Part I — Situation overview

On 27 June 2026, the transport and investment minister, Dávid Vitézy, announced on his social media page that, on the government’s decision, it had officially initiated the lifting of the secrecy related to the investment in the Budapest–Belgrade railway line. The step was preceded by a meeting a day earlier with Gong Tao, the ambassador of the People’s Republic of China in Budapest. The minister indicated: the making public of the documentation has begun, but for this the official approval of the Chinese side is also needed, since the project proceeds on the basis of a bilateral agreement between two countries. The investment is physically almost finished — the roughly 160-kilometre section running from Ferencváros to the Hungarian–Serbian border at Kelebia is now double-track, freight trains use the line, but the train-control system is still under testing, so passenger service has not yet started.

The secrecy is not accidental but the result of a legal act: the documents of the railway line and the Chinese loan agreement were classified by the National Assembly — on the initiative of the then government led by Viktor Orbán — for ten years by a law adopted in 2020. Public-law precision matters: the classification was not “ordered” by the government on its own, but adopted by the legislature; the lifting is therefore not a simple government gesture either, but a legislative and — because of the bilateral agreement — diplomatic process. According to press summaries the investment is on the order of HUF 750 billion, a project financed predominantly from a Chinese loan, in which the return conditions also fell within the classified scope (444.hu, 27 June 2026). 444.hu also records that several concerns were raised about the quality of the construction, but, citing the classified contracts, the previous government did not respond substantively to the inquiries.

According to MIAK’s reading, initiating the lifting of the secrecy is right, but the character of the problem is decided not in the gesture but in the content: in the case of an infrastructure financed from public money and a foreign-currency loan, the yardstick of democratic accountability is not partial publicity but full contract transparency and an independent ex-post audit. Ending the secrecy means a real turn only if the lifted documents reveal the full truth of the return, the currency risk and the main-contractor conditions.

Part II — Literature foundation

The interpretive frame of the topic is corruption and governance research, supplemented by the literature of China strategy. In her work Corruption and Government (1999), Susan Rose-Ackerman (American legal scholar-economist, one of the leading researchers of the political economy of corruption) sets out that secrecy is itself the breeding ground of corruption: hidden transactions erase market information, and capital-intensive “white elephant” projects with little economic rationality are attractive to decision-makers precisely because it is easier to place invisible commissions on large investments — this is a direct argument for full contract publicity. In their study Governance Matters (1999), Daniel Kaufmann and his co-authors (governance researchers at the World Bank, the creators of the Worldwide Governance Indicators) prove empirically that better governance — including “voice and accountability”, that is, publicity and accountability — leads causally to better development outcomes; this underpins the demand from the side of measurability. Henry Kissinger’s (American diplomat and foreign-policy thinker, a defining figure of US diplomacy in the 1970s) book On China (2011) describes, with the concept of the weiqi strategy, the Chinese long-term, gradually encircling negotiating logic — this explains why the lifting cannot be treated as a single gesture, but a predictable China policy resting on an itemised risk–benefit balance is needed. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that create more substantive transparency than the mere lifting of the secrecy.

3.1 Full contract publicity, in machine-readable form (within 90 days)

The lifted documents must be published not as a scanned PDF but in a structured, machine-readable form: the full text of the loan agreement, the interest and repayment conditions, the currency designation, the main-contractor and subcontractor agreements, and the input data of the return calculation. The responsible party is the Ministry of Transport and Investment, the deadline is 90 days from the approval of the Chinese side, and for the intervening stages every element that can be made public unilaterally, without Chinese consent. In Rose-Ackerman’s framework (see 6.4.1) this is what eliminates the corruption advantage of secrecy. The proposal builds on the programme points KO4 — railway development with data-based priority and A2 — public-procurement transparency: if the contract is accessible as data, the anomaly-screening algorithms can carry out the over-pricing and repeat-winner analysis.

3.2 Independent return, currency-risk and contractor audit (within 6 months)

Publicity alone is insufficient if no one interprets the data. MIAK proposes an independent, public expert audit with three focuses: whether the return calculation is realistic (on the basis of passenger and freight traffic forecasts), how big the currency risk of the loan is — that is, by how much the repayment burden grows if the forint weakens against the currency of the loan — and whether the Chinese main-contractor conditions and the quality guarantees were fair and at market level. The audit should be carried out by a body independent of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), drawing in even international experts; the ÁSZ is a controlling, not a sanctioning organ, so its findings go before the National Assembly and — in case of suspicion of a crime — the prosecution service. The 6-month deadline follows the model of the cost-benefit analysis made mandatory in the spirit of A8 — cohesion-policy accountability, and connects to the G23 — public-debt sustainability framework: a foreign-currency loan modifies the risk profile of the entire debt path.

