Part I — Situation overview

In early July 2026 the focus of Hungarian foreign policy shifts to Ankara: the Hungarian prime minister travels to the Turkish capital for the two-day NATO summit beginning Tuesday, accompanied by the foreign minister and the defence minister; in his absence the prime-ministerial duties are performed by the minister heading the Prime Minister’s Office. The stake of the summit reaches far beyond protocol: according to information from 24.hu and Reuters, the US president, Donald Trump, will negotiate in person on Wednesday with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky about “how the war could be ended” — Trump also spoke by telephone at the weekend with Zelensky and Russian president Vladimir Putin. Alongside the meeting with the host, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the US president is encouraging the allies to increase their defence spending, and the announcement of several billion dollars’ worth of defence agreements is expected at the summit.

In the shadow of the negotiations, the reality of the war is sharper than ever: according to Telex’s report, in recent days a Russian missile and drone attack struck Kyiv, with several civilian casualties, and Zelensky warns of a large-scale Russian offensive. The summit is therefore not an abstract diplomatic event, but a consultation with direct consequences taking place in the middle of an ongoing war — one in which the Hungarian position carries policy weight on the questions of defence spending, Ukraine support and energy security too.

MIAK’s reading is that the situation is a test of the predictability of Hungarian foreign policy. Peace is the centre of every sober goal, but the road to it cannot be the sacrifice of alliance solidarity or of international law. Conceptual precision also matters: military defence policy and NATO affairs fall within the competence of the defence portfolio, and the international negotiations within that of the foreign-policy leadership and the prime minister — not within the domain of interior administration. For MIAK the question is not “West or East”, but whether Hungary remains a reliable, principled and predictable actor within its own alliance system.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, let us fix the conceptual frame in which the summit can be interpreted. Henry Kissinger (a US diplomat and foreign-policy thinker of German origin, a former secretary of state), in his work World Order, traces international order back to two pillars — the balance of power and legitimacy: a lasting order arises only where the balance of forces is also framed by rules accepted by the participants, and the negotiated settlement is precisely the harmonisation of these two. The EU’s 2016 Global Strategy document formulates the ambition of strategic autonomy (the Union’s independent capacity to act), yet expressly embedded in partnership with NATO — “this is not the time for global policemen and lone warriors”. And Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (1949), which forms the basis of NATO, sets out the obligation of collective defence — the treatment of an attack on one member as an attack on all members — which is the legal core of alliance solidarity. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in the 6.4 Literature in detail section.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three principles along which the Hungarian representation, at the summit and afterwards, can take a predictable, principled position that serves the Hungarian interest on a factual basis.

3.1 Principled pragmatism in supporting the peace negotiations (immediate)

MIAK supports every credible negotiation aimed at ending the war — but the frame of the support is principled pragmatism: neither ideological rigidity nor mere interest-maximisation, but a transparent, value-based, yet realist position. In Kissinger’s balance frame (see 6.4.1) a lasting peace is the result not of raw force but of a legitimate order accepted by the participants — which is why, according to MIAK, the Hungarian position should support the ceasefire and the negotiated settlement within the frame of international law and Ukraine’s sovereignty, not above them. This is the practical application of the KP4 principled-pragmatism doctrine: advocating peace cannot mean abandoning the principle of alliance solidarity or the rejection of aggression.

3.2 Strategic balance and predictable alliance commitment (2026)

The strength of Hungarian foreign policy, according to MIAK, comes from no single external power dominating its room for manoeuvre, while at the same time it remains predictable in its alliance commitments. The KP11 strategic balance-of-power policy describes exactly this: the balance of the EU, NATO and bilateral relations, not the playing of one against another. At the summit this means that Hungary must act as a constructive, reliable partner — the veto and waiting are not a strategy, but the loss of room for manoeuvre. And the handling of crisis situations must be planned according to the KP7 crisis-management protocol, built on scenario analysis and systematic decision-making, not as reactive, day-to-day political steps.

