Part I — Situation overview

By the 12 June 2026 issue of Magyar Közlöny (the official gazette), Prime Minister Péter Magyar dismissed with immediate effect all four chiefs of the large intelligence services, as well as the director-general of the Constitution Protection Office (AH — the national security service responsible for internal, constitution-protection counter-intelligence), Szabolcs Bárdos; by the press, the appointment of new professional leadership is under way (Péter Buda is being placed in a position responsible for professional leadership alongside national-security chief adviser Péter Tóth). The precision of the public-law frame matters here: the national security services come under the executive power, under prime-ministerial or ministerial direction — the dismissal of their chiefs is a decision published in Magyar Közlöny, a personnel competence of the executive power, not a statutory act, and must not be confused with the judiciary (the courts) or the independent constitutional bodies (e.g. the prosecution service).

The topic stands out from the daily news flow because it is not a single change, but a simultaneous change of the whole national-security leadership corps — at the head of the four services and the AH. This makes it one of the substantive tests of the change of government as to whether the rearrangement of power points towards professional, depoliticised operation or merely changes the political colour of the leaders. The services — precisely because of their secrecy and their special instruments — are the most sensitive parts of the executive power: the quality of the control exercised over them is one of the gauges of the entire rule-of-law structure.

In MIAK’s reading, the change of leaders is in itself neither good nor bad: the replacement of a service chief is a legitimate instrument of the executive power, and the question of leadership trust is a legitimate consideration. But the lasting result is given not by the departure of persons, but by the rule-based and depoliticised selection system that follows them, and by the strengthened, multiparty parliamentary control over the services. The character of the problem is therefore institutional, not personal: the stake is whether the change leads towards depoliticisation or merely another mapping of the political cycle.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. The work Governance Matters (1999) by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón (governance researchers at the World Bank) captures the quality of governance in six measurable dimensions — among them political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law — and shows that institutional quality causally improves development outcomes; from this it follows that a change of leaders is justified not by loyalty but by a measurable improvement in institutional quality. John Locke (English philosopher, the founding thinker of liberal state theory), in his Second Treatise of Government (1690), describes political power as a trust (a fiduciary authorisation) exercised for the common good, to be exercised by fixed, promulgated, known rules, not by the arbitrary will of those in power — from which, as regards the services, it follows that they serve the constitutional order and the community, not the leader of the day. From the two sources together MIAK’s frame emerges: the national-security transformation succeeds if it moves power towards fixed, rule-based, depoliticised operation, and if it makes its quality measurable — not if it merely changes the political colour of the leaders. The detailed literature treatment can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that make the “what comes instead” question after the change of leadership rule-based and depoliticised.

3.1 Merit-based, public, security-screening-bound selection for the service top posts

MIAK, by the KI7 (Civil-servant selection and rotation system) programme point, proposes that the filling of national-security top posts happen along pre-fixed, public competence criteria and a mandatory, pre-appointment security screening. In the Locke frame (see 6.4.2) this directly realises the principle of “fixed, known rules, not arbitrary will”: it is the executive power’s right to choose a leader, but the logic of selection should be transparent and professional, not political loyalty. The responsible parties are the appointing Prime Minister or minister and the legislator regulating the national-security personnel order; the measure does not limit the right of dismissal, but makes the filling of new leaders accountable.

3.2 Strengthened, multiparty parliamentary control over the services

The change of leaders is an occasion for control to be strengthened beyond the change of persons. MIAK, by the A6 (Strengthening checks and balances) programme point, proposes strengthening the powers of the parliamentary National Security Committee: substantive information and investigation rights accessible to the opposition too, a regular reporting obligation and an independent review of the use of special instruments. In the Kaufmann frame (see 6.4.1) this is the strengthening of the “voice and accountability” dimension: the quality of democratic control over the services is a measurable institutional factor. Thus the accountability of the services depends not on the person of the leader of the day, but on institutional guarantees. The responsible party is the legislator; the timeframe is the legislative cycle.

3.3 Depoliticised operation and professional continuity alongside the change

MIAK proposes that the change of the entire leadership corps be not the mere mapping of the political cycle, but professional renewal: in the selection of the new leadership, the professional career path and independence should be the yardstick, and the operational continuity of the services (the undisturbed running of ongoing national-security tasks) should be ensured by transitional guarantees. The goal is not a change of direction in politicisation, but depoliticised operation serving exclusively the constitutional order — in line with the logic of KI7 and A6. Legal precision matters here too: the services come under the executive power, dismissal is a prime-ministerial/ministerial competence — this must not be confused with judicial independence or the independent constitutional role of the prosecution service.

The common principle of the three proposals is that they shift the emphasis from the who departs question to the by what system the successor arrives and under what control they operate question. Dismissal is a legitimate instrument of power; depoliticisation is realised if selection, control and accountability are rule-based — not a daily function of political will. This is what binds the proposals to the literature frame of Part II: power must not only be taken over, it must be placed under fixed rules and measurable control.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Public administration Merit-based, screening-bound service-leader selection If only the political colour changes, the promise of depoliticisation is hollowed out
National security Strengthened, multiparty parliamentary control and operational continuity The simultaneous change of the entire leadership corps may cause a transitional operational risk and a gap in professional continuity
Society / rule of law Strengthening democratic accountability over the services Weak control over special instruments may create the appearance of depoliticisation without real guarantees

