Part I — Situation overview

On 24 May 2026 the appointments of the 55 state secretaries of the government led by Péter Magyar appeared in the Magyar Közlöny, closing the executive phase of government formation. The portfolios presented their leadership teams one after another: at the head of the Ministry of Defence, Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi introduced the new leadership; at the Ministry of Transport and Investment, Dávid Vitézy designated who would have the task of preparing the new Highway Code; Ervin Nagy is responsible for culture, György Heidl for church affairs, Gábor Tóth for law enforcement. According to the report of 444.hu and HVG, the list includes a former police chief, a corporate senior executive and a former editor-in-chief.

The logic of government formation closes with this step. After the announcement of the ministers and the prime-ministerial oath taken at the inaugural session of 9 May 2026, the second line of the executive, the state-secretary corps, has now been set up — this determines who is responsible for the concrete policy portfolios, from the Highway Code reform through defence cyber-protection to culture financing. The public-law precision matters: state secretaries are appointed by the prime minister, not the President of the Republic — the latter appoints the ministers, on the proposal of the prime minister. In the preceding weeks MIAK followed in several posts the process of ministerial nominations and the partial replacement of administrative state secretaries; the present gazette act is their end point: the entire leadership apparatus assembled at once, formally.

In MIAK’s reading the list of the appointed persons in itself decides nothing yet. The change of era will be real only if the selection was competence-based and conflict-of-interest screened, and if the renewed ministerial structure receives measurable efficiency and bureaucracy-reduction targets. The question, then, is not who the new leaders are, but under what conditions they start work — for the quality of the executive apparatus is decided not on the day of appointment but on the measurable performance of the coming months.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scholarly framework within which the assembly of a leadership corps can be assessed. The work Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (economists, leading authors of institutional economics, who received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2024) is built on the distinction between inclusive and extractive institutions: the inclusive institution broadly shares power and incentives, the extractive one diverts resources to the benefit of a narrow elite — and a country’s lasting performance is decided not by the intent of the leaders but by the nature of the institutions. The executive apparatus — and thus the state-secretary corps — is precisely the point where this difference becomes practice: under merit-based, accountable selection state capacity grows, while under loyalty-based, opaque appointments it slides in an extractive direction. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, the international body analysing and issuing recommendations for the advanced economies) in its fresh Economic Outlook supports this at the macro level: growth and resilience to shocks are stronger where public-administration capacity is predictable and efficient. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that raise the appointment act into a verifiable quality standard.

3.1 Public appointment dossier for every state secretary (within 30 days)

MIAK proposes that for every state-secretary appointment the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office publish, within 30 days, a uniform, public dossier: a professional CV, a published extract of the assets declaration, and a half-page, plain-language statement of tasks and objectives. This is not the stigmatisation of persons but the documentation of the justification of the selection. In the Acemoglu–Robinson frame (see 6.4.1) it is precisely this publicity that makes the institution inclusive: if the citizen can see why this particular leader was chosen for which task, the appointment becomes accountable. MIAK’s KI7 programme point already contains the principle of a pre-appointment “character audit” and assets-proportionality verification — its immediate, public application to the 55 new leaders is the new government’s first credibility test.

3.2 Mandatory conflict-of-interest screening and merit-based justification (within 60 days)

MIAK proposes that every state-secretary appointment undergo a documented conflict-of-interest screening, and that the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office publish, within 60 days, the merit-based justification: what competence, prior achievement or sector experience justified the choice. In the case of the former corporate senior executives and media leaders on the list this is especially important — a leader arriving from the private sector brings valuable expertise, but the transparency of prior business and ownership ties cannot be skipped. This is the common logic of the KI7 official-selection and the KI6 competitive pay-system programme points: talent must be retained, but the price of retention cannot be the sacrifice of transparency.

3.3 Measurable performance target for every new portfolio (as part of the 100-day plan)

MIAK proposes that every state-secretary portfolio receive, at the outset, 2–4 public, measurable performance targets that fit into the 100-day government programme. The Highway Code preparation announced by Dávid Vitézy, for example, will be more than a mere legislative item only if it is tied to a concrete, data-driven target — for example the reduction of traffic accidents or micromobility injuries. This is the essence of the KI3 (bureaucracy reduction, measurably) and the KI8 (Drucker-style efficiency measurement) programme points — the latter building on the achievement-based leadership principles of Peter Drucker (Austrian–American management theorist, one of the founders of modern management science).

The three proposals are bound by a common principle: the appointment is not an end point but the beginning of an accountability cycle. According to the lesson of the Acemoglu–Robinson frame, the quality of the leadership apparatus is guaranteed not by intent but by institutionalised publicity and measurability — and it is precisely these elements that MIAK places around the appointments.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Public administration A more predictable, competence-based leadership corps; faster administration with measurable targets The public dossier can become a bureaucratic burden if it is not simple and templated
Economy Higher public-administration capacity → better use of investment and funds The former interests of private-sector leaders can bring conflicts of interest
Society Growing institutional trust, if the selection is justified and transparent The “loyalty vs. competence” suspicion undermines trust if the screening is absent

The main fault line runs between pace and quality. The new government had to set up a leadership corps quickly so that governance would not stall — but speed cannot come at the expense of transparency. The proposal tips to the risk side if the public dossier and the conflict-of-interest screening become only an after-the-fact, formal exercise, or if the performance targets are formulated so broadly that a year from now nothing can be held to account on them. The model works, by contrast, if the three elements — publicity, screening, measurable target — are built in already at the outset, not retroactively.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested performance indicators — KPIs)

The following performance indicators (KPIs, i.e. indicators that show whether the measure succeeded) are suggested — worth tracking 6–12 months out:

  • Coverage of the public appointment dossier: for what percentage of the 55 state secretaries the CV, the assets-declaration extract and the statement of objectives are publicly available (target: 100%).
  • Average administration time in the renewed portfolios (target: measurable decrease under KI3).
  • The fulfilment rate of the 100-day performance targets per portfolio, with public accountability.
  • The share of appointments that have undergone conflict-of-interest screening (target: 100%, documented).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message is simple: the appointment of the 55 state secretaries is not a closing but an overture — to an accountability cycle. MIAK asks the government to attach to the appointments, immediately, a public dossier, a documented conflict-of-interest screening and measurable performance targets, and asks the public to hold these to account. This approach moves two MIAK foundational values: transparency, because the justification of the selection and the publicity of the assets relations make the exercise of power verifiable, and data-drivenness, because tying the portfolios to measurable targets makes performance — not political loyalty — the measure of leadership work. The credibility of the change of era is decided precisely by whether the new majority is willing to apply to itself the standards it demanded of its predecessors.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the liberal and public-affairs lane 444.hu, Telex and HVG focused primarily on the list and the career paths of the appointees — HVG highlighted the diverse background of “a former police chief, a Henkel boss and a former editor-in-chief”, while Telex presented the qualifications and career paths in a separate piece. In the economic lane Portfolio published the full list, focusing on the concrete portfolio allocation. 24.hu highlighted Dávid Vitézy’s announcement, stressing the new Highway Code preparation task. In the conservative lane Magyar Nemzet highlighted the role of the state secretary responsible for construction and road transport, in the frame of action against speeding.

The framings differed in what they regarded as news value: the liberal–public-affairs lane placed the emphasis on the who question (persons, background), the economic lane on the what question (portfolios, structure), and the conservative lane on the what do they do question (concrete policy tasks). For MIAK it is precisely the fourth question, little emphasised in the press, that is the most essential: under what conditions — with competence screening and a measurable target — they start their work.

6.2 Facts and data

  • 55 state-secretary appointments appeared in the Magyar Közlöny on 24 May 2026.
  • The closing of the executive phase of government formation followed the inaugural session and prime-ministerial oath of 9 May 2026.
  • Hungary’s government-effectiveness indicator is +0.42 according to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 — a modest value to be improved, the improvement of which requires a predictable, competence-based apparatus.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the competence screening of appointments, bureaucracy reduction and performance measurement are the main emphasis;
  • Transport and infrastructure (programme points) — the link between the Vitézy-style Highway Code preparation and micromobility regulation;
  • Culture (background material) — the cultural state secretariat and the transparency of financing;
  • Defence (background material) — the new structure of defence leadership and cyber-protection functions.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Acemoglu and Robinson: Why Nations Fail

The central thesis of Acemoglu and Robinson is that the fate of countries is decided not by the quality of leaders but by the nature of institutions: inclusive institutions broadly share power and incentives, extractive ones divert resources to the benefit of a narrow elite. The authors use the example of the Spanish colonial administration to show how an entire institutional web was built up solely for the purpose of exploitation — “the Spanish created a whole web of institutions in order to exploit the indigenous peoples”, the elements of which “served the goal of pushing the indigenous population’s standard of living down to subsistence”. Translated to the assembly of the Hungarian leadership corps, the lesson is: the appointment apparatus is inclusive if it is merit-based and public; if the selection is loyalty-based and opaque, the institution — regardless of the actors’ intent — slides in an extractive direction. The appointment of the 55 state secretaries therefore matters not in itself but because of the logic of the selection.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

6.4.2 OECD: Economic Outlook — Testing Resilience

The OECD’s fresh assessment confirms the institutional thesis at the macro level: predictable, efficient public-administration capacity is one of the conditions of growth and resilience to shocks. The report frames the 2026 global outlook precisely as a “test of resilience”, and points out that the impact of external shocks — an energy-price jump, supply-chain disruption — is dampened where the state’s executive apparatus is prepared and predictable. The quality of the leadership corps is therefore not merely a domestic-political but also an economic question: high public-administration capacity means better use of investment and funds, and thus greater economic resilience. In this frame, measurable performance is the chief task of the new state-secretary apparatus.

📖 Source: OECD: Economic Outlook — Testing Resilience (2026)

6.5 International comparison

The international patterns of competence-based public-service selection are well documented: in the Singapore model civil-service salaries are tied to the median of key private-sector positions in order to retain talent and prevent corruption — MIAK’s KI6 programme point adopts this logic too. The essence is common to all proven models: leadership selection produces state capacity if merit and performance are the primary criterion, not political reliability.

Public administration and e-government

  • KI7 — Official-selection and rotation system
  • KI6 — Competitive public-service pay system
  • KI3 — Bureaucracy reduction, measurably
  • KI8 — Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration

Transport and infrastructure

  • KO5 — Micromobility and cyclist-friendly development
  • KO2 — Smart traffic management

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 25 May 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail
  • 📖 OECD: Economic Outlook — Testing Resilience (2026)

Note: the visible text of the blog does not show the books’ local file path — only the author and title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not the reader’s.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI7)
  • MIAK policy area: Transport and infrastructure (programme points; programme point ID: KO5)
  • MIAK press monitor, 25 May 2026 — topic 2, score: 88/100

Additional public data sources:

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 — government effectiveness (+0.42)
  • OECD Government at a Glance — public-administration capacity indicators

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