Part I — Situation overview

On 11 May 2026, in his first parliamentary speech, Prime Minister Péter Magyar publicly called on those public-law dignitaries “who were servants of the previous regime” to resign — including President Tamás Sulyok, the presidents of the Constitutional Court and the Curia, the Prosecutor General, the presidents of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), the Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH), the Media Authority and the National Judicial Office (OBH). The deadline is 31 May. The next day, the press offices of the GVH and the Prosecutor General publicly reacted: neither institution intends to resign.

The GVH’s reply explicitly referred to the legal framework: “The president of the Hungarian Competition Authority is bound by oath to perform his official service (…) he cannot be instructed in his functions, and he carries out his task separately from other bodies, free from influence.” The authority also drew attention to Article 4 of the ECN+ directive of the European Parliament and Council (2019/1), which makes the independence of national competition authorities mandatory for EU member states. Csaba Balázs Rigó, president of the GVH, began his second six-year presidential mandate on 15 April 2026; in December 2025 he was elected vice-chair of the bureau of the OECD Competition Committee.

The Prosecutor General referred back to a recent interview by Prosecutor General Gábor Bálint Nagy, in which he explained: he wishes to continue the professional work already begun, he never felt political pressure, and he can only take responsibility for cases from the period following his election. MIAK’s reading: a public, deadline-bound call to resign from the new prime minister, directed at independent office-holders appointed by Parliament and protected by statutory terms of office, raises a constitutional double standard — and clarifying this is a structural, not a rhetorical question.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth setting out the scientific frame in which the topic can be interpreted. In Controlling Corruption (1988), Robert Klitgaard argues: corruption thrives where monopoly and discretion (room for judgement) meet with a lack of accountability — captured by the C = M + D − A formula. From his argument it follows directly: anti-corruption institutions (prosecution, competition authority) are strong precisely because they operate independently of the executive’s discretion. Susan Rose-Ackerman’s Corruption and Government (1999) embeds Klitgaard’s thesis in a political-economy frame: the primary task of independent institutions is to provide control against the potential abuses of executive power, and so relativising their independence directly raises the risk of corruption. Alexis de Tocqueville, in Democracy in America (1835/1840), argues that one of the primary conditions for the stability of democracy is governmental self-restraint: the executive holding a majority mandate must voluntarily refrain from operational influence over independent institutions, because these checks are the antidotes to the tyranny of the majority. The detailed literature discussion can be found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures so that the credibility debate about independent institutions does not be decided along political lines, but in a rule-of-law frame.

3.1 Parliamentary inquiry committee on the operation of the GVH and the prosecution (within 30 days)

Within the framework of the existing constitutional procedure (Article 7 of the Fundamental Law + Act XVII of 2014 on inquiry committees), Parliament should set up a parliamentary inquiry committee on the operation of both institutions over the past 6 years (since the start of the Rigó mandate). The committee’s task: document analysis, hearings, a public report on patterns indicating political influence (e.g. non-initiated investigations, internal directive instructions, appointment policy). The committee should operationalise the Klitgaard (see 6.4.1) C = M + D − A formula: it should document the concrete points where A (accountability) is lacking. The report should also include legislative amendment proposals. Responsible: the Parliament’s Justice and Constitutional Affairs Committee + the Budget and Finance Committee acting as a joint inquiry committee.

3.2 Preparation of the establishment of an Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office (within 90 days)

The legal-institutional draft for the Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office (Singapore CPIB model, see 6.4.2 reference frame), as set out in the A10 programme point, should be submitted to Parliament within 90 days. The office would report directly to the prime minister — but be independent in operation, and able to investigate any public official or politician. Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore model shows: an office set up by the cabinet but substantively autonomous is the most effective form for speeding up corruption proceedings, without weakening the Prosecutor General by political call. So the two institutions are not rivals but complementary.

3.3 Institutional independence index and annual public report (launch within 60 days, first edition within 12 months)

The methodological development of the institutional independence index, as set out in the A6 programme point, should be completed within 60 days; the first annual report should be published by 1 May 2027. Index metrics: the share of substantive decisions taken against the government, the political composition of the appointing body, the degree of budgetary independence, decision-making throughput time, the number of positions held in international professional organisations (OECD, EU bodies). The Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office, the GVH, the Prosecutor General, the ombudsman, the Media Authority and the OBH all feature in the report. In a Tocquevillian (see 6.4.3) sense, this creates a measurable framework for governmental self-restraint: not a rhetorical pledge, but a data table published annually and usable in public debate.