3.3 Smart defence-spending increase turned to domestic development (2026–2030)

The pressure to increase defence spending is one of the summit’s main topics. MIAK supports the scheduled increase under the HV5 programme point — the GDP-proportionate (relative to gross domestic product) increase of defence spending, but with the proviso that a significant part of the increment be productive investment: domestic research and development, Hungarian manufacturing, dual (military-civilian) use infrastructure — not merely imports. Thus defence spending strengthens both security and the domestic economy at once. The planning should follow the HV12 geostrategic approach: the integration of the Carpathian Basin’s position and NATO’s eastern-flank logistical role — on a predictable schedule fixed several years in advance, not as the object of a political bargain changing year by year.

These three proposals are bound together by a single principle: predictability is a value in itself. Support for peace, alliance loyalty and smart defence investment reinforce one another if Hungarian foreign policy is principled and planned — exactly as Kissinger’s balance doctrine and the EU’s strategic frame suggest.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Foreign policy A predictable, reliable image as an ally, a strengthening negotiating position Veto-and-waiting policy can lead to isolation and loss of room for manoeuvre
Defence Scheduled spending turned to domestic development → security + economic yield If the increment goes on imports, the security and economic yield is also lost
Economy Dual-use infrastructure, R&D, jobs from the defence investment Sudden, unplanned spending increase burdens the budget without return

The main trade-off is the following: the desire for peace and the alliance obligation may in the short term come into tension. In MIAK’s position, however, this tension is only apparent: a principled, predictable Hungary can argue more credibly for a negotiated settlement than an unreliable actor operating with occasional vetoes. The proposal works if the peace principle and the solidarity principle appear together, reinforcing one another; it tips to the risk side if the daily political gain overrides long-term alliance predictability.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK considers the following suggested performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) worth tracking:

  • Defence-spending path: whether GDP-proportionate defence spending rises at the pace proposed in HV5 (towards 2.5% by 2027).
  • Productive share: whether the domestic R&D and manufacturing share of the defence-spending increment reaches 40%.
  • Alliance reliability: whether the number of Hungarian vetoes and blockings in joint EU/NATO decisions falls.
  • Crisis-management capacity: whether an institutionalised, scenario-based foreign-policy crisis-management structure operates.

These are suggestions, not government decisions — MIAK considers worth tracking what shows, on a factual basis, whether Hungarian foreign policy is principled and predictable.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: the Ankara summit is a test of the predictability of Hungarian foreign policy. MIAK asks the decision-maker and the public to support the peace efforts within the frame of international law and alliance solidarity, and to raise defence spending wisely, planned for domestic development and several years in advance — instead of the veto and waiting, constructive, principled participation is the Hungarian interest.

The topic moves two MIAK foundational values. Data-drivenness is at stake because the Hungarian position — from defence spending to Ukraine support — must be based on facts and scenario analysis, not on mood or a campaign message. And openness, because a predictable Hungary cooperating with its allies enjoys a stronger negotiating position and greater room for manoeuvre than an isolated actor operating with occasional vetoes.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The public-affairs and liberal-left band (24.hu, Telex, 444.hu, Népszava) approached the summit primarily from the Trump–Zelensky meeting and the war situation: 24.hu highlighted the fact of the negotiation and the pressure to increase defence spending, Telex the attacks on Kyiv and the threatening offensive, and 444.hu the details of the Hungarian delegation’s trip and the domestic political context. The economic band (Portfolio) treated the summit from the angle of the peace and market consequences, in a cool, analytical frame. The pro-government-conservative band (Mandiner, Magyar Nemzet) placed the emphasis on the announcement of the Trump–Zelensky meeting and on the National Assembly sitting in the prime minister’s absence — the framing here rather strengthened the domestic-political aspect. In the spirit of being ideology-free it should be recorded: alliance predictability and the negotiated, lawful support of peace are not a side-dependent goal — MIAK applies the same principled, factual yardstick, regardless of the daily political reading.

