Part I — Situation overview

In the final months of the outgoing Orbán government — two months before the April 2026 election — the then minister for science and higher education, Balázs Hankó, signed a HUF 261 billion state support contract with the Élvonal Research Institute Foundation led by Nobel-laureate physicist Ferenc Krausz. The support was based on the foundation’s tailored project portfolio, without a substantive tender procedure or prior professional evaluation. Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced on 15 May 2026 — on the weekend following the day the new government took office — that the government is terminating the contract on the ground of irregularity. The next day, on 16 May 2026, Technology Minister Zoltán Tanács, in a statement and in several press interviews, justified the decision: the HUF 261 bn commitment was a single-person discretionary decision, in the absence of a public, competitive tender frame; the use of such an amount is legitimate only with verifiable professional evaluation and multi-actor decision.

In statements to ATV and Mandiner, former minister Balázs Hankó claims that the termination is “pure political persecution”, and that it is substantively irregular, because the contract is backed by a government decision. According to the Tisza government’s position, the lack of a government decision is exactly the problem: a commitment of this profile, which channels the R&D block of the annual budget through 2027 to a single beneficiary, was not controlled either by the parliamentary or by the independent professional evaluation chain. Former MTA president László Lovász formulated a measured position in the 444.hu article: the scientific quality of the Krausz team is unquestionable, and the goal of the support might be useful in itself, but “he does not see through the budget” — there is a problem with the sequencing of Hungarian research funding as a whole, not with this one researcher. The 444.hu report “What did Balázs Hankó promise HUF 261 billion for?” goes through in detail what the money would have been spent on: the four-pillar programme of the Élvonal project (attosecond physics, quantum technology, medical imaging development, biotechnology) is in itself a substantiated set of topics — but precisely for this reason it would be important that it receive its funding through a public, peer-review-based, multi-actor decision.

MIAK’s reading: the character of the case is not the research value of the Krausz team, but the manner of public-money distribution. The basic problem is the lack of transparency and the wave of commitments in the final weeks of an electoral cycle; the solution is, alongside the termination, the construction of a structural, competitive R&D-funding framework, which recognises excellence in a rule-following way.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

The interpretive framework of the topic rests on three professional sources. Robert Klitgaard’s Controlling Corruption (1988) introduces the C = M + D − A formula: corruption (C) flourishes where monopoly (M) and discretionary authority (D) meet a lack of accountability (A) — a single, no-public-tender contract of HUF 261 bn signed at the end of an electoral cycle is affected in all three dimensions. Susan Rose-Ackerman, in Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (1999), separates the systemic consequences of rent-seeking research funding (rent-seeking research grants) and the peer-review-based competitive system: the rent-seeking model reduces average research efficiency even if the beneficiary is excellent. Andreas Schleicher’s World Class — How to build a 21st-century school system (2018) shows, with OECD-level comparative samples, why competitive, multi-year, peer-review-based R&D funding produces better and fairer results — it analyses the examples of Singapore, Estonia and Finland. The detailed literature discussion can be found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that, alongside the termination, build a solid replacement system — so that researcher excellence is not harmed, and so that transparency does not remain just a communications promise.

3.1 Professional conversion of the Élvonal portfolio with a competitive framework (within 60 days)

After the termination, the original four-pillar theme of the HUF 261 bn (attosecond physics, quantum technology, medical imaging development, biotechnology) should not disappear, but be converted into four standalone, public, internationally peer-reviewed tender calls. Each call should (i) offer a multi-year (5–7 years) frame budget, (ii) allow consortium applications (university + academic research institute + industrial partner), (iii) run an independent international evaluation panel (at least 50% foreign reviewers), and (iv) be available to every Hungarian research institute and university. The Krausz team can also submit its own project, but fitting into the competitive system — the scientific value is thereby verified transparently. This is the direct application of G4 (innovation ecosystem) and O3 (data-driven education development).

3.2 Procurement moratorium for the closing phase of the electoral cycle (legislative package within 90 days)

In the 90 days before the election, every individual support contract above HUF 500 million and every procurement commitment above HUF 1 billion should be moved into a mandatory suspended-effect phase: the contract can enter into force at the earliest on the 60th day after the election, and only if the new government — or, if the old one stays, the same government, with a new parliamentary confirmation — maintains it after evaluation by a professional panel. This is not retroactive; it applies to cycles starting from the day of the election. Direct extension of A2 (procurement transparency) and A6 (strengthening of checks and balances).

3.3 Public R&D-portfolio dashboard (within 12 months)

The entire portfolio of Hungarian state R&D funding (NKFIH, Élvonal-like calls, MTA supports, academic research-institute operations) should appear on a single, machine-queryable public dashboard. The interface should show, at project level, the awarded amount, the research place, the responsible researcher, the composition of the peer-review panel, the thematic classification, the indicator commitments, and the interim performance. This is the R&D-specific application of A1 (public-money dashboard) — a direct link to the public-money dashboard of the 3rd topic, but with science-policy detail.