3.3 The China relationship on an itemised benefit–risk balance, not on bloc logic (from the next contract cycle)

According to MIAK the Budapest–Belgrade lesson goes beyond the concrete line: for every significant China-related commitment, the KP21 — four-dimensional China-analysis framework should be applied. Its essence is that the decision should rest not on either pro-China or anti-China camp logic, but on four itemised aspects — economic sustainability, demographic trend, political-transitional risk, multipolar room for manoeuvre. Kissinger’s weiqi description (see 6.4.3) warns: the Chinese negotiating style is one of gradual, long-term gaining of advantage, which is why the Hungarian side must arrive at every such contract with a prior exit and renegotiation scenario, as prescribed by the KP22 — exit-strategy planning protocol.

The three proposals are bound together by a common principle: the democratic legitimacy of a strategic investment financed from public money and a foreign-currency loan stands or falls on transparency and independent verifiability. The lifting of the secrecy is its precondition, not its fulfilment — the real yardstick is what the country learns from the lifted data, and what it builds into the next contract conclusions.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Economy Actual disclosure of the return and the currency risk; more realistic debt-path planning If the figures are unfavourable, publicity may cause market and political turbulence in the short term
Society Public trust is restored: the taxpayer can see what their money goes on Partial or delayed lifting may breed cynicism as “pseudo-transparency”
Public administration A precedent for the default publicity of strategic contracts Overuse of the “national-security exception” could reproduce secrecy in other projects
Foreign policy A predictable, rule-based China relationship, less ad-hoc exposure The Chinese side may refuse consent and frame this as a diplomatic tension

The main trade-off is the pace and completeness of publicity. The proposal tips to the risk side if the lifting stalls because of a Chinese veto, or if the government publishes only the politically convenient details — then the lifting of the secrecy would paradoxically legitimise the old system. The proposal works if the Hungarian side fixes in advance which elements it makes public even unilaterally, and launches the independent audit on the already available data, independently of the Chinese approval. The currency risk is a particularly sensitive point: the repayment burden of a long-maturity loan not denominated in forints affects the budget for decades, so quantifying the risk cannot be postponed until the full lifting.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes the following performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicator) for tracking the process:

  • The share of contract elements made public relative to the full documentation — target: 100% by the conclusion of the lifting, with itemised justification in case of partiality.
  • Whether an independent, public return and currency-risk audit is made within 6 months (yes/no, with date of publication).
  • The actual start date of passenger service on the line — the first real metric of the social benefit of the investment.
  • How many of the future China-related contracts were made with the four-dimensional analysis under KP21 — target: 100% from the next cycle.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message is concise: initiating the lifting of the secrecy is a good first step, but it expects from the government full, machine-readable contract publicity and an independent return, currency-risk and contractor audit — and from the public, that it not be content with the partial gesture but hold the content to account. The China relationship should rest on an itemised benefit–risk balance, not on camp logic. The topic moves two MIAK foundational values: transparency, because the democratic legitimacy of an investment financed from public money rests on its knowability, and accountability, because publicity is only worth something if independent control and — where necessary — holding to account are joined to it. Without these two values the lifting of the secrecy would remain a mere communication act.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The economic band (Portfolio) gave the most level-headed, fact-history framing: it placed the emphasis on the technical data of the investment (line 160, Ferencváros–Kelebia, double-track, 160 km/h) and on the logic of the process, highlighting that the making public of the documentation has begun, but Chinese approval is indispensable. The liberal-left/public-affairs band (444.hu, HVG) emphasised the critical context: 444.hu called the project “the largest railway development of all time” from a classified Chinese loan, and highlighted that the previous government, citing the classified contracts, did not respond to the quality concerns. The conservative/pro-government band (Mandiner) chose the factual news frame, but recorded an important public-law fact that the other papers highlighted less: the classification was adopted by the National Assembly in 2020, on the initiative of the then government, for ten years. Népszava (liberal-left) likewise framed the news as an initiative of the Tisza government (headline-level reference only). On the whole the bands agreed on the facts; the difference was in the weighting of the responsibility context: the liberal-left band emphasised the antecedent responsibility, the conservative band the legislative background, and the economic band the technical-procedural side.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Line section Ferencváros – Kelebia border station, ~160 km, double-track, 160 km/h Portfolio, 27 June 2026
Scale of the investment ~HUF 750 billion, predominantly from a Chinese loan press summary (444.hu, 27 June 2026)
Legal basis of the secrecy a law adopted in 2020, 10-year classification Mandiner, 27 June 2026
Announcement 27 June 2026, Dávid Vitézy transport and investment minister HVG / 444.hu / Portfolio, 27 June 2026
Hungary WGI 2024 — control of corruption −0.17 World Bank WGI
Hungary WGI 2024 — government effectiveness +0.42 World Bank WGI

