Part I — Situation overview

On 25 May 2026 AP, Euractiv and Al Jazeera all reported that the United States and Iran speak of a deal “largely negotiated” to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. According to Donald Trump the agreement is “not fully negotiated yet”, and on 24 May 2026 Iran denied that it had agreed on a key question — while a supertanker had already set off through the strait. The market reacted at once: oil prices began to fall on the peace prospect, reversing the direction of last week’s energy-price shock. On the Hungarian side Portfolio and 24.hu followed the development with a dual optic, highlighting both the contradiction between the US announcement and the Iranian denial, and the traffic starting through Hormuz.

The background is last week’s chain of events: tension around the Strait of Hormuz triggered an energy-price shock that reached the whole European economy — a rise in German borrowing costs, a Brussels warning on the need for targeted energy support. A significant share of global crude-oil and liquefied-natural-gas traffic passes through the strait; its closure threatens a price shock, its reopening promises price stabilisation. The present turn is therefore not a new crisis but the possible reversal of an earlier shock — yet the outcome is uncertain, because the deal is not yet signed, and the Iranian denial signals precisely this fragility.

Hungary is an import-dependent, energy-intensive economy, so every move around Hormuz feeds directly into domestic fuel and gas prices, and through these into inflation, the forint exchange rate and industrial competitiveness. In MIAK’s reading the key question is not whether peace comes tomorrow or next week, but whether the country’s preparedness is independent of this uncertainty. A price drop is good news, but not a strategy: the real stake is that the next shock — which will certainly arrive sooner or later — reaches the Hungarian consumer less.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the scholarly framework. In The Return of Depression Economics Paul Krugman (American economist, Nobel laureate, a recognised researcher of international trade and finance) has a recurring thesis that “the good opinion of the markets is fickle” — investor confidence is fragile, yesterday’s good press does not protect against tomorrow’s confidence crisis; an external price shock shakes precisely this confidence, and drives economic policy into the dilemma between raising interest rates and devaluation. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, the analytical body of the advanced economies) in its fresh Economic Outlook also quantifies the thesis: because of the energy-price shock and the unpredictability of the Middle East conflict, global GDP growth is expected to ease to 2.9% in 2026 — that is, the real-economy price of the shock is measurable. And in World Order Henry Kissinger (American diplomat, former Secretary of State) reminds us that lasting order arises not from a single moral insight but from the balance and self-restraint among powers — a Middle East peace settlement will be as stable as it reflects that balance, not as much as an announcement promises. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that turn the peace window into lasting resilience.

3.1 Two-outcome scenario analysis (within 60 days)

MIAK proposes that the Planning Ministry and the Finance Ministry prepare, within 60 days, a public two-outcome scenario analysis: one branch modelling the impact of lasting peace and price stabilisation, the other the failure of the deal and a fresh energy-price shock. On both branches the inflationary and budgetary impact must be quantified, as well as the exposure of energy-intensive sectors and households. This is a direct application of MIAK’s G25 (energy-price-shock preparedness plan) programme point: preparedness is not reaction but forward planning. In line with the Krugman thesis (see 6.4.1) the model must explicitly handle the possibility of a confidence reversal — that market mood can switch quickly.

3.2 Targeted, not blanket energy-support framework (in the coming budget cycle)

MIAK proposes that the government build any potential energy-price compensation on a needs basis, in targeted form — in line with the European Commission’s warning that billions could be wasted if energy support is not targeted. Blanket price support is regressive: a significant part of the resources goes to the top income deciles, while the protection of those in need is diluted. The targeted model is both cheaper and fairer. This is the intersection of the G15 (countercyclical fiscal stabiliser — i.e. the rule that the state spends more in a crisis and saves in good times) and the K7 (energy-market shock resilience) programme points: an automatic compensation mechanism for the moment of the shock, but in a disciplined, targeted form.

3.3 Accelerating import diversification and renewable capacity (in the peace window)

MIAK proposes that the government use the relative price calm to structurally reduce energy dependence: to diversify supply routes and sources (LNG-terminal access, regional interconnectors), and to expand renewable capacity and the storage capacity indispensable to it. This is the essence of the K2 (energy-transition plan) and the K7 programme points — renewable expansion without storage causes grid instability, so the two must be scheduled together. On the foreign-policy side the KP8 (economic-diplomacy integration) and the KP11 (strategic balance policy) provide the frame: energy procurement should not leave Hungary at the mercy of a single route or supplier.

The three proposals are bound by a common principle: the period of cheap energy is not a goal but a tool — the window in which preparation is cheapest. The lesson of the Kissingerian balance logic is that lasting security is built not from a single piece of good news but from the conscious reduction of exposure.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Economy Oil-price drop → easing inflation, stronger forint, lower import bill The deal may collapse; a budget based on the price drop is vulnerable
Energy/climate The peace window can accelerate diversification and renewable expansion Cheap fossil energy can dampen the appetite to invest (comfort trap)
Foreign policy A more stable Middle East environment reduces Hungarian exposure The settlement is fragile; the regional balance can tip at any time

The main dilemma stretches between short-term relief and long-term preparation. The greatest risk is precisely the comfort of the price drop: if cheap energy holds back diversification and renewable investments, the next shock hits the country just as unprotected as the last. The proposal tips to the risk side where the government takes price stabilisation as cash in hand, and the scenario analysis plans only the optimistic branch. It works, by contrast, where the peace window is deliberately turned to reducing exposure — that is, where the response to good news is not relaxation but preparation.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested performance indicators — KPIs)

The following performance indicators (KPIs, i.e. indicators that show whether the measure succeeded) are suggested — worth tracking 12–24 months out:

  • Energy-import concentration: the share of crude-oil and gas imports coming from a single source/route (target: measurable decrease).
  • Growth in renewable capacity and storage capacity (target: an annual increase of several hundred MW in storage capacity under K2).
  • Existence of a standby scenario plan for both energy-price outcomes, kept up to date.
  • The targeting of energy-price compensation: what share of the support reaches households in need.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message: the price drop is good news, but preparation is the task. MIAK asks the government to use the peace window not for relaxation but for two-outcome planning, a targeted compensation framework and accelerated energy diversification; and asks the public to hold preparedness — not just the current petrol price — to account. This approach moves two MIAK foundational values: data-drivenness, because scenario analysis and the quantified impact model base the decision on facts rather than intuition, and universal representation, because the targeted, needs-based compensation protects the most vulnerable households, not those who are already doing well. Resilience does not depend on what tomorrow’s news brings, but on how prepared we are for it.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the economic lane Portfolio worked with a dual optic: in a separate piece it highlighted the Iranian denial (“Iran denies it agreed with Trump on a key question”) and the supertanker setting off through Hormuz — that is, it presented both the peace prospect and its fragility. In the public-affairs lane 24.hu and Telex placed the emphasis on the US announcement (Rubio’s forecast of a deal “within hours”, the possible reopening of the strait). In the conservative lane Magyar Nemzet and Mandiner gave a more cautious, sceptical frame — “calm before the storm”, “the agreement was postponed” — turning the uncertainty into news value.

The international sources (AP, Euractiv, Al Jazeera), by contrast, tied the event more strongly to the market and energy-policy consequences: the fall in the oil price and the European Commission’s warning about targeted energy support appeared directly. For MIAK it is exactly this linkage that matters: the news in itself is diplomatic, but from a Hungarian standpoint the stake is economic and energy-policy.

6.2 Facts and data

  • According to the OECD’s fresh outlook, global GDP growth is expected to ease to 2.9% in 2026, partly because of the energy-price shock and the Middle East conflict.
  • A significant share of global crude-oil and liquefied-natural-gas traffic passes through the Strait of Hormuz — the state of the strait is direct world-market price data.
  • Hungary is an import-dependent, energy-intensive economy: 2025 annual inflation was 4.3% according to the KSH (Central Statistical Office), on which energy-price volatility has a direct effect.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Economy (programme points) — energy-price-shock preparedness, the countercyclical stabiliser and inflation management are the main emphasis;
  • Environment and climate (programme points) — energy-market shock resilience, the energy transition and storage capacity;
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — economic diplomacy and strategic balance policy in energy procurement.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Paul Krugman: The Return of Depression Economics

Krugman’s recurring idea is that market confidence is fragile and fickle: regarding the Mexican “tequila crisis” he warns that “the good opinion of the markets is fickle, today’s good press does not insulate from tomorrow’s confidence crisis” (paraphrase following the author’s analysis). An external price shock shakes precisely this confidence, and drives economic policy into the dilemma between raising interest rates (which curbs demand) and devaluation. In the case of the Hungarian energy-price-shock reversal this means: the fall in the oil price improves the mood, but the mood can quickly turn back if the deal collapses — therefore preparation must build not on the optimistic scenario but on the possibility of a confidence reversal.

📖 Source: Paul Krugman: The Return of Depression Economics

6.4.2 OECD: Economic Outlook — Testing Resilience

The OECD’s fresh assessment frames 2026 as a “test of resilience” and also quantifies the price of the shock: “global GDP growth is expected to ease to 2.9% in 2026 before rising to 3.0% in 2027”, as “the rise in energy prices and the unpredictability of the Middle East conflict raise costs and reduce demand”. According to the report, the median inflation expectation has also risen in the wake of the energy-price jump. For the Hungarian economy this means: the shock has a measurable real-economy price, and reducing exposure — not merely waiting out the temporary price drop — is the appropriate response.

📖 Source: OECD: Economic Outlook — Testing Resilience (2026)

6.4.3 Henry Kissinger: World Order

In analysing the Westphalian peace system, Kissinger shows that lasting order arises not from a single moral insight but from the balance among powers: the system “was built on independent states, which refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs and check each other’s ambitions through a general balance of power” (paraphrase following the author’s analysis). A peace settlement is therefore as lasting as it reflects that balance. In the case of the Middle East deal and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz this counsels caution: an announcement is not yet order; the stability of a supply route depends on the balance of power behind it, which can tip at any time — therefore Hungarian energy policy must not bet on the durability of a single settlement.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: World Order

6.5 International comparison

Energy diversification and targeted compensation are proven European practice: in the context of the current shock the European Commission again argued expressly for targeted energy support, warning that blanket support is wasteful. Regional interconnectors, access to LNG terminals and the expansion of renewable capacity are the backbone of several EU member states’ resilience strategies too — these are operational realisations of MIAK’s K7 shock-resilience programme point.

Economy

  • G25 — Energy-price-shock preparedness plan
  • G15 — Countercyclical fiscal stabiliser

Environment and climate

  • K7 — Energy-market shock resilience
  • K2 — Energy-transition plan
  • K8 — Electric-transport transition strategy

Foreign policy

  • KP8 — Economic-diplomacy integration
  • KP11 — Strategic balance policy
  • KP4 — Principle-based pragmatism doctrine

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 25 May 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Paul Krugman: The Return of Depression Economics
  • 📖 OECD: Economic Outlook — Testing Resilience (2026)
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: World Order

Note: the visible text of the blog does not show the books’ local file path — only the author and title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G25)
  • MIAK policy area: Environment and climate (programme points; programme point ID: K7)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP11)
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 25 May 2026 — topic 1, score: 88/100

Additional public data sources:

  • OECD Economic Outlook (2026) — energy-price and growth path
  • IEA Oil Market Report — oil-market data
  • KSH energy-price statistics, MNB inflation report

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