special-tax vote, NVVH debate, TEK reorganisation, public-education amendment). In the left-liberal band HVG published two analyses: one gave the risk framing of “almost unlimited power” about the super-authority, the other examined the dismantling of the NER networks in the public-procurement system — the paper thus took a position supporting the aim while weighing the tool critically. The conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) touched the topic this day not through the institutional details but within the frame of the protest against the constitutional amendment — Fidesz had earlier compared the planned office to the State Protection Authority. Népszava carried the start of the bill’s debate on its front page (title-level reference only).

6.2 Facts and data

  • The NVVH bill was submitted by the government on 10 July 2026, and the National Assembly began its debate under an urgent procedure on 14 July 2026 (24.hu, ATV); the 17th amendment to the Fundamental Law, adopted on 13 July, enshrines the office at the level of the Fundamental Law (Portfolio).
  • Under the proposal the office’s president is elected by the National Assembly with a two-thirds majority; alongside the president four vice-presidents (public finance, investigation, prosecution, appeals) operate; the candidate needs at least 15 years of professional experience, and anyone who in the past six years was a politician, a member of the government or a party employee is excluded (Portfolio).
  • The office receives its own budget chapter, which cannot be reduced without its consent; for refusal to cooperate it may impose fines from 50 thousand to 50 million forints on private individuals and from 500 thousand to 5 billion forints on companies (Portfolio).
  • According to HVG, the office receives the roughly 6 billion forint budget of the wound-up Sovereignty Protection Office and may manage up to 10 billion forints a year; the paper estimates the asset mass unlawfully outsourced in the NER era at up to 30 thousand billion forints (HVG).
  • From 1 October 2026 TEK turns from an independent law-enforcement body into a territorial organ of the police, in the name of reducing duplications in law-enforcement tasks (ATV, based on the interior-ministerial submission).
  • According to the World Bank’s governance indicators (WGI — Worldwide Governance Indicators), in 2024 Hungary stood at −0.17 in the control-of-corruption dimension (World Bank WGI 2024) — below the regional midfield; the NVVH’s effect will be measurable on this time series over the long term.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the institutional plan of the independent corruption-investigation office and public-money transparency (A10, A1, A6);
  • Public security and policing (programme points) — the accountability conditions of the reorganisation of law-enforcement bodies (KB6, KB7);
  • Education (background) — the labour-law framework of teachers’ interest assertion and the restoration of the right to strike.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

By Klitgaard’s analytical frame, corruption flourishes where monopoly and discretion meet the absence of accountability — and rules in themselves are neither good nor bad: a rule can create a monopoly (and with it a corruption rent), but it can also narrow discretion and ease accountability. The book’s most famous case study is Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), which was created in 1973 completely separated from the police precisely because the public trusted only a unit independent of every earlier organisation — the office received strong investigative powers, but its founder from the start also stressed the preventive, system-improving function. Translated to the NVVH plan: the Hungarian proposal moves all three factors of the Klitgaard formula — it grants a case-precedence monopoly and broad discretion — so the balance is decided on the accountability side: judicial review, parliamentary reporting and public case statistics are not accessory elements but the condition of the construction’s workability.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman assesses independent anti-corruption agencies on the basis of the Hong Kong and Singapore experience: in both success stories three elements went together — the commitment of the topmost political leadership, credible law enforcement by an independent agency operating with strong statutory authorisation, and the parallel reform of the civil service. At the same time the author expressly warns of the risk of abuse: an anti-corruption commission reporting exclusively to the executive can become a tool of suppressing political opponents, which is why control is provided by oversight boards and independent courts — it is worth considering that the office answer not to the head of government but to the legislature. A separate lesson is the primacy of structural reform: one failure of the Hong Kong office was precisely that in the briberies around licence issuance it pursued the corrupt individuals instead of simplifying the cumbersome procedure that produced the corruption. Translated to the Hungarian debate: the NVVH’s parliamentary accounting and the parallel simplification of the public-procurement and licensing system are not supplementary — by international experience they are the condition of success.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First

Singapore’s founding prime minister describes in his memoir the practical recipe of the anti-corruption turn. The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) operated under the prime minister’s office, with investigative powers extending to every official and minister, and deliberately concentrated on the “big fish” of the top circles; at the level of smaller cases the state did not investigate but eliminated the breeding ground of corruption — with simplified, published procedures and a radical reduction of the number of permits and approvals it withdrew discretion from the system. The rigour extended to its own political camp too: proceedings were opened against a minister and a governing-party member of parliament as well, which was the test of the system’s credibility. Translated to the NVVH plan: the strength of the Singapore model lay not in the office’s power but in its consistency — pursuing the “big fish” builds trust only if the procedural order is predictable, one’s own side enjoys no protection either, and the system also eliminates the opportunities for abuse, not merely punishes the abusers.

📖 Source: Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First — The Singapore Story

6.5 International comparison

The international experience of institutions specialised in asset recovery is mixed. Hong Kong’s ICAC and Singapore’s CPIB are the successful extreme (in detail in 6.4); by the experience of the World Bank’s StAR programme dealing with the recovery of stolen assets, however, the final closure of high-value asset-recovery cases typically takes 5–10 years, and a fraction of the reported claims is recovered — this is of key importance for managing Hungarian communication expectations. In Romania the example of the anti-corruption prosecution service (DNA) is instructive in both directions: it achieved spectacular results in the cases of high-ranking politicians, but in some phases of its operation it itself became the object of rule-of-law criticism because of its cooperation with the secret services and shortcomings in procedural guarantees — the tool’s credibility hinged on procedural discipline. And the fresh Hungarian accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office means that in cases involving EU funds the NVVH must reconcile competence with a supranational prosecution service — a forced but useful external control.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)
  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

Public security and policing

  • KB6 — Police code of ethics and accountability
  • KB7 — Anti-corruption internal oversight reform

Proposed new programme point: Teachers’ interest-reconciliation and strike-guarantee framework — for the Education area: an institutionalised wage-negotiation calendar alongside the restored right to strike, and a pre-fixed strike order protecting pupils’ rights.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 14 July 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First — The Singapore Story

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A10, A1, A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Public security and policing (programme points; programme point ID: KB6, KB7)
  • MIAK press monitor, 14 July 2026 — topic 3, score: 84/100

Additional public data sources (if used):

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 — control of corruption
  • World Bank StAR (Stolen Asset Recovery) programme — methodological handbooks

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