6.2 Facts and data

Indicator Value Source
Venue and duration of the NATO summit Ankara, two days (from Tuesday) 24.hu / Reuters, 6 July 2026
Trump–Zelensky meeting Wednesday, on ending the war 24.hu / Reuters
Expected defence agreements several billion dollars 24.hu / Reuters
MIAK-proposed defence-spending target GDP 2.5% (2027), 3.5% (2030) MIAK HV5
Productive-share target in the increment 40%+ MIAK HV5

From MIAK’s point of view the figures underline the importance of planning: the spending increase brings a security and economic yield only if it is scheduled and directed to domestic development.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — principled pragmatism (KP4), the strategic balance (KP11) and the crisis-management protocol (KP7) are the gravitational centre of the topic;
  • Defence (programme points) — the scheduled increase of defence spending (HV5) and geostrategic planning (HV12) provide the defence aspect.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Henry Kissinger: World Order

Kissinger derives the durability of international order from the coincidence of two factors — the balance of power and legitimacy: the balance of forces is in itself unstable if it is not accompanied by a common rule order accepted by the participants. The negotiated settlement is precisely the harmonisation of these two: not the dictate of the victor, but an order that the parties accept as legitimate and are therefore willing to maintain. For ending the war in Ukraine this means: a ceasefire is not in itself peace — a lasting order can be created only by an agreement embedded in international law and respect for sovereignty. MIAK therefore supports negotiation, but with the maintenance of the legitimate frame.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: World Order

6.4.2 EU: Global Strategy (2016)

The EU’s 2016 global strategy formulates the ambition of strategic autonomy — the Union’s independent capacity to act in defence of its own interests and values — yet embeds this expressly in partnership, not in lone action. The document literally sets out the deepening of the transatlantic bond and the NATO partnership as the direction, and rejects the role of “global policeman” and “lone warrior”. In the Hungarian interpretation this supports MIAK’s strategic-balance principle: independent Hungarian interest-assertion and alliance loyalty are not each other’s opposites, but each other’s preconditions.

📖 Source: EU: Global Strategy (2016)

6.4.3 NATO Treaty (Washington Treaty, 1949)

Article 5 of NATO’s founding charter sets out the principle of collective defence: an armed attack on one member of the alliance is regarded as an attack on all members, and the members are obliged to provide assistance. This is the legal core of alliance solidarity — not rhetoric, but a treaty obligation. In the Hungarian interpretation this frame provides the legal basis of the defence-spending increase and of alliance reliability: the predictable fulfilment of the obligations arising from membership is not an option, but at once the price and the benefit of collective security.

📖 Source: NATO Treaty (Washington Treaty, 1949)

6.5 International comparison

The smart increase of defence spending turned to domestic development is an internationally proven direction: the most successful allies (for example the Baltic states or Poland) consciously tie the spending increase to domestic defence-industry development, research and development and dual-use infrastructure, so that the security expenditure is also an economy-developing investment. This is the operational confirmation of the EU’s strategic frame: the alliance contribution is sustainable if it also strengthens one’s own economy and capacity to act — not merely imports, but investment.

Foreign policy

  • KP4 — Principled-pragmatism doctrine
  • KP7 — Foreign-policy crisis-management protocol
  • KP11 — Strategic balance-of-power policy

Defence

  • HV5 — Scheduled increase of defence spending
  • HV12 — Geostrategic defence planning

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 6 July 2026 — topic 4):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: World Order
  • 📖 EU: Global Strategy (2016)
  • 📖 NATO Treaty (Washington Treaty, 1949)

Note: in the blog’s visible text the book’s local file path does not appear — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP4, KP11)
  • MIAK policy area: Defence (programme points; programme point ID: HV5)
  • MIAK press monitor, 6 July 2026 — topic 4, score: 82/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Official NATO communiqués; conclusions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council; SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) defence-spending data

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