The main point to weigh is whether the transformation touches the system or only the personnel. A simultaneous, comprehensive change of leaders is fast and spectacular, but if it is not followed by rule-based, depoliticised selection and strengthened parliamentary control, then the services remain just as much instruments of the executive power of the day — only the hand changes. The proposals tip towards the risk side if, under the slogan of “professionalism”, a new, one-directional loyalty is in fact built; that is why MIAK holds the hardest condition to be public, merit-based selection and the strengthening of the opposition powers of the National Security Committee.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK considers the following suggested performance indicators (KPIs, i.e. numerical indicators that show whether the measure has succeeded) worth tracking:

  • Whether the new service chiefs are selected on the basis of public, pre-fixed professional criteria and a mandatory security screening.
  • Whether the parliamentary National Security Committee gets substantive information and investigation powers accessible to the opposition too.
  • Whether an independent review of the use of special (covert information-gathering) instruments operates, and how regularly it reports.
  • The development of Hungary’s ranking on the political-stability and government-effectiveness dimensions of the World Bank’s governance indicators (WGI).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message — to decision-makers and the public alike — is that the national-security change of leaders should be measured not by the fact of dismissal, but by what comes after it: public, merit-based, screening-bound selection, strengthened, multiparty parliamentary control and operational continuity. The concrete request to the legislator and the government is that it lay down these rule-based guarantees alongside the change — otherwise the transformation merely reverses the political sign. The topic engages two MIAK foundational values most of all: accountability, because democratic, parliamentary control over the services working with covert instruments is one of the gauges of the rule of law, and ideology-free operation, because the services must serve the constitutional order and the community’s security, not a single political side.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The announcement appeared across the entire domestic media palette, with differing emphases. The conservative band (Magyar Nemzet) placed the fact and the speed of the dismissal at the centre: “fired four national-security leaders with immediate effect” — the framing highlighted the sudden, comprehensive change. The public-affairs and left-liberal band (444.hu, Telex, ATV) brought the fact of the dismissal and removal more matter-of-factly, also addressing separately the departure of the AH director-general. The economic band (Portfolio) described the removal of the chiefs of the four services. 444.hu also brought a forward-looking thread: the question of the new professional leadership (Péter Buda, chief adviser Péter Tóth). The difference in framings is instructive: on one side the drama of the change, on the other the process and the professional succession — and MIAK’s reading steps beyond exactly this when it turns the question towards the rules of selection and parliamentary control: not who departs, but by what system the successor arrives and under what control they operate.

6.2 Facts and data

  • By the 12 June 2026 issue of Magyar Közlöny, the Prime Minister dismissed with immediate effect all four chiefs of the large intelligence services, as well as the director-general of the Constitution Protection Office, Szabolcs Bárdos (Magyar Nemzet, 444.hu, Telex, Portfolio, 12 June 2026).
  • The appointment of new professional leadership is under way: Péter Buda is being placed in a position responsible for professional leadership alongside national-security chief adviser Péter Tóth (444.hu, 11 June 2026).
  • The national security services come under the executive power; the dismissal of their chiefs is a decision taken within prime-ministerial/ministerial competence and published in Magyar Közlöny — not a statutory act.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — merit-based, screening-bound leader selection and the appointment order;
  • Defence (background material) — the national-security architecture and civilian, democratic control over the services;
  • Public security and law enforcement (background material) — accountability over special instruments and the principle of depoliticised operation.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Kaufmann: Governance Matters

The authors show, on the data of more than 150 countries, that the quality of governance causally improves development outcomes, and break governance down into six measurable dimensions. Translated to the national-security change of leaders, this means that the yardstick of success is not the political colour of the leaders, but whether the change leads to a measurable improvement in government effectiveness, political stability and accountability — and for that, depoliticised selection and strong democratic control are needed.

„…six aggregate indicators corresponding to six basic governance concepts: voice and accountability, political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and graft. As measured by these indicators, governance matters for development outcomes."

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

6.4.2 John Locke: Second Treatise of Government

Locke interprets political power as a fiduciary trust exercised for the common good: the holder of supreme power is bound to govern by fixed, promulgated rules known to all, not by occasional, arbitrary decisions. Translated to the national security services, this is a direct lesson: the services and their leaders serve the constitutional order and the community’s security, not the interest of whoever is in power — therefore their selection and their control too must rest on fixed, transparent rules, not on political loyalty.

„…whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees…"

📖 Source: John Locke: Second Treatise of Government (Második értekezés a polgári kormányzatról)

6.5 International comparison

The established European models of democratic control over intelligence services — the British, the German or the Scandinavian parliamentary-oversight models — have in common that the services are controlled by strong, multiparty parliamentary committees and independent review bodies, and the selection of leaders is bound to professional criteria and screening. The Venice Commission’s recommendations on oversight of intelligence reinforce the same principle: the legitimacy of control over the services comes from the fact that it is not exclusively in the hands of the executive power. The lesson for the Hungarian transformation is not the copying of a specific model, but the principle: a depoliticised service is sustained by rule-based selection and strengthened democratic control, not by the leader’s political colour.

Public administration and e-government

  • KI7 — Civil-servant selection and rotation system
  • KI6 — Competitive public-service pay system

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 13 June 2026 — topic 7):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters
  • 📖 John Locke: Second Treatise of Government (Második értekezés a polgári kormányzatról)

Note: the books’ local file path does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI7, KI6)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 13 June 2026 — topic 7, score: 74/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Venice Commission recommendations on democratic oversight of intelligence
  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024 — political stability, government effectiveness

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