The 2024 values of the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) give context: the control-of-corruption indicator (−0.17) is below the international midfield, which signals precisely the governmental transparency deficit that the classified mega-investment embodies.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transport and infrastructure (programme points) — the data-based priority of railway development and the ex-post return check;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the accountability frame of contract publicity and the independent audit;
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — the four-dimensional analysis of China-related investments and the predictable, rule-based China relationship;
  • Economy (background material) — the debt-path and currency-risk aspect of the foreign-currency loan.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

Rose-Ackerman’s central thesis is that secrecy is not a side circumstance but the structural precondition of corruption: the hidden transaction erases price information and admits only the narrow circle of insiders to the playing field. She separately highlights that high-level corruption distorts project selection towards capital-intensive investments, because commissions are easier to hide on these:

„One empirical study demonstrates that high levels of corruption are associated with higher levels of public investment as a share of GDP (and lower levels of total investment and FDI). More corrupt countries spend relatively less on operations and maintenance and have lower quality infrastructure (…) They will frequently support ‘white elephant’ projects with little value in promoting economic development."

In the case of Budapest–Belgrade this framework explains why partial publicity is insufficient: as long as the full contract is secret, the investment cannot be judged on the question of whether genuine economic rationality or the logic of commission-placement governed the conditions. Full transparency is precisely what neutralises the corruption advantage of secrecy.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.2 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

Kaufmann and his co-authors break the quality of governance into six aggregate indicators, one of which is “voice and accountability” — the dimension of publicity and accountability. According to their empirical result:

„Six new aggregate measures capturing various dimensions of governance provide new evidence of a strong causal relationship from better governance to better development outcomes."

The thesis here underpins the MIAK proposal from the reverse direction: if better governance — including transparency — leads causally to better development outcomes, then a classified mega-investment is not a neutral technical solution but a governmental deficiency carrying a development cost. The authors’ methodology is at the same time the underlying measurement system of the Hungarian WGI values (including the −0.17 control of corruption), that is, the data of point 6.2 and this book come from the same research tradition.

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

6.4.3 Henry Kissinger: On China

Kissinger illustrates Chinese strategic thinking with the logic of the board game weiqi (often known in the West as “go”), contrasting it with the spirit of chess that aims at a decisive battle:

„If chess is about the decisive battle, wei qi is about the protracted campaign. (…) Wei qi teaches the art of strategic encirclement. (…) Chess produces single-mindedness; wei qi generates strategic flexibility."

This image is directly applicable to the Budapest–Belgrade case: the Chinese side’s negotiating logic is one of gradual, long-term, encircling gaining of advantage, not of a single great victory. Therefore the tying of the lifting of the secrecy to Chinese approval is not an isolated episode either, but one moment of a long game — the Hungarian side must arrive at every such contract with an itemised, pre-fixed risk–benefit balance and an exit scenario, as the China-analysis framework prescribes.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: On China

6.5 International comparison

The practical feasibility of contract publicity is illustrated by several European examples. Slovakia introduced the e-Zmluvy system in 2011, which prescribes the online publication of every state contract — in the transparent categories public-procurement prices fell on average by 5–8%. Ukraine’s ProZorro system (2016) pushed back the share of single-bid procedures from 40% to 18%, with savings on the order of USD 2 billion a year. The question of the transparency of Chinese-loan-financed infrastructure is on the agenda regionally too: several Central European and Balkan states have faced the fact that bilateral secrecy clauses make independent return checks difficult — which shows exactly why it is of strategic importance that Hungary treat the lifting as a precedent, not a one-off gesture.

Transport and infrastructure

  • KO4 — railway development with data-based priority

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A2 — public-procurement transparency
  • A8 — cohesion-policy accountability (the model of cost-benefit analysis)

Foreign policy

  • KP21 — four-dimensional China-analysis framework
  • KP22 — exit-strategy planning protocol

Economy

  • G23 — public-debt sustainability framework

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 28 June 2026 — topic 6):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: On China

Note: the local file path of the book does NOT appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transport and infrastructure (programme points; programme point ID: KO4)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A2)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP21)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 28 June 2026 — topic 6, score: 76/100

Additional public data sources (if used):

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024 — control of corruption, government effectiveness

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