The three proposals together draw a single principle: the termination will be right in the long term only if a replacement system is built alongside it. By Klitgaard’s formula this is the reduction of D (discretionary authority) and the increase of A (accountability) at the same time.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Research and development The competitive system results, in the medium and long term, in a larger concentration of resources on actual excellence; wider access for young researchers In the transition period (6–12 months before 3.1) a financing gap may emerge; some projects could suffer real damage if 3.1 slips
Public finances HUF 261 bn can be redirected into a public tender frame; annual budgetary headroom grows Litigation (Hankó’s irregularity claim) may drag on, legal cost and transitional uncertainty
Scientific public life The peer-review framework builds trust; the share of international cooperation grows The “political persecution” narrative (Hankó/Mandiner) divides the research community; the emotional attachment around the Krausz person may overshadow the structural debate
International optics From the EU point of view, the KP17 issue-based coalition-building strengthens (a direct signal to the Commission) If 3.1 does not start quickly, Hungarian science enters the international press with a “self-destructive” image
Public administration The 3.2 pre-election moratorium institutionally reduces the “end-of-cycle commitment wave” — structural improvement The legislative package (3.2) requires parliamentary debate, and in the next electoral cycle may fall back under the old rule if not at cardinal-law level

The key dilemma is the balance between speed and replacement. If the termination is faster than the 3.1 call publication, researcher projects may be damaged in the transition phase. If 3.1 is slow, the political narrative (“they are dismantling science”) may strengthen. The timing must be closely coordinated.

Part V — Measurability and conclusion

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed performance indicators — KPIs)

MIAK proposes four indicators to monitor over the next 12 months:

  • Share of competitive calls within state R&D spending: reaches 60% within one year (currently ~35%, OECD MSTI estimate). Data source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators + NKFIH annual report.
  • R&D spending as a share of GDP: the 2027 commitment should not fall because of the transition year — the level above 1.4% is to be maintained. Data source: Eurostat GERD time series.
  • International tender participation of the Krausz team (ERC, Horizon Europe): at least two new consortium or individual applications within 12 months. Data source: ERC + Horizon Europe tender register.
  • Professional panel of new competitive calls: for the four calls under 3.1, at least 50% foreign reviewers, institutional conflict-of-interest-freedom documented. Data source: NKFIH call publication.

NOTE: these are proposed, worth-tracking indicators, not a government decision — MIAK draws up the framework of independent monitoring.

5.2 Conclusion

The termination of the HUF 261 billion contract is not a victory in itself — only a window. MIAK’s request to the government: do not leave the window standing empty; the 3.1 four competitive calls should launch within 60 days, and the scientific value of the Krausz team should be shown again in the public tender system. The request to the public: do not let the case stop at the “Tisza or Hankó — whom do we believe” level — the structural question (peer-review-based R&D funding) is the one that affects the reader’s own tax payment.

The case activates two MIAK foundational values at once: transparency (the distribution of every forint of public money is public, can be applied for and can be debated) and data-drivenness (excellence rests on objectively measurable indicators, not on personal discretion) are natural parts of this regime change. The two values are operational here: without them, the termination is only a negative act, without a built-in system in their place.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by media spectrum

The liberal-left band (Telex, 444.hu, HVG, Népszava) discusses the case in a structural transparency frame: 444.hu’s report “What did Balázs Hankó promise HUF 261 billion for?” also presents the professional details of the four-pillar programme, and reports former MTA president László Lovász’s balanced position; Telex’s Hankó article also clashes the “irregular contract break” argument with the transparency frame. The public-affairs / economic band (24.hu, Portfolio, ATV) emphasises the technical-procedural side: Portfolio reports the legal details of the government-decision background, and 24.hu reports Zoltán Tanács’s detailed justification in interview form. The conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) chooses the “persecution narrative” frame: Mandiner’s Hankó quote with the headline “they want to terminate purely for political reasons”, Magyar Nemzet targets the person of the new science minister. None of the conservative-band articles substantively discusses that the HUF 261 bn contract was concluded two months before the election, without a tender procedure — this argumentation gap is itself a telling signal.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Amount of the terminated contract: HUF 261 billion (several sources), sometimes 262 billion; the main figure is 261.
  • Time of signing: about two months before the 12 April 2026 election (444.hu report).
  • Original topics: four pillars — attosecond physics, quantum technology, medical imaging development, biotechnology (444.hu).
  • Hungarian R&D spending as a share of GDP, 2023: 1.4% (Eurostat GERD). EU average: 2.28%. OECD average: 2.72%.
  • Estimated share of competitive tenders within state R&D spending around 2024: ~30–35% (based on OECD MSTI).
  • The Krausz team’s Nobel-prize-winning result: experimental generation of attosecond light pulses (Ferenc Krausz — Pierre Agostini, Anne L’Huillier, 2023 Nobel Prize in Physics).
  • Cited legal framework: general public-procurement and public-finance regulation; conditions of sole-source contracting.

6.3 Policy projections

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — A1 Public-money dashboard, A2 Procurement transparency, A6 Strengthening of checks and balances (programme point ID: A1, A2, A6);
  • Education (programme points) — O3 Data-driven education development, O8 Performance-based teacher motivation (programme point ID: O3, O8);
  • Economy (programme points) — G4 Innovation ecosystem and active development policy, G11 Disruptive innovation protection (programme point ID: G4, G11).

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

American economist-sociologist Robert Klitgaard introduces the C = M + D − A formula in his 1988 foundational work: the corruption probability (Corruption) is proportional to the product of M (Monopoly) and D (Discretion); A (Accountability) reduces it. Klitgaard goes through the public-money-distribution systems of developing and developed countries, and in every case shows that discretionary sole-source contracting — especially toward a central government with a large monopoly position — simultaneously increases M and D. According to Klitgaard’s argument, the termination can be of two kinds: either it is aimed at reducing D (in the next cycle there will be no such individual contract again), or at increasing A (public audit, peer-review). MIAK’s 3.1–3.3 proposal answers both.

“Corruption flourishes where monopoly and discretionary authority meet a lack of accountability. The path to reducing corruption is not moralising but structural transformation.” (paraphrase)

In the Hungarian Élvonal case this means: the criticism is not directed at the person of Krausz, but at the contracting mechanism, which was problematic in all three variables M, D and A.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption (1988).

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

American jurist-economist Susan Rose-Ackerman’s 1999 work systematises the link between rent-seeking behaviour and government public-money distribution. Rose-Ackerman argues that the cleanest form of research-and-development fund-raising is the peer-review-based competitive tender, because this minimises rent-seeking behaviour and maximises research efficiency. Where the state gives large R&D support through a sole-source contract, the average yield falls at the system level, regardless of how excellent the beneficiary is — the distortion comes from the fact that adapters (“those who can talk to ministers”), and not the best researchers, win.

“Peer-review-based competitive tendering is not only fair but also more efficient — rent-seeking behaviour eats up the resource at the system level, even if the given beneficiary is excellent.” (paraphrase)

In the Hungarian Élvonal case this means: the excellence of Krausz’s research is not an argument for awarding HUF 261 bn without a tender — on the contrary, the excellence would be more clearly demonstrable in a competitive tender.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (1999).

6.4.3 Andreas Schleicher: World Class — How to build a 21st-century school system

German-Swiss economist Andreas Schleicher, OECD director of education and science policy, in his 2018 work goes through the best-performing education and science systems. He highlights three model countries: Singapore’s Research, Innovation and Enterprise (RIE) programme redistributes the R&D portfolio every five years through competitive tendering, and ranks with international peer-review; Estonia’s Centres of Excellence programme gives a seven-year frame contract to the winning consortia of the competition, and every interim report is public; Finland’s Academy of Finland annual calls apply a three-stage evaluation (prior, panel, on-site). As a common point Schleicher identifies: all three countries make every R&D contract over one million euros a compulsory subject of competitive tendering, and there is no “commitment wave” at the closing phase of the electoral cycle.

“Competitive, multi-year, peer-review-based R&D funding is not an option but a precondition of research quality — the rent-seeking model is not sustainable even if the beneficiary is genuinely excellent.” (paraphrase)

The Hungarian 3.1 call package can take a direct example from the Singaporean RIE four-year cyclical model.

📖 Source: Andreas Schleicher: World Class — How to build a 21st-century school system (OECD, 2018).

6.5 International comparison (where relevant)

Two EU examples illustrate the operational lessons of the books in 6.4. Germany (DFG — Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft): all R&D support is competitive, peer-review-based; the Excellence Strategy programme offers a 7-year frame budget to winning clusters with international evaluation panels; the transparency data are public at the project level. European Research Council (ERC): fixed, transparent evaluation cycle every three years; Hungarian researchers’ ERC participation share is below the EU average (~0.8% of EU-level support, while the population share is ~2.1%) — exactly the kind of structural under-use that a reform of the state R&D system could turn around. Both examples realise the Schleicher-model competitive, multi-year, peer-review triad at the operational level.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A2 — Procurement transparency
  • A6 — Strengthening of checks and balances
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)

Education

  • O3 — Data-driven education development
  • O8 — Performance-based teacher motivation

Economy

  • G4 — Innovation ecosystem and active development policy
  • G11 — Disruptive innovation protection

Suggested new programme point: Procurement and large sole-source contract moratorium for the closing phase of the electoral cycle (T-90 days) — with suspended effect, for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 16 May 2026 — 2nd topic):

Knowledge-base references (professional books):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption (1988)
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (1999)
  • 📖 Andreas Schleicher: World Class — How to build a 21st-century school system (OECD, 2018)

MIAK-internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A2, A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Education (programme points; programme point ID: O3)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G4, G11)
  • MIAK press monitor, 16 May 2026 — 2nd topic, score: 81/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Eurostat — GERD time series (rd_e_gerdtot)
  • OECD — Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI)
  • NKFIH — annual report and tender-call archive
  • ERC — Funded Projects database

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