The shared principle of the three proposals: the systemic problem with independent institutions can be handled in a rule-of-law frame — inquiry committee, founding of a new office, measurable index. With these, the executive too gains control channels, without having to rely on a political call to resign. Otherwise, the precedent risk is greatest here: if the new government replaces independent institutions with its own political word, the next government will do the same.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Law The parliamentary inquiry committee creates a fact-based debate; the index reduces the possibility of “step-by-step” political extortion. The inquiry committee may drag on, and the government may lose political momentum in pursuing corruption cases.
Politics Péter Magyar loses the quick, dramatic removal option — in exchange he gets a constitutionally protected institutional reform package, which the next government cannot reverse with simple political word. Rhetorical force toward the voter base may weaken (“why doesn’t Rigó resign right now?”).
Economy The stabilising institutional frame of the GVH and the prosecution improves investor judgement — Hungary’s international competitiveness and rule-of-law indices converge toward the EU average. In the short term investors may be sceptical of the debate — every seventh day a fresh “Brussels warning” narrative may cut across the new cabinet’s communication.

The essence of the dilemma: the political call to resign is quick, but structurally unstable; the constitutional reform package is slower, but cumulative in effect. The proposal tips toward the risk side if the government fails to launch the inquiry committee within 30 days, and the debate about independent institutions is pushed into the political ring.

Part V — Measurability and conclusion

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

The performance indicators (KPIs) are proposed for the following 12-24-month time window:

  • Parliamentary inquiry committee set up by 11 June 2026, first public report by 1 September 2026.
  • The legal-institutional draft of the Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office in the CPIB model is submitted to Parliament by 10 August 2026.
  • Institutional independence index methodology completed by 12 July 2026, first annual report published by 1 May 2027.
  • Avoidance of the resignation-call precedent: by 31 December 2026 the new government publicly commits to settling the terms of office of the heads of independent institutions only in a statutory frame.

5.2 Summary

MIAK calls on Prime Minister Péter Magyar and his government: any possible replacement of the heads of the Hungarian Competition Authority and the Prosecutor General should be handled not through a political call, but in the framework of a parliamentary inquiry committee, a new office in the CPIB model and an institutional independence index. This package of proposals directly affects two of MIAK’s foundational values: checks and balances (the constitutional role of independent institutions) and accountability (compliance with rule-of-law procedures) — and the sustained enforcement of precisely these foundational values is what distinguishes a democratic transition from a “newly coloured” concentration of power.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by media spectrum

In the liberal-left and public-affairs strand (Telex, HVG, 24.hu) the emphasis was on the legal-constitutional frame: Telex quoted in detail the GVH’s reference to the ECN+ directive and Csaba Balázs Rigó’s OECD position; HVG highlighted the text of the independent institutions’ statement; 24.hu contextualised the recent interview of the Prosecutor General. HVG also reported in a separate article: a former communications director of Tamás Sulyok filed a public-interest notification at the Prosecutor General — this is the other side of the topic (prior internal involvement in the NER legacy). The business (Portfolio) and conservative (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) strands did not pick up this topic at top level in the 12 May run — Magyar Nemzet and Mandiner handled the central narrative of cabinet formation. This spectrum asymmetry is in itself a warning sign: the issue of institutional independence did not receive an interpretive frame from a conservative optic, even though NER criticism could be a thread leading into it.

6.2 Facts and data

Indicator Value Source
Start of Csaba Balázs Rigó’s second mandate 15 April 2026 GVH official communiqué, Telex 11 May 2026
Independence basis of GVH (EU law) Article 4 of the ECN+ directive EU Parliament and Council Directive 2019/1
OECD position Vice-chair of the bureau of the Competition Committee (December 2025) OECD Bureau of the Competition Committee
Resignation deadline (Péter Magyar’s call) 31 May 2026 Péter Magyar’s parliamentary speech, 10 May 2026
Constitutional basis (prosecution) Article 29 of the Fundamental Law Fundamental Law of Hungary, current text

6.3 Policy projections

  • Legal foundations (background material) — prosecution as an autonomous constitutional body (Article 29 of the Fundamental Law), GVH as an autonomous competition supervisory authority.
  • Justice (background material) — differentiation of judicial independence and the autonomous prosecutorial organisation, programme point I4.
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — Checks and balances (A6), Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office (A10).

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard’s C = M + D − A formula is a structural model of corruption risk: where monopolistic (M) position and discretionary (D) authority meet with a lack of accountability (A), systemic corruption appears. From the formula it follows directly that the institutional role of the competition authority and prosecution is exactly to strengthen M (monopoly control) and A (accountability) — which is a potential counterweight to executive power. If these institutions can be replaced under political pressure, the A factor in the formula decreases, and systemic corruption risk rises immediately.

“Corruption depends on monopoly power, discretion, and the lack of accountability. Reducing any of these will reduce corruption.” (Klitgaard, 1988, Chapter 3)

In the Hungarian GVH–Prosecution debate this means: replacing the heads of the two institutions by political call increases long-term corruption risk, even if the reason for replacement seems legitimate in the short term. The solution in the Klitgaard frame: structural strengthening of the A factor (accountability) — e.g. a parliamentary inquiry committee, an institutional independence index.

📖 Source: Klitgaard, Robert: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman embeds Klitgaard’s formula in a political-economy context: she points out that independent institutions — particularly the prosecution and the competition authority — are the primary tools for controlling executive power, and relativising their independence is in every case a weakening of political accountability.

“Independent agencies that monitor government activity are essential to controlling corruption. Their independence from political pressure is not a bureaucratic nicety, but a structural prerequisite.” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, Chapter 9)

In the Hungarian context, this thesis directly affects the question of the GVH and the prosecution: their independence should not be aligned with the political strength of the executive — not even if the calling politician’s electoral support is high. The structural prerequisite in the Rose-Ackerman sense means: it cannot be decided on ad-hoc political consideration, but is fixed in a constitutional and statutory frame.

📖 Source: Rose-Ackerman, Susan: Corruption and Government

6.4.3 Tocqueville: Democracy in America

In his early 19th-century work, Tocqueville argues: one of the main dangers to the stability of democracy is the tyranny of the majority — the executive backed by majority authorisation tends to suppress independent institutions and minority opinions. The culture of governmental self-restraint — the conscious respect for checks and balances — is the condition for the lasting functioning of democracy.

“The majority therefore in that country exercises a prodigious actual authority, and a moral influence which is scarcely less preponderant; no obstacles exist which can impede or even retard its progress, so as to make it heed the complaints of those whom it crushes upon its path.” (Tocqueville, 1835, Vol. I, Chapter XV)

In light of the Tisza government’s 70% mandate, this Tocquevillian thesis takes on particular relevance: precisely now, at the beginning of the governmental cycle, the new government has the greatest political weight over independent institutions — and therefore it must prove now that it can enforce governmental self-restraint. If the government handles institutional independence by political call, this weakens not only the current institutions but also the culture of governmental self-restraint — and in the long term its own system of controls.

📖 Source: Tocqueville, Alexis de: Democracy in America

6.5 International comparison

  • EU ECN+ Directive (2019/1): the independence of national competition authorities is fixed in EU law — member states cannot dispose of the head of the competition authority as political topicality demands. Concrete case-law precedent: the Polish UOKiK case (2021).
  • Singapore CPIB model: Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau is directly subordinated to the prime minister but operationally independent, and is one of the foundational institutions of the Lee Kuan Yew meritocratic model.
  • Italy (CSM and the Antimafia prosecutor’s office): the independent prosecutorial structure (CSM = Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura) was deliberately made autonomous from 1959 onwards, as a lesson learnt from the fall of fascist-era political influence.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A10 — Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)
  • A14 — International institutional participation and accountability

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 12 May 2026 — top 2 topic):

Knowledge-base references (professional books):

  • 📖 Klitgaard, Robert: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Rose-Ackerman, Susan: Corruption and Government
  • 📖 Tocqueville, Alexis de: Democracy in America

MIAK-internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Legal foundations (background material — Article 29 of the Fundamental Law; Article 4 of the ECN+ directive)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A10, A14)
  • MIAK press monitor, 12 May 2026 — 2nd topic, score: 92/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • European Commission annual Rule of Law report (Country Chapter — Hungary)
  • ÁSZ reports database
  • GRECO (Group of States against Corruption) evaluation reports
  • OLAF annual reports
  • Transparency International